Indy Kandola

The accused was charged with breaching a condition of his Long-Term Supervision Order that required him to immediately report any changes in his relationships.

He received a text message from a previous victim and replied that he needed to ask his parole officer if they could communicate, which he did the next day.

The Crown alleged this constituted a failure to report "immediately." The Court found the actus reus was met as the status of the relationship had changed and reporting was not immediate.

However, the Court held the Crown failed to prove the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, as the accused believed he had put any change on hold awaiting permission.

The accused was found not guilty.

Following a jury conviction for two counts of sexual interference, the court sentenced the offender for repeated sexual abuse of two young children committed over several years while standing in positions of parental and grandparental trust.

Applying the principles in child-sexual-offence sentencing, the court emphasized denunciation, deterrence, profound actual and foreseeable harm, the abuse of trust, the multiplicity of incidents, and the vulnerability of the victims.

The court held that consecutive sentences were required because the offences involved two separate victims, but applied totality to fix an overall fit sentence of nine years' imprisonment.

Ancillary orders including no-contact, child-protection, SOIRA, DNA, and weapons prohibition orders were also imposed.

The defendant, Jefferson Dance, was charged with dangerous driving causing death and impaired driving causing death following a high-speed rear-end collision in Wasaga Beach that killed the other driver.

The Crown presented evidence that the defendant was driving a Tesla Model Y at speeds up to 196 km/h in a 50 km/h zone with a blood-alcohol concentration nearly four times the legal limit.

The defense argued that the collision was caused by an intervening mechanical defect in the Tesla causing sudden unintended acceleration, but failed to introduce admissible evidence to support this theory.

The court rejected the defense's arguments, finding that the defendant's extreme speed and high level of intoxication constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person.

Ultimately, the court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving causing death.

The court sentenced Milton Urgiles to five years' imprisonment for criminal negligence causing death, following the fatal crash of a commercial truck with unroadworthy tires.

The decision reviews the facts, victim impact, aggravating and mitigating factors, and relevant sentencing principles and authorities, emphasizing the high degree of moral blameworthiness and the need for denunciation and deterrence in workplace safety offences.

The accused, a supervisor at an excavating company, was charged with criminal negligence causing death after a driver was killed in a dump truck collision.

The collision occurred when the truck's front left tire, which was severely worn and bald, exploded.

The day before the collision, the driver had texted the accused about a steering issue, but the accused failed to have the truck inspected by a mechanic and directed the driver to continue operating it.

The court found that the accused had the authority to direct the driver's work, failed to take reasonable steps to prevent bodily harm, and showed a wanton and reckless disregard for the driver's life.

The accused was found guilty.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter and trafficking in cocaine and fentanyl after selling drugs to a vulnerable individual who subsequently died of a fentanyl overdose.

The Crown sought a 12-year sentence, while the defence argued for 4 to 6 years.

The court emphasized the extreme danger of fentanyl and the need for denunciation and deterrence, rejecting the argument that the victim's autonomous choice to ingest the drugs mitigated the offender's moral blameworthiness.

The court imposed a global sentence of 8 years in prison, comprising 8 years for manslaughter, 30 months concurrent for fentanyl trafficking, and 1 year concurrent for cocaine trafficking.

This criminal trial concerned George Brazier, who faced charges of manslaughter and three counts of trafficking in controlled substances (fentanyl, heroin, and cocaine).

The Crown alleged that Brazier sold fentanyl and cocaine to James Glover, who subsequently died from a fentanyl overdose.

The court found Brazier guilty of trafficking fentanyl and cocaine, and of unlawful act manslaughter, concluding that his conduct in supplying the fentanyl significantly contributed to Glover's death and was objectively dangerous.

The charge of trafficking heroin was acquitted due to insufficient evidence.

The Crown applied under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code to adduce the preliminary inquiry testimony of a key witness who was deemed too ill to testify at trial due to severe mental health challenges triggered by her previous testimony.

The accused opposed the application, arguing lack of full opportunity to cross-examine and trial unfairness due to new evidence.

The court found the witness was too ill to testify, the defence had a full opportunity to cross-examine her at the preliminary inquiry, and the admission of the evidence would not render the trial unfair.

The application was granted, and the transcripts were admitted as substantive evidence.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and drug trafficking, brought an O'Connor application seeking production of a key Crown witness's psychiatric hospital records.

The Crown had previously applied under s. 715 of the Criminal Code to admit the witness's preliminary hearing testimony, arguing she was presently too mentally ill to testify at trial.

The defence argued the hospital records were likely relevant to assessing her mental health before the preliminary hearing.

The court dismissed the application at the first stage, finding the records from early 2020 were too remote to be likely relevant to her present state of health or to whether the preliminary hearing triggered her recent mental health decline.

During a trial for drug trafficking and manslaughter, the Crown brought an O'Connor application to disclose the medical records of a fragile witness.

The Crown sought to adduce the witness's preliminary hearing transcript in lieu of oral testimony.

The court applied the two-stage O'Connor procedure to the second tranche of subpoenaed medical records.

Finding the records relevant to the witness's ability to testify, the court ordered the disclosure of the psychiatric assessment portions with appropriate redactions to protect the witness's privacy.

The Crown brought an O'Connor application to obtain the medical records of a key witness who claimed she was medically unstable to testify at the accused's trial for drug trafficking and manslaughter.

The court found the stage one threshold was easily met, as the records were likely relevant to the witness's mental health and ability to testify.

After reviewing the first tranche of records at stage two, the court ordered the release of relevant portions to counsel, subject to redactions for non-relevant personal and medical information, balancing the public interest in the search for truth against the witness's privacy interests.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of a statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for drug trafficking and manslaughter.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary because police failed to record their interactions with the accused from the time of his arrest until the formal interview, relying on R. v. Moore-McFarlane.

The court distinguished Moore-McFarlane, finding the uncontradicted testimony of the police officers credible and reliable.

The court concluded there were no threats, promises, or oppressive circumstances, and the accused's minor injury during arrest did not affect his operating mind.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

The Crown sought to qualify an OPP officer as an expert witness to interpret coded text messages and provide context on the illicit drug trade in a trial for drug trafficking and manslaughter.

The defence did not contest the admissibility of the evidence but reserved the right to cross-examine on potential bias.

The court applied the Mohan and White Burgess frameworks, finding the proposed evidence logically relevant, necessary, and the officer properly qualified.

The officer was qualified to provide opinion evidence on the indicia of trafficking, street values of drugs, and the interpretation of coded language.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and trafficking following a fatal drug overdose, brought an O'Connor application seeking third-party records, including cell phone records and mental health treatment records of the deceased and a key Crown witness.

The court found that the mental health records did not meet the likely relevance threshold, as the request relied on stereotypical assumptions about drug users and mental illness rather than case-specific evidence.

The application for the cell phone records of the witness's mother was granted to proceed to the second stage of the O'Connor analysis, while the remaining requests were dismissed.

This ruling addresses six substantive pre-charge issues in a manslaughter jury trial.

The court decided to leave the defence of consent to fight with the jury for the accused Zenczuk, but excluded evidence of his post-offence laughter as it lacked probative value and carried high prejudice.

For accused Clare, the court declined to instruct the jury on aiding or on s. 21(2) liability due to insufficient evidence of a common intention to commit a group assault.

The court also clarified the instruction regarding the inference of encouraging words uttered by Clare and limited the admissibility of the victim's criminal record to only the most recent assault conviction, deeming older convictions too remote to be probative of current disposition.

This ruling addresses the appropriate jury instruction when directed verdicts of acquittal and stays of proceedings are granted against some, but not all, defendants in a joint criminal trial.

The court considered arguments from defence counsel, who sought to withhold reasons for the defendants' departure, and the Crown, who advocated for instructions consistent with R. v. Rowbotham.

The judge decided to instruct the jury on the directed verdicts and stays, have the Crown enter stays in the jury's presence, and provide a cautionary instruction to prevent speculation and ensure individual assessment of guilt for the remaining defendants.

This decision provides supplemental reasons for directed verdict applications in a criminal trial involving charges of manslaughter, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought to rely on s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code to establish liability for manslaughter against all defendants, clarifying a previous misunderstanding of their position.

The court, however, found that even with the application of s. 21(2), there was insufficient evidence to establish a common intention among the defendants to commit a group assault on the pedestrians, which is a prerequisite for extended liability under s. 21(2).

Consequently, the earlier directed verdicts of acquittal for manslaughter against two defendants and assault causing bodily harm against two others remained undisturbed.

The court ruled on directed verdict applications for four defendants charged with manslaughter, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm following a fatal altercation.

The judge dismissed the assault with a weapon charge for all defendants due to insufficient evidence.

Manslaughter charges were dismissed for two defendants (Ampadu and Paniccia) but proceeded for two others (Clare and Zenczuk).

Assault causing bodily harm charges proceeded for two defendants (Ampadu and Paniccia) but were dismissed for the other two (Clare and Zenczuk).

The court found insufficient evidence for a common intention to attack all pedestrians, requiring individual assessment of party liability.

The defendant, on trial for manslaughter and assault charges, had his bail revoked when his father withdrew as surety.

A bail hearing was held to determine new release conditions.

The court found the Crown established a safety risk and likelihood of re-offence, necessitating a surety release.

The defendant proposed his mother as surety.

The court ultimately released the defendant on a $25,000 recognizance with his mother as surety, imposing house arrest and other conditions, but removing the electronic monitoring ankle bracelet.

The electronic monitoring condition was deemed constitutionally non-compliant due to its imposition without an opportunity to be heard, its unaffordable cost, and the significant emotional toll it placed on the family.

The defendant, facing serious charges including manslaughter, had his bail revoked after his father withdrew as surety.

The court conducted a fresh bail hearing, determining that the original recognizance was vacated and a new de novo hearing was required, with the Crown bearing the onus.

Given the defendant's history of breaching bail conditions and committing further serious offenses, the court found that an unconditional undertaking or less stringent conditions were insufficient.

A surety release was deemed necessary to address public safety concerns and the substantial likelihood of re-offence.

The matter was adjourned to determine adequate sureties and further conditions.