M. Stevens

The accused was charged with importing and possessing child pornography after police intercepted a child sex doll and conducted a controlled delivery to his home, followed by the execution of a search warrant.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging multiple s. 8 breaches.

The court found that while the search warrant was validly issued, the police breached s. 8 by conducting the controlled delivery without judicial authorization, as it exceeded the implied license to knock.

Furthermore, the police deliberately disregarded the search warrant's specific instructions to enter through a south-facing basement door, instead entering through the front door, conducting a safety search of the entire multi-unit home, and searching the garage.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the evidence, emphasizing the need to dissociate from the police's deliberate disregard for the limits of their search warrant authority.

The applicant, charged with robbery and firearms offences, brought an application to exclude fingerprint evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The police identified the applicant by matching a fingerprint left at the crime scene to fingerprints stored in the RCMP's AFIS database from when the applicant was a young person.

The court found that the statutory access period for the youth records had expired, and the RCMP unlawfully retained the fingerprints in violation of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

This constituted a breach of the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the RCMP's failure to destroy the records was a serious violation that circumvented Parliament's clear intent, and admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The fingerprint evidence was excluded.

The accused was on trial for sexual assault and threatening death.

The complainant testified through a Punjabi interpreter.

During the trial, it became evident that the complainant was capable of testifying in English.

The court noted that the right to an interpreter under s. 14 of the Charter requires a necessity criterion to be met.

Because the use of an interpreter materially interfered with the court's ability to make credibility determinations, and the trial was still in its early stages, the court declared a mistrial so the complainant could testify in English with a stand-by interpreter.