Anthony Michael Bugo

The applicant brought a motion before the Court of Appeal.

Due to a non-publication order imposed at the bail hearing under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, as well as publication bans under s. 110 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code, the court's decision contains protected information.

Consequently, the full decision is withheld from online publication until the order ceases to be in effect, though it remains available at the court registry.

Following convictions after a judge-alone trial for sexual assault, uttering threats, arson, and break and enter arising from intimate-partner violence incidents, the court determined a fit custodial sentence by balancing denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and totality.

The court rejected a conditional sentence despite substantial post-offence rehabilitation and sobriety efforts, emphasizing the gravity of the sexual assault and intentional fire-setting.

The court imposed consecutive and concurrent terms, reduced the aggregate sentence under totality, and further reduced it for restrictive bail conditions in part.

The court declined to impose a Sex Offender Information Registration Act order under s. 490.012(3), finding it unnecessary on the facts.

The accused was charged with nine counts arising from two discrete incidents in May and June 2019 involving his former partner.

The Crown conceded two counts.

The court found the accused guilty of uttering threats (two counts), sexual assault, arson, and break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The court acquitted on assault, break and enter with intent (May incident), uttering threats (June incident), and escape from lawful custody.

The defence of automatism based on substance abuse was rejected, as the court found the accused retained sufficient capacity to form the necessary intent for the offences.

The Crown sought to admit a statement given by the accused to police following his arrest for assault, uttering threats, and related offences.

The defence opposed admission, arguing the statement was involuntary and that various Charter breaches occurred, including violations of sections 10(a), 10(b), and 7.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the statement.

The court found that the statement was voluntary and that while two technical Charter violations occurred (failure to inform the accused of all charges at the initial arrest and providing an incorrect charge description at the second arrest), these breaches were remedied before the statement was taken through a "fresh start." The court admitted the statement.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The anticipated total delay was approximately 17.6 months, which fell under the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The court deducted 48 days of defence delay because the defence declined earlier trial dates offered by the Crown.

The net delay was calculated at 16 months.

The court found that the case did not take markedly longer than it reasonably should have, and the defence failed to take meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings, such as scheduling a judicial pre-trial to address late disclosure.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, Ricardo Davidson, sought release on a recognizance with house arrest terms after being in custody since July 30, 2019, facing multiple charges including sex trafficking, firearm possession, threatening, and assault.

This was his first bail hearing, and it was a reverse onus case.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Davidson failed to demonstrate that his continued detention was not justified on secondary and tertiary grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code.

The proposed release plan with a surety was deemed insufficient to mitigate the substantial likelihood of re-offending or interfering with justice, given the gravity of the charges, the strength of the Crown's case, and the accused's criminal record.

The court also addressed and dismissed arguments regarding pre-trial delay due to a joint trial and the risk of COVID-19 in detention.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, sought an order permitting the admission of evidence of extrinsic sexual abuse of the complainant.

The applicant challenged the constitutional validity of sections 278.93 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the statutory procedure for determining admissibility of extrinsic sexual history and private records compels disclosure of defence evidence and strategy in advance of trial, breaching sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The applicant also contended that granting the complainant standing on the admissibility voir dire creates an appearance of unfairness.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory provisions can be applied in a manner consistent with the principle against self-incrimination, the right to a fair trial, and the complainant's rights to privacy and equality, provided that applications under section 278.93 are brought during cross-examination of the complainant rather than as pre-trial motions.

This ruling addresses six substantive pre-charge issues in a manslaughter jury trial.

The court decided to leave the defence of consent to fight with the jury for the accused Zenczuk, but excluded evidence of his post-offence laughter as it lacked probative value and carried high prejudice.

For accused Clare, the court declined to instruct the jury on aiding or on s. 21(2) liability due to insufficient evidence of a common intention to commit a group assault.

The court also clarified the instruction regarding the inference of encouraging words uttered by Clare and limited the admissibility of the victim's criminal record to only the most recent assault conviction, deeming older convictions too remote to be probative of current disposition.

This ruling addresses the appropriate jury instruction when directed verdicts of acquittal and stays of proceedings are granted against some, but not all, defendants in a joint criminal trial.

The court considered arguments from defence counsel, who sought to withhold reasons for the defendants' departure, and the Crown, who advocated for instructions consistent with R. v. Rowbotham.

The judge decided to instruct the jury on the directed verdicts and stays, have the Crown enter stays in the jury's presence, and provide a cautionary instruction to prevent speculation and ensure individual assessment of guilt for the remaining defendants.

This decision provides supplemental reasons for directed verdict applications in a criminal trial involving charges of manslaughter, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought to rely on s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code to establish liability for manslaughter against all defendants, clarifying a previous misunderstanding of their position.

The court, however, found that even with the application of s. 21(2), there was insufficient evidence to establish a common intention among the defendants to commit a group assault on the pedestrians, which is a prerequisite for extended liability under s. 21(2).

Consequently, the earlier directed verdicts of acquittal for manslaughter against two defendants and assault causing bodily harm against two others remained undisturbed.

The court ruled on directed verdict applications for four defendants charged with manslaughter, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm following a fatal altercation.

The judge dismissed the assault with a weapon charge for all defendants due to insufficient evidence.

Manslaughter charges were dismissed for two defendants (Ampadu and Paniccia) but proceeded for two others (Clare and Zenczuk).

Assault causing bodily harm charges proceeded for two defendants (Ampadu and Paniccia) but were dismissed for the other two (Clare and Zenczuk).

The court found insufficient evidence for a common intention to attack all pedestrians, requiring individual assessment of party liability.

The defendants, jointly charged with manslaughter and assault, brought a motion seeking further disclosure from the Crown.

The applications concerned two areas: notes taken by police officers during witness preparation meetings with the Crown, and materials the Crown intended to use to cross-examine a proposed defence expert witness (a toxicologist) on the issue of bias.

The Crown opposed both applications, arguing that the notes contained no new relevant information and were subject to litigation privilege, and that the expert's prior testimony transcript was a matter of public record and not part of the "fruits of the investigation." The court ruled that the Crown was obliged to disclose both the officers' notes, finding them relevant and not privileged, and the transcript of the expert's prior evidence, as it related to the expert's impartiality and the accused's constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

The court emphasized the Crown's role as a minister of justice, prioritizing the proper administration of justice over tactical litigation advantages.

The request for "will-say" statements from officers who did not take notes was denied, as it would amount to creating evidence rather than disclosing existing material.

The Crown sought to exclude cell phone copies of surveillance video in a manslaughter trial, arguing they were unreliable due to unexplained differences from the original and violated the best evidence rule.

The defence contended the cell phone copies offered superior clarity and had been used without objection in a prior mistrial.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the cell phone copies met the threshold for reliability, provided the clearest images, and thus satisfied a common sense application of the best evidence rule, emphasizing that "original" does not always mean "better" in terms of evidence quality.

The Crown brought an application to relitigate two prior evidentiary rulings made during an initial trial that ended in a mistrial.

The rulings concerned the admissibility of a witness's statement and the scope of cross-examination regarding an alleged attempt to influence testimony.

Applying s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code and the "interests of justice" factors from R. v. Victoria, the court found that the prior rulings were not clearly wrong and that no new evidence or arguments were presented to justify relitigation.

The application was dismissed, affirming the binding nature of the previous evidentiary decisions for the re-trial.

The defendant, Diego Alcaraz, was charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after stabbing his boyfriend, David Valencia, during a domestic dispute.

The central issue at trial was whether Alcaraz acted in self-defence.

The court considered the conflicting testimonies of Alcaraz and Valencia, Alcaraz's immediate 911 calls, and a toxicology report for Valencia.

The court found Alcaraz's account of Valencia's escalating jealousy and physical aggression more plausible, supported by Valencia's own admissions and the consistency of Alcaraz's statements with the physical evidence.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Alcaraz did not have reasonable grounds to believe force was being used against him or that he did not stab Valencia for self-protection.

Alcaraz was acquitted of both charges.

The accused, E.I., was charged with sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The forcible confinement charge was withdrawn during the trial.

The central issue was whether the complainant, D.H.-G., consented to the sexual activity.

The court found D.H.-G.'s evidence lacked credibility and reliability due to numerous contradictions and inconsistencies between her trial testimony, police statement, and preliminary inquiry evidence, as well as contradictions from the Crown's supporting witness.

The Crown failed to disprove consent beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal for the accused on the sexual assault charge.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving his spouse's 12-year-old niece, JW.

The incident occurred during a family visit, where JW alleged the defendant lightly touched her breast and she later observed him making "jerking movements" in his groin area.

The defendant testified he was attempting to wake JW to move her from an uncomfortable sleeping arrangement and denied any intentional sexual touching, suggesting the breast contact was accidental while reaching for her shoulder.

The court applied the R v W(D) test for conflicting evidence and the R v Chase factors for sexual assault.

The judge found both witnesses credible but concluded that the touching was likely accidental and lacked sexual connotation or aggression.

The Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with luring a child by means of computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment, triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of one year imprisonment.

The court conducted a Charter challenge to the constitutionality of subsections (3) and (4) of section 172.1, finding subsection (3) unconstitutional but subsection (4) constitutionally valid.

The accused was convicted based on his failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the online interlocutor, who was actually an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old.

The court then addressed the accused's Charter challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence under section 12 of the Charter, finding it grossly disproportionate to the circumstances of the offence and the offender's personal characteristics.

The applicant was charged with luring a child by means of a computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of the combined operation of subsections 172.1(3) and 172.1(4).

Subsection (3) creates a presumption that a representation of being underage constitutes proof of the accused's belief in that age, rebuttable only by evidence to the contrary.

Subsection (4) provides that honest belief in legal age is not a defence unless the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain the person's age.

The applicant argued these provisions violated section 7 (fundamental justice) and section 11(d) (presumption of innocence) of the Charter.

The court found the presumption in subsection (3) unconstitutional as applied in concert with subsection (4), as it could compel conviction despite reasonable doubt about the accused's belief.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether Ms. Kathleen Hao, a conditionally accredited Tagalog interpreter, was qualified to provide interpretation assistance for the defendant's trial on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Crown sought to qualify Ms. Hao for simultaneous interpretation, alternatively for consecutive interpretation.

The defence opposed qualification on both grounds, arguing that her conditional accreditation status and occasional use of English words rendered her unqualified.

The court found Ms. Hao not qualified for simultaneous interpretation but qualified for consecutive interpretation, based on her passing score in consecutive interpretation on the MAG test, combined with her background, training, and courtroom experience.