L. Saunders

The court sentenced James William Schwalm to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 20 years after he pleaded guilty to the second degree murder of his wife, Ashley Schwalm.

The decision details the planning and execution of the murder, the subsequent cover-up, and the devastating impact on the victim’s family and children.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including the calculated nature of the offence, the absence of prior criminal record, and the guilty plea, ultimately finding that a parole ineligibility period above the usual range for intimate partner homicides was warranted.

Following guilty pleas to sexual interference, making an arrangement by telecommunication to commit a specified sexual offence against a child, breaching a prohibition order, and breaching probation, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation.

The offender consented to designation but argued for a shorter determinate sentence and enhanced pre-sentence custody credit.

Applying the dangerous offender framework, the court found the statutory criteria met beyond a reasonable doubt and concluded that the offender posed a high likelihood of harmful recidivism, but that a determinate penitentiary sentence combined with a 10-year long-term supervision order would adequately protect the public.

An eight-year sentence was imposed on the predicate offences, with 41 months of pre-sentence custody enhanced to 46 months, together with extensive ancillary orders.

The court sentenced an Indigenous offender who pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and making available child pornography after police found a very large collection of highly graphic child sexual abuse material and evidence of online sharing.

Applying the statutory sentencing principles, the court held that denunciation and general deterrence were primary, and specific deterrence was also significant given the offender's prior sexual offence record, diagnosed paraphilic disorder, elevated risk of sexual recidivism, and limited insight.

The court considered Gladue and Ipeelee factors, including intergenerational trauma and community circumstances, but found they did not substantially reduce moral blameworthiness or justify a non-penitentiary or materially shorter custodial sentence.

A sentence of three years and 10 months on the making available count and three years and four months concurrent on the possession count was imposed, together with DNA, lifetime SOIRA, lifetime s. 161 prohibitions, and forfeiture.

The offender pleaded guilty to the second-degree murder of his wife, whom he stabbed while she was in bed.

The court considered the offender's history of domestic violence against the victim, his mental health issues, and his guilty plea.

Applying the criteria under section 745.4 of the Criminal Code, the court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of 15 years.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of trafficking in fentanyl and two counts of using a forged document.

She participated in a scheme where she used fraudulent prescriptions to obtain fentanyl patches from a pharmacy, which she then gave to a co-conspirator for financial gain.

The court considered the extreme danger of fentanyl, the offender's role as a low-level participant, her guilty plea, and her status as a first-time offender.

The court sentenced the offender to 26 months in jail concurrent on all counts, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The accused, a 22-year-old Indigenous first offender, pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm against a young Indigenous woman while both were highly intoxicated.

The Crown sought a six-month custodial sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

Applying Gladue principles and considering the accused's significant rehabilitative efforts, community support, and the systemic factors outlined in his Gladue report, the court concluded that a custodial sentence was not necessary.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years of probation.

Jayme Syring pleaded guilty to four counts of impaired care or control causing bodily harm and one count of failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

The offences stemmed from a single-vehicle rollover where Syring, impaired by alcohol, injured his common-law spouse and her three young children, who were not properly secured, and then fled the scene.

The court considered aggravating factors including the serious nature of the offences, the abandonment of injured victims, Syring's lengthy criminal record, and his substance abuse issues.

Mitigating factors included his guilty plea, remorse, and initial steps towards addressing his addiction.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for drinking and driving offences causing bodily harm.

A penitentiary sentence of two years and two months was imposed after credit for pre-sentence custody, along with a three-year driving prohibition and a DNA order.

The offender was convicted by a jury of impaired operation causing death and criminal negligence causing death after driving his truck into a concrete median while highly intoxicated, unlicensed, and uninsured.

Following the collision, the offender engaged in egregious post-offence conduct by moving the deceased passenger's body to the driver's seat and repeatedly lying to police and medical staff to deflect blame.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing the offender to 9 years in the penitentiary and imposing a 12-year driving prohibition.

A young person charged with criminal harassment, mischief, and two counts of assault sought to apply to a youth justice court judge for release on modified terms, having been released on conditions by a Justice of the Peace.

The Crown argued the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the application, contending that section 33(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act implicitly restricted such applications to cases where the young person had been detained.

The court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the application de novo, finding that young persons must have access to ongoing review of bail conditions consistent with the principle of enhanced procedural protection and the constitutional right to reasonable bail.

Following sentencing for offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court addressed the Crown’s request for forfeiture of property seized in connection with the offence, including cash, a cellular phone, and a motor vehicle.

The offender contested only the forfeiture of the vehicle.

The court found the circumstances materially similar to those considered in persuasive appellate authority and concluded that forfeiture was appropriate under s. 16 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The vehicle was therefore ordered forfeited along with the other seized items.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample to an approved roadside screening device under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the trial judge improperly relied on his silence to reject his credibility and erred in finding the police had articulable cause to stop his vehicle for suspected distracted driving.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge impermissibly linked the appellant’s pre‑trial silence to credibility findings, contrary to established appellate authority.

The court also found that the police lacked objectively discernible facts establishing articulable cause for the traffic stop, rendering the detention arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter.

Given the Charter breach and resulting investigative opportunity for unrelated offences, the court vacated the conviction and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for flight from a peace officer under s. 249.1 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the trial judge reached an unreasonable verdict by failing to properly consider his evidence denying criminal intent and by failing to address a defence of reasonable excuse.

The appellate court held that the only available defence raised by the evidence was absence of mens rea, as the record contained no evidence supporting a reasonable excuse.

The court found that the trial judge correctly understood that the Crown was required to prove an intention to evade police beyond a reasonable doubt and reasonably rejected the appellant’s testimony as contradictory and fabricated.

The trial judge’s credibility findings and conclusions were supported by the evidentiary record.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired care or control and care or control over 80 arising from erratic driving and subsequent breath tests showing a blood alcohol concentration of 210 mg/100 ml.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence relating to possible bolus drinking, failed to consider cocaine use as an alternative explanation for impairment, erred in upholding a strip search as lawful, and incorrectly found that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly considered the totality of the evidence and reasonably rejected the bolus drinking theory based on witness observations and expert evidence.

It also held that there was no evidentiary basis to infer cocaine ingestion, that the strip search complied substantially with the principles in R. v. Golden, and that the police acted reasonably in obtaining breath samples.

No legal or factual error warranting appellate intervention was found.

Sentencing following conviction after a non‑jury trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, possession of cocaine, and possession of property obtained by crime under $5,000.

Police executing a search warrant at a motel room seized 11.18 grams of crack cocaine, 3.21 grams of cocaine, digital scales, a debt list, and cash.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record for drug trafficking offences spanning decades and had served multiple prior custodial sentences.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for trafficking in crack cocaine while considering mitigating factors including a difficult personal background and relatively small quantities of drugs.

Enhanced credit for pre‑trial custody under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code was denied because the offender’s remand detention arose from other charges.

A custodial sentence was imposed with credit for time served.

The applicant, charged with drug offences, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at his motel room.

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) was deficient, the no-knock entry was unreasonable, and his rights were breached when he was questioned before being advised of his right to counsel.

The court found the ITO established reasonable grounds based on corroborated confidential informant tips, and the no-knock entry was justified by exigent circumstances.

While the pre-caution questioning breached the applicant's rights, the court applied the Grant framework and concluded the physical evidence should not be excluded, as society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits outweighed the fleeting breach.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of cocaine, and possession of property obtained by crime under $5,000 following execution of a search warrant at a motel unit.

Police located crack cocaine and cocaine packaged in multiple baggies, a digital scale with cocaine residue, numerous small baggies, debt lists, multiple cell phones, and over $1,500 in small-denomination currency.

The accused was the sole occupant of the small, cluttered motel unit and his vehicle was parked outside throughout police surveillance.

The court held that constructive possession was established based on circumstantial evidence demonstrating knowledge and control over the drugs.

Considering the packaging, paraphernalia, expert evidence on trafficking indicators, and cash denominations, the court concluded the drugs were possessed for the purpose of trafficking and that the currency represented proceeds of crime.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm and drug offences following his arrest while driving with a loaded prohibited firearm and marijuana.

At a bail hearing, the justice of the peace endorsed the information under s. 515(9.1) of the Criminal Code based on the accused's prior criminal record, restricting pre-sentence custody credit to 1:1.

Following conviction on all counts, the accused challenged the constitutionality of s. 719(3.1), which removes sentencing discretion regarding enhanced pre-sentence custody credit when a bail justice has made a s. 515(9.1) endorsement.

The court found the impugned provision violated s. 7 of the Charter and declared it of no force and effect.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6 years imprisonment with 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicants sought an order for costs against the Crown following a stay of criminal charges for breach of their Charter s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

They argued that costs were justified due to late and illegible disclosure, alleged misconduct by the investigating officer, and alleged failures by the Crown in addressing inaccurate evidence given by a police witness.

The court reviewed the governing principles that costs may be awarded in criminal proceedings only for Crown misconduct or in other exceptional circumstances where fairness requires relief.

The court found that disclosure problems were attributable to the investigating officer and police administration rather than the Crown, and that the Crown neither participated in nor knowingly tolerated misconduct.

The court further held that the circumstances were not exceptional enough to justify a Charter remedy of costs.