Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: 19-075-00BR DATE: 20190610 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – PETER VANDERVEEN Applicant

Counsel: Frederick Temple, for the Crown Bernard Cugelman, for the Defendant

HEARD: May 28, 2019

RULING ON BAIL APPLICATION

DI LUCA J. :

[1] The Applicant, Peter Vanderveen, is charged with first degree murder of William Lackey, who he shot in the head with a small calibre rifle on January 30, 2019.

[2] He applies for bail pending trial and proposes a significant surety release plan, including electronic monitoring.

[3] The Crown opposes release on the tertiary ground only. The Crown agrees that Mr. Vanderveen presents no primary or secondary ground concerns in view of the proposed release plan.

[4] For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that Mr. Vanderveen should be admitted to bail.

The Evidentiary Record on this Application

[5] In support of this application, Mr. Vanderveen filed his own affidavit as well as affidavits on behalf of his proposed sureties; Colleen Rankin-Walker, Dennis Johnston and Karen Mason. The Crown elected not to cross-examine any of the affiants.

[6] I also received a number of letters in support from friends, colleagues and community members who know Mr. Vanderveen. These letters were initially attached as an exhibit to Ms. Rankin-Walker’s affidavit, but the originals and one additional letter in support were filed at the hearing. Lastly, I heard very brief viva voce evidence from the proposed surety, Ms. Mason, who is the mother of the deceased’s girlfriend.

[7] On May 31, 2019, following the hearing, defence counsel, with the consent of the Crown, provided an email containing an additional package of material from Recovery Science Corporation, a company that provides electronic monitoring services for bail releases.

[8] In response to the application, the Crown filed a synopsis of the allegation, supplemented by a summary of certain police investigations relevant to the issue of bail. The Crown also filed some photos of the scene, and a video and transcript relating to a post-arrest statement made by Mr. Vanderveen. The video statement was played in court, in the presence of the sureties and Mr. Vanderveen’s other supporters.

[9] During the hearing of the application, the Crown sought an adjournment to conduct further legal research. I denied the adjournment but advised the Crown that I would hold off on considering my decision for a few days, to allow the Crown an opportunity to provide any additional case law and written submissions if desired. By email dated May 31, 2019, at 3:45 p.m., the Crown indicated that he would not be filing any additional case law.

[10] In order to complete the record, I will mark the emails received from counsel following the hearing as additional exhibits.

Applicable Legal and Constitutional Principles

[11] Section 11(e) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. The importance of this right was best expressed by Iacobucci J. dissenting in R. v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64, where he stated at paras. 47-49:

At the heart of a free and democratic society is the liberty of its subjects. Liberty lost is never regained and can never be fully compensated for; therefore, where the potential exists for the loss of freedom for even a day, we, as a free and democratic society, must place the highest emphasis on ensuring that our system of justice minimizes the chances of an unwarranted denial of liberty.

In the context of the criminal law, this fundamental freedom is embodied generally in the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and further in the specific right to bail. When bail is denied to an individual who is merely accused of a criminal offence, the presumption of innocence is necessarily infringed. This is the context of this appeal, one in which the “golden thread” that runs through our system of criminal law is placed in jeopardy. And this is the context in which laws authorizing pre-trial detention must be scrutinized.

Section 11 (e) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms calls particularly on courts, as guardians of liberty, to ensure that pre-trial release remains the norm rather than the exception to the norm, and to restrict pre-trial detention to only those circumstances where the fundamental rights and freedoms of the accused must be overridden in order to preserve some demonstrably pressing societal interest.

[12] The Supreme Court of Canada has, on a number of occasions, discussed the importance of the right to bail, and has provided guidance on its meaning: see R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, R. v. Pearson, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665, R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, and R. v. Antic, 2017 SCC 27. These cases all recognize that the statutory right to bail found in the Criminal Code has taken on a constitutional dimension that involves two concepts: “just cause” and “reasonable bail”.

[13] The concept of “just cause” has two separate but related meanings: see R. v. Antic, at paras. 33-34. First, “just cause” relates to the circumstances in which a denial of bail is constitutionally permissible. Bail should only be denied in narrow circumstances where it is necessary to promote the proper functioning of the bail system: see Antic, at para. 40. Second, “just cause” describes the statutory grounds enumerated in section 515(10) of the Criminal Code, which justify the detention of the accused. The statutory grounds include the flight risk, public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice.

[14] The charge of first degree murder is a section 469 offence and, as such, the defendant is required to apply for bail pursuant to section 522(1) of the Criminal Code. In accordance with section 522(2) of the Code, the onus to justify release rests on the applicant on a balance of probabilities. In this regard, the applicant must show cause why his detention is not justified within the meaning of section 515(10) of the Code.

[15] Section 515(10) of the Code provides as follows:

Justification for detention in custody

(10) For the purposes of this section, the detention of an accused in custody is justified only on one or more of the following grounds:

(a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court in order to be dealt with according to law;

(b) where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, or any person under the age of 18 years, having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice; and

(c) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including

(i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case,

(ii) the gravity of the offence,

(iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used, and

(iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more.

[16] In R. v. St-Cloud, supra, at para. 87, the Supreme Court provided the following guidance on the tertiary ground found in section 515(10)(c):

• Section 515(10)(c) does not create a residual ground for detention that applies only where the first two grounds for detention ((a) and (b)) are not satisfied. It is a distinct ground that itself provides a basis for ordering the pre-trial detention of an accused.
• Section 515(10)(c) must not be interpreted narrowly (or applied sparingly) and should not be applied only in rare cases or exceptional circumstances, or only to certain types of crimes.
• The four circumstances listed in s. 515(10)(c) are not exhaustive.
• A court must not order detention automatically even where the four listed circumstances support such a result.
• The court must instead consider all the circumstances of each case, paying particular attention to the four listed circumstances.
• The question whether a crime is “unexplainable” or “unexplained” is not a criterion that should guide the analysis.
• No single circumstance is determinative. The justice must consider the combined effect of all the circumstances of each case to determine whether detention is justified.
• This involves balancing all the relevant circumstances. At the end of this balancing exercise, the ultimate question to be asked by the court is whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. This is the test to be met under section 515(10)(c).
• To answer this question, the court must adopt the perspective of the “public”, that is, the perspective of a reasonable person who is properly informed about the philosophy of the legislative provisions, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case. However, this person is not a legal expert and is not able to appreciate the subtleties of the various defences that are available to the accused.
• This reasonable person’s confidence in the administration of justice may be undermined not only if a court declines to order detention where detention is justified having regard to the circumstances of the case, but also if it orders detention where detention is not justified.

[17] In assessing the tertiary ground, it is important to recall that at the bail stage of the proceedings the accused is presumed innocent of the offence charged, regardless of the strength of the Crown’s case or the possibility of a lengthy jail sentence, see R. v. St-Cloud, supra, at para. 56. Furthermore, it is important to remember that release of persons charged with offences is the cardinal rule and detention is the exception. The entitlement to release is closely linked with the presumption of innocence guaranteed by section 11(d) of the Charter.

[18] As well, in assessing the tertiary ground, the strength of the proposed release plan is a relevant factor. As Trotter J. (as he then was) explained in R. v. Dang, 2015 ONSC 4254, at para. 58:

A reasonable and knowledgeable member of the community may take a different view of a case in which an accused person charged with a violent offence is released into the community with virtually no supervision, compared to a situation where a strict plan has been put in place to monitor the accused. The plan goes to the core of s. 515(10)(b), but it may also impact on the application of s. 515(10)(c). The bail decision does not involve a stark choice between absolute freedom on one hand, and detention on the other. Realistically, it is a choice between release on conditions and detention. I see nothing wrong with this reality being reflected in s. 515(10)(c).

The Allegations

[19] The deceased, William “Lee” Lackey, was 34 years old at the time of his death. His mother, Susan Lackey, had been in a relationship with Mr. Vanderveen some time ago. Mr. Vanderveen was in some ways like an uncle to Mr. Lackey.

[20] It appears that Mr. Lackey had a troubled past and lived a bit of a transient lifestyle. He had once lived with Mr. Vanderveen for a period of time, and continued to have his mail sent to the Vanderveen residence even though he had not lived there in some time. When not at the Vanderveen residence, Mr. Lackey lived at various other locations and at times hotels. There is some suggestion that Mr. Lackey’s girlfriend may have stolen $20,000 from Mr. Vanderveen at some point in the past.

[21] In the time frame leading up to the shooting, Mr. Vanderveen and Mr. Lackey were not getting along. Mr. Vanderveen felt that Mr. Lackey was using him for money and to get rides. He grew tired of Mr. Lackey spending time at his house.

[22] In an effort to prevent Mr. Lackey from attending at the residence, Mr. Vanderveen called the local taxi company and asked them to stop driving Mr. Lackey to the Vanderveen residence. During the call, he advised that Mr. Lackey owed him approximately $3,000. The call was made on December 28, 2018. Taxi records reveal that Mr. Lackey was last taken to the Vanderveen residence on that date.

[23] On January 27, 2019, Mr. Lackey had a friend drive him out to the Vanderveen residence. He paid the friend $10 for the ride. Once at the residence, he asked Mr. Vanderveen for Valium or Lorazepam.

[24] Later that day, Mr. Lackey told a friend that he was planning on going to visit Mr. Vanderveen to see if he would agree to sign bail for a friend who was in jail. He also indicated that he was planning on staying there for a few days. He explained that he had no money and nowhere to live.

[25] On January 28, 2019, Mr. Vanderveen picked up Mr. Lackey and his friend Sherry Johnson. He brought sandwiches and coffee for them and drove them to court in Orillia. Later that afternoon, Mr. Lackey told Ms. Johnson that he was going to take a cab to the Vanderveen residence to see if he could get some money. Ms. Johnson was aware that Mr. Lackey would frequently obtain money from Mr. Vanderveen.

[26] On January 30, 2019, at approximately 9:30 a.m., Mr. Lackey approached Jamie McHugh at a Tim Hortons and asked him for a ride to the Vanderveen residence. While Mr. McHugh did not know Mr. Lackey, he agreed to give him a ride.

[27] When they arrived at the residence, Mr. Lackey went inside to get some money. He came back out with approximately $9 in change which he had taken from a “laundry money” jar of some type.

[28] While Mr. Lackey went outside to pay Mr. McHugh for the ride, Mr. Vanderveen walked approximately 36 to 40 feet past a gun locker containing unloaded firearms, and entered the rear of the home where he opened a second gun locker and retrieved a .17 calibre rifle. He then retrieved ammunition from a separate locked cabinet, loaded the bolt action rifle and went back to the kitchen. Mr. Vanderveen described this gun as his “squirrel gun”, which he used to dispatch squirrels who were eating at his birdfeeders.

[29] By the time he returned to the kitchen, Mr. Lackey was re-entering the home. Mr. Vanderveen was approximately eight feet away. There was no discussion, threat or struggle. Mr. Vanderveen was holding the rifle at waist height. He fired a single shot which hit Mr. Lackey in the eye. As Mr. Vanderveen explained in his statement to police, he “didn’t even give Mr. Lackey a chance to leave”.

[30] After the shot was fired, Mr. Lackey fell forward landing on his coffee cup. He was bleeding from his head onto the kitchen floor. Mr. Lackey was struggling and it appeared like he was trying to get up. Mr. Vanderveen retrieved a tarp from the garage and attempted to place it under or around him. In his statement, Mr. Vanderveen indicates he was confused at the time and wanted to help Mr. Lackey. He could not really explain why he retrieved a tarp for this purpose. Mr. Vanderveen then sought help from his brother Andrew, but it appears that Andrew had gone out.

[31] At 11:31 a.m., Andrew Vanderveen received a phone call from Mr. Vanderveen, who indicated that he was in a lot of trouble. Mr. Vanderveen also gave Andrew instructions to take care of the house for a while.

[32] At 11:36 a.m., Mr. Vanderveen called 911 and indicated he had shot Mr. Lackey approximately 5 to 10 minutes before the call.

[33] At 11:44 a.m., police arrived on scene and placed Mr. Vanderveen under arrest for attempt murder. The charge was later upgraded once Mr. Lackey died in hospital on February 2, 2019.

[34] Following his arrest and consultation with counsel, Mr. Vanderveen provided a lengthy statement. He explained that his intention was not to shoot to kill Mr. Lackey, but rather to scare him out of the house.

[35] A police investigation resulted in the seizure of surveillance videos that show the vehicle used to drop off Mr. Lackey at the Vanderveen residence at certain locations. Based on the times of those videos and the distances between the locations of the videos and the home, police believe that approximately 35 minutes elapsed between Mr. Lackey’s drop off and the call to 911.

[36] A search of the residence revealed six marijuana plants growing in the basement, and some cultivated marijuana in bags in a freezer also in the basement of the home.

The Applicant’s Background and Proposed Plan of Release

[37] The Applicant is currently 69 years of age. He turns 70 on August 12, 2019. He has lived most of his life on a farm property in the village of Jarratt, initially with his parents and later on his own. In 2000, the farm property was sold, but Mr. Vanderveen purchased a home on a lot that was severed from the farm property. He owns the home free of liens or mortgages.

[38] While Mr. Vanderveen has been in relationships, he is not married nor does he have any children.

[39] Mr. Vanderveen has a high school education and has taken additional college courses in engineering technology and carpentry. He started his carpentry apprenticeship with Norman Johnston Construction in Orillia, and when he was 24 years of age he became a licensed interprovincial carpenter.

[40] Over the years he has been employed as a factory worker, taxi driver and carpenter. For a period of time, Mr. Vanderveen was licensed to operate a trap line for fur pelts. Since 1992, Mr. Vanderveen has been employed with Dennis Johnston Construction in Oro-Medonte. Dennis Johnston is one of the proposed sureties. He is also the son of Norman Johnston, one of Mr. Vanderveen’s first employers.

[41] Mr. Vanderveen has a criminal record with two convictions. In 1993, he pleaded guilty to possession of explosives and received a fine of $750 and three years’ probation. The explosive in question was dynamite that he purchased from someone intending to use it to blow up beaver dams in relation to his trap line business. In 2012, he pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana and received a $400 fine. He has no other outstanding charges.

[42] Mr. Vanderveen has owned guns for most of his adult life. At the time of his arrest, he owned approximately 10 long guns as well as related ammunition.

[43] The village of Jarratt is a small community. Mr. Vanderveen is known to his neighbours as a caring and helpful type who is always ready to assist.

[44] Mr. Vanderveen has proposed three sureties.

[45] The first proposed surety is his niece, Ms. Colleen Rankin-Walker. Ms. Rankin-Walker is a personal support worker. Her husband is a supervisor at Western Mechanical in Barrie. They own a home with $300,000 in equity. They have three children ages 21, 18 and 17. Her father, Andrew Vanderveen, is presently residing in Mr. Vanderveen’s home in Jarratt.

[46] The second proposed surety is Mr. Vanderveen’s boss, Dennis Johnston. Mr. Johnston has known Mr. Vanderveen since childhood as they were both in the same grade school. Mr. Johnston lives in Oro-Medonte and has a home with $475,000 in equity.

[47] He describes Mr. Vanderveen as an excellent employee who is honest, hard-working and extremely reliable. He is prepared to continue to employ Mr. Vanderveen, and is also prepared to pick him up and drop him off from his surety residence every day.

[48] The third proposed surety is Karen Mason, the mother of the deceased’s girlfriend. She resides in Washago and has an interest in a matrimonial home as well as other property assets. From 1994 until her retirement 2010, Ms. Mason worked for the Ontario Provincial Police in various administrative capacities.

[49] She has known Mr. Vanderveen since 2012 when her daughter started dating the deceased, Mr. Lackey. During this time, Mr. Vanderveen was always very kind to her daughter, often offering her and Mr. Lackey a ride or place to stay. In her brief viva voce testimony, Ms. Mason confirmed that she had spoken with her daughter who indicated she was not opposed to Mr. Vanderveen’s release on bail.

[50] None of the proposed sureties have criminal records or any outstanding charges. All of the proposed sureties understand their role and obligations to the court should Mr. Vanderveen be released.

[51] The proposed plan of release would have Mr. Vanderveen reside with his niece, and work with Mr. Johnston. Mr. Vanderveen is prepared to abide by house arrest conditions except when in the company of his sureties. He is also prepared to comply with electronic monitoring.

Analysis

[52] I will start my analysis with a very brief assessment of the primary and secondary grounds for detention. As stated earlier, the Crown agrees that Mr. Vanderveen has met his onus in respect of these two grounds. Nonetheless, and for the sake of completeness, I will provide some brief reasons explaining why I also agree.

[53] The primary ground relates to the risk of flight posed by the accused. In any case where an accused is charged with murder and is facing a life sentence of imprisonment with a possible parole ineligibility period of 25 years, the court must carefully assess the risk of flight.

[54] In this case, the evidence before me suggests that Mr. Vanderveen has a long-standing connection with the community he lives in. He has lived, more or less, his entire life at the same property in Jarratt. He is almost 70 years of age. He has three proposed sureties who live in nearby communities, and understand their obligation to ensure that Mr. Vanderveen comes to court as required. There is nothing in his criminal past that suggests that he is a flight risk. While the Crown’s case against the accused, as will be discussed in relation to the tertiary ground, is very strong on manslaughter and certainly arguable in terms of second degree murder, it is not a strong case on first degree murder. In short, I agree with the Crown’s concession in relation to the primary ground. It is well-founded in the evidence. Mr. Vanderveen presents a low risk of flight.

[55] The secondary ground deals with public safety and assesses whether the accused poses a substantial risk of committing further offences if released, and/or poses a substantial risk of interfering with the administration of justice if released. In this regard, I note that Mr. Vanderveen’s criminal record offers little support for a finding that he poses a substantial risk in either regard. He has no other outstanding charges. While the strength of the Crown’s case is a factor to consider, in my view, the strong surety plan that is proposed will adequately address any concerns about Mr. Vanderveen’s risks if released. Again, I agree with the Crown’s concession in relation to the secondary ground. While it cannot be said that Mr. Vanderveen poses no risk, I am satisfied that he does not pose a substantial risk in view of the release plan.

[56] I turn next to the core issue in this bail application, and that is whether Mr. Vanderveen has established on a balance of probabilities that his release is not justified on the tertiary ground. In this regard, I will review each of the statutory criteria listed in section 515(10)(c).

The Strength of the Crown’s Case

[57] I start with the strength of the Crown’s case. Mr. Vanderveen is charged with first degree murder. Mr. Vanderveen admits he shot Mr. Lackey in the head and admits that he retrieved the firearm for the purpose of intimidating or scaring Mr. Lackey. On the evidence before me, I conclude that the Crown has a weak case for first degree murder, an arguable case for second degree murder and very strong case of manslaughter. In terms of the defences available on the evidence, there is a theoretical possibility of an outright acquittal on the basis of pure accident and perhaps defence of property. The core of the defence, at least as revealed in the statement tendered is that there was no intent to kill, only an intent to intimidate or scare Mr. Lackey with the firearm.

[58] In terms of first degree murder, liability rises and falls on planning and deliberation. There is no suggestion that this a constructive first degree murder case. The evidence of planning and deliberation could be inferred from the distance and time it would have taken Mr. Vanderveen to leave the kitchen, walk to the other end of the home, unlock a gun cabinet to retrieve the rifle, unlock a second gun cabinet to retrieve the ammunition, load the firearm and return to the kitchen. While planning and deliberation can occur in moments and there is no requisite degree of sophistication or complexity for the plan, this evidence of planning and deliberation presents, in my view, a relatively weak basis to sustain a conviction for first degree murder.

[59] In terms of the intent for murder, on the evidence before me the Crown has an arguable case for establishing that Mr. Vanderveen intended to kill, or at least intended to cause serious bodily harm knowing that it was likely to result in death. On this issue, the act itself permits certain inferences. Mr. Lackey was shot through the eye at close range with essentially no warning. In the immediate aftermath of the shooting he was placed on a tarp, and medical assistance was only summoned after some time had passed and a call had first been made to Mr. Vanderveen’s brother. A jury could assess this evidence, in concert with the evidence of motive, and conclude that Mr. Vanderveen acted with one of the requisite intents for murder. On the other hand, a jury might consider that the weapon used was not nearly the most lethal weapon readily available, and might also consider Mr. Vanderveen’s explanation for how the gun went off and conclude or at least have a reasonable doubt about his intent for murder. While this determination will be for a jury to make on another day, for the purposes of the bail application I conclude that the Crown’s case for murder is certainly arguable though not overwhelming.

[60] Mr. Vanderveen denies an intent to kill and argues essentially a defence of accident. I pause to note that the defence of accident can refer to absence of intent to commit a certain act, for example intentionally discharging a firearm to scare someone and hitting that person by accident, i.e. without an intent to kill. The defence of accident can also apply to the act itself, for example unintentionally discharging a firearm by accidentally pulling the trigger while picking up a firearm and shooting someone standing nearby. In Mr. Vanderveen’s statement, he appears to mainly suggest the former instead of the latter, which would support a finding of manslaughter.

[61] Mr. Vanderveen does not advance self-defence or provocation in his statement. In theory, Mr. Vanderveen might possibly secure an acquittal on the basis of defence of property and perhaps pure accident, though this seems unlikely on the basis of the evidence at the bail hearing.

The Gravity of the Alleged Offence

[62] There is no issue that first degree murder is one of the most serious offences in the Criminal Code. The objective gravity of this offence is obvious, see R. v. B.S., 2007 ONCA 560 at para. 11. That said, I remind myself that there is no category of offence that is, by virtue of its objective seriousness, automatically excluded from the right to reasonable bail, see R. v. LaFramboise (2005), 203 C.C.C. (3d) 492 (Ont.C.A.) at para. 31 and R. v. Blind (1999), 139 C.C.C. (3d) 87 (Sask.C.A.).

Circumstances Surrounding the Commission of the Murder

[63] While tragic and unwarranted, this is not an overly brutal or heinous offence. Mr. Lackey was shot once with a small calibre rifle, and he died as a result despite medical intervention that was summoned by Mr. Vanderveen.

[64] There is no realistic suggestion that Mr. Lackey was a vulnerable victim or that the offence had any aggravating motivation behind it, see R. v. St-Cloud, supra, at para. 88.

The Potential for a Lengthy Sentence of Imprisonment

[65] There is no issue that if Mr. Vanderveen is convicted of murder, he will face a life sentence. Given his age, the period of parole ineligibility may well turn out to be academic. Even if he is convicted of manslaughter, he nonetheless faces a significant penitentiary sentence.

Other Circumstances

[66] As discussed in R. v. St-Cloud, the list of factors in section 515(10)(c) is not exhaustive. The four listed factors are the main factors to be considered, but other circumstances can inform the decision on the tertiary ground. In this regard, I consider both Mr. Vanderveen’s personal circumstances and the nature of the proposed release plan. Mr. Vanderveen is approaching 70 years of age. He has a long history of gainful employment. His criminal record is quite minor. His gave a statement to police immediately following the incident. The statement has a candidly remorseful quality to it. Mr. Vanderveen also has a significant amount of community support, as set out in the many letters filed.

[67] In terms of the proposed plan of release, I am satisfied that the sureties are honourable and trustworthy members of the community who will do their level best to ensure that Mr. Vanderveen complies with his bail conditions. Their promise to do so will be backed by a significant pledge of money.

Balancing the Tertiary Ground Factors

[68] In balancing the tertiary ground factors, the ultimate question to be asked is whether detention is required to maintain a reasonable person’s confidence in the administration of justice. A reasonable person is one who is informed of the philosophy and principles that inform the bail provisions of the Criminal Code, the Charter values that are implicated and the particular circumstances of the case under consideration.

[69] As set out in R. v. St-Cloud, supra, at para. 80, a reasonable person is “a thoughtful person, not one who is prone to emotional reactions, whose knowledge of the circumstances of a case is inaccurate or who disagrees with our society’s fundamental values. But he or she is not a legal expert familiar with all the basic principles of the criminal justice system, the elements of criminal offences or the subtleties of criminal intent and of the defences that are available to accused persons”.

[70] In my view, a reasonable person, properly informed of the circumstances of this case, would not lose confidence in the administration of justice if Mr. Vanderveen were admitted to bail. While the offence alleged is very serious and carries with it the potential of a very long jail sentence, the circumstances of the offence, Mr. Vanderveen’s own personal circumstances and the nature of the release plan being proposed, support the conclusion that the administration of justice is properly served by a release in this case. That release will involve a significant financial pledge and very restrictive conditions. Mr. Vanderveen is not simply being released on his own to await trial.

Conclusion

[71] As indicated at the outset of these reasons, I am satisfied that Mr. Vanderveen has met his onus to demonstrate why his detention is not required on the three grounds listed in section 515(10) of the Code.

[72] In my view, this is not a case where a reasonable member of the public would lose confidence in the administration of justice if they were fairly apprised of the circumstances of this case, including the proposed plan of release.

[73] Mr. Vanderveen will be released on a recognizance of bail in the amount of $100,000 with the three named sureties. No deposit shall be required.

[74] Prior to receiving these reasons, counsel were advised of my “bottom line” decision and invited to jointly provide wording for the conditions of release. A copy of the email sent to counsel will be noted as an exhibit in order to complete the record.

[75] Once I receive the agreed upon conditions of release or in the alternative receive further submissions from counsel on appropriate conditions, I will release a further brief endorsement setting out the precise conditions of release.

[76] The application is granted.

Justice J. Di Luca Released: June 10, 2019