Frederick Temple

Peter Vanderveen, charged with first-degree murder, applied for bail pending trial.

The Crown opposed release solely on the tertiary ground (public confidence in the administration of justice), conceding no primary or secondary ground concerns due to a robust surety plan including electronic monitoring.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. St-Cloud and R. v. Antic, assessed the strength of the Crown's case (weak for first-degree murder, arguable for second-degree, strong for manslaughter), the gravity of the offence, the circumstances of the commission, and the potential sentence.

Considering Vanderveen's age, community ties, minor criminal record, remorseful statement, and the comprehensive release plan, the court found that a reasonable, informed person would not lose confidence in the administration of justice by granting bail.

The application was granted, and Vanderveen was released on a $100,000 recognizance with three sureties and restrictive conditions.

This ruling addresses six substantive pre-charge issues in a manslaughter jury trial.

The court decided to leave the defence of consent to fight with the jury for the accused Zenczuk, but excluded evidence of his post-offence laughter as it lacked probative value and carried high prejudice.

For accused Clare, the court declined to instruct the jury on aiding or on s. 21(2) liability due to insufficient evidence of a common intention to commit a group assault.

The court also clarified the instruction regarding the inference of encouraging words uttered by Clare and limited the admissibility of the victim's criminal record to only the most recent assault conviction, deeming older convictions too remote to be probative of current disposition.

This ruling addresses the appropriate jury instruction when directed verdicts of acquittal and stays of proceedings are granted against some, but not all, defendants in a joint criminal trial.

The court considered arguments from defence counsel, who sought to withhold reasons for the defendants' departure, and the Crown, who advocated for instructions consistent with R. v. Rowbotham.

The judge decided to instruct the jury on the directed verdicts and stays, have the Crown enter stays in the jury's presence, and provide a cautionary instruction to prevent speculation and ensure individual assessment of guilt for the remaining defendants.

This decision provides supplemental reasons for directed verdict applications in a criminal trial involving charges of manslaughter, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought to rely on s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code to establish liability for manslaughter against all defendants, clarifying a previous misunderstanding of their position.

The court, however, found that even with the application of s. 21(2), there was insufficient evidence to establish a common intention among the defendants to commit a group assault on the pedestrians, which is a prerequisite for extended liability under s. 21(2).

Consequently, the earlier directed verdicts of acquittal for manslaughter against two defendants and assault causing bodily harm against two others remained undisturbed.

The court ruled on directed verdict applications for four defendants charged with manslaughter, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm following a fatal altercation.

The judge dismissed the assault with a weapon charge for all defendants due to insufficient evidence.

Manslaughter charges were dismissed for two defendants (Ampadu and Paniccia) but proceeded for two others (Clare and Zenczuk).

Assault causing bodily harm charges proceeded for two defendants (Ampadu and Paniccia) but were dismissed for the other two (Clare and Zenczuk).

The court found insufficient evidence for a common intention to attack all pedestrians, requiring individual assessment of party liability.

The defendant, on trial for manslaughter and assault charges, had his bail revoked when his father withdrew as surety.

A bail hearing was held to determine new release conditions.

The court found the Crown established a safety risk and likelihood of re-offence, necessitating a surety release.

The defendant proposed his mother as surety.

The court ultimately released the defendant on a $25,000 recognizance with his mother as surety, imposing house arrest and other conditions, but removing the electronic monitoring ankle bracelet.

The electronic monitoring condition was deemed constitutionally non-compliant due to its imposition without an opportunity to be heard, its unaffordable cost, and the significant emotional toll it placed on the family.

The defendant, facing serious charges including manslaughter, had his bail revoked after his father withdrew as surety.

The court conducted a fresh bail hearing, determining that the original recognizance was vacated and a new de novo hearing was required, with the Crown bearing the onus.

Given the defendant's history of breaching bail conditions and committing further serious offenses, the court found that an unconditional undertaking or less stringent conditions were insufficient.

A surety release was deemed necessary to address public safety concerns and the substantial likelihood of re-offence.

The matter was adjourned to determine adequate sureties and further conditions.

The defendants, jointly charged with manslaughter and assault, brought a motion seeking further disclosure from the Crown.

The applications concerned two areas: notes taken by police officers during witness preparation meetings with the Crown, and materials the Crown intended to use to cross-examine a proposed defence expert witness (a toxicologist) on the issue of bias.

The Crown opposed both applications, arguing that the notes contained no new relevant information and were subject to litigation privilege, and that the expert's prior testimony transcript was a matter of public record and not part of the "fruits of the investigation." The court ruled that the Crown was obliged to disclose both the officers' notes, finding them relevant and not privileged, and the transcript of the expert's prior evidence, as it related to the expert's impartiality and the accused's constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

The court emphasized the Crown's role as a minister of justice, prioritizing the proper administration of justice over tactical litigation advantages.

The request for "will-say" statements from officers who did not take notes was denied, as it would amount to creating evidence rather than disclosing existing material.

The Crown sought to exclude cell phone copies of surveillance video in a manslaughter trial, arguing they were unreliable due to unexplained differences from the original and violated the best evidence rule.

The defence contended the cell phone copies offered superior clarity and had been used without objection in a prior mistrial.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the cell phone copies met the threshold for reliability, provided the clearest images, and thus satisfied a common sense application of the best evidence rule, emphasizing that "original" does not always mean "better" in terms of evidence quality.

Warren Mann was found guilty of attempted murder and aggravated assault.

The court imposed a life sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the extreme brutality of the attack, the severe and permanent injuries inflicted on the victim, and the domestic-like context of the violence.

The court rejected arguments for a reduced sentence based on the offender's mild depression or adjustment disorder, finding these insufficient to mitigate responsibility for a crime of this magnitude.

The offender's lack of prior record was the sole mitigating factor.