SCJ 2019

The Harmon Defendants brought a motion to strike the claim against them in the 'Monster Claim'.

The plaintiff, Premium Trust, claimed repayment of a loan but failed to allege any direct contract or duty owed by the Harmon Defendants to Premium Trust.

The court found that the pleading did not sufficiently disclose a cause of action against the Harmon Defendants.

The court struck the relevant paragraph of the claim and granted the plaintiff leave to amend the pleading.

The applicant sought a declaration regarding the amount owed to discharge a commercial mortgage.

The mortgage had a face value of $3 million, but the net amount advanced was approximately $2.6 million after deducting the lender's financing costs.

The applicant argued it was only required to repay the net amount advanced.

The court held that the express terms of the Mortgage Financing Agreement required the applicant to repay the full $3 million face value, displacing the general equitable rule that a mortgagee can only recover the amount actually advanced.

The plaintiffs in a certified competition law class action regarding price-fixing of lithium-ion batteries moved for approval of settlements with the LG Chem and Toshiba defendants, as well as for approval of class counsel fees.

The court found the settlements, which provided approximately $5.1 million from LG Chem and $264,000 from Toshiba, to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The court also approved class counsel's fee request of approximately $1.18 million, representing a 25% contingency fee, finding it reasonable given the risks undertaken and the results achieved.

K.J. was found guilty of sexual assault against J.C., a 34-year-old woman with the functional capacity of a 5-9 year old.

The sentencing hearing addressed disputed facts, including the extent of sexual misconduct and a history of abuse, which the court found not proven beyond a reasonable doubt except for one incident.

The court considered aggravating factors such as K.J.'s prior sexual misconduct convictions, J.C.'s vulnerability, a trust-like relationship, and the severe impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors were few.

The court applied sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, imposing a sentence of 6 years imprisonment along with ancillary orders.

The accused, J.P., was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a five-year-old complainant.

The case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused being found naked in bed with the complainant whose shorts and underwear were down, inculpatory statements by the accused, and DNA evidence.

The court found the mother's evidence unreliable due to inconsistencies and emotional state, and the expert DNA evidence inconclusive regarding the source and timing of semen.

The accused's testimony was disbelieved due to inconsistencies.

However, considering the evidence as a whole, the court was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt, leading to dismissal of all charges.

The plaintiff, a construction company, sued the defendant municipality after being disqualified from a Request for Proposals (RFP) process for a City Hall expansion.

The plaintiff alleged that the municipality acted in bad faith and with bias when it disqualified the plaintiff for refusing to sign a confidentiality agreement and for communicating directly with City Council.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff had breached the clear terms of the RFP and that the municipality's decision to disqualify the plaintiff was fair, made in good faith, and based on the advice of an independent fairness advisor.

The court also held that even if the municipality had breached the RFP, the plaintiff would only be entitled to reliance damages, not expectation damages for lost profits.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder for shooting the victim in the head with a concealed handgun.

The court considered the devastating impact on the victim's family, the offender's lack of a significant criminal record, and the jury's recommendations for parole ineligibility.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years, along with non-communication, DNA, and lifetime weapons prohibition orders.

The plaintiffs and the defendant police officer provided written submissions on costs following the plaintiffs' successful motion for leave to amend their statement of claim.

The defendant argued the plaintiffs' submissions were late, but the court found them timely under the Rules of Civil Procedure as the deadline fell on a weekend.

Although the plaintiffs were successful on the motion, the court expressed concern over the timing of the new, more serious allegations of battery and sexual assault, which the defendant argued were an attempt to circumvent the Limitations Act.

Consequently, the court declined to award costs immediately to the successful plaintiffs, instead fixing costs at $6,500 payable in the cause.

The accused sought a review of a detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code following his arrest for firearms and drug offences.

He had been detained on the tertiary ground.

The accused presented fresh evidence regarding his willingness to live with his estranged father under strict house arrest conditions, which the court accepted as a material change in circumstances under the Palmer test.

The court found that a reasonable person's confidence in the administration of justice would not be undermined by his release, given the strict bail plan including a $30,000 bond, GPS ankle monitoring, and a capable surety.

The detention order was vacated and the accused was released.

The defendant employer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for wrongful dismissal and damages under the Human Rights Code.

The plaintiff alleged he was constructively dismissed and that the employer failed to accommodate his medical inability to perform door-to-door sales.

The court found no objective evidence of constructive dismissal, noting the employer reasonably requested medical information to design an accommodation plan, which the plaintiff refused to provide.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action challenging their expulsion from the church.

The plaintiffs argued that the church's constitution and by-laws formed a legally binding contract and that they were denied procedural fairness.

Applying the Supreme Court's decision in Wall, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision of a voluntary religious organization absent an underlying legal right.

The court found no evidence of a contract or civil right, concluded the ecclesiastical issues were not justiciable, and granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action regarding entitlement to termination benefits following an alleged change in control.

The plaintiff's action involved the same factual matrix and similar contractual terms as two other actions proceeding to trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that granting summary judgment would risk duplicative proceedings and inconsistent findings of fact, contrary to the principles in Hryniak.

The applicant vendors sought a declaration that the respondent purchaser breached an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property and an order for the release of the $72,500 deposit.

The purchaser failed to close the transaction, alleging that water damage in the garage and basement frustrated the contract and rendered the property uninsurable and unable to be financed.

The court found that the purchaser breached the agreement, as there was insufficient evidence of substantial damage to justify frustration of the contract.

The court also denied the purchaser's request for relief from forfeiture, finding that the deposit was not disproportionate, forfeiture was not unconscionable, and the purchaser had acted in bad faith by using the alleged damage as a pretext to avoid closing after failing to secure favorable financing extensions.

The offender was convicted of possession of child pornography after police seized computers containing 9,888 images and 105 videos, including depictions of violence and infants.

The Crown sought 18 to 24 months' incarceration, while the defence requested a conditional sentence, citing the offender's mental health issues, including PTSD and depression, and his diagnosis of multiple sclerosis.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, noting the serious nature and size of the collection.

The court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed 15 months' incarceration followed by three years' probation, along with DNA and sex offender registry orders.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel from the record in a manslaughter retrial due to a potential conflict of interest.

Defence counsel had previously represented two key Crown witnesses, one of whom was convicted as the shooter in the underlying incident.

Despite the respondent's fundamental right to counsel of choice and proposed waivers, the court found that the potential need to cross-examine former clients created an appearance of unfairness.

The application was granted to protect public confidence in the administration of justice.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against the plaintiff's controlling mind, Mr. Beach, for allegedly violating previous court orders, and an interlocutory injunction to restrain him from interfering in the management of joint venture development projects.

The court dismissed the motion for an injunction, finding it unnecessary as the parties had reached an understanding regarding the interpretation of the joint venture agreements.

The court also declined to make a finding of contempt, noting that while Mr. Beach's conduct was not condoned, it did not rise to the level requiring a contempt order and would be better addressed through costs.

The applicant mother brought a motion, and the respondent father brought a cross-motion, regarding where their two 10-year-old children would spend the upcoming weekend.

Both parents had committed the children to attending separate, simultaneous family weddings in different cities.

The court noted the conflict arose from the parents' ongoing inability to communicate effectively.

Finding no perfect solution, the court ordered a compromise: the parenting schedule was altered to allow the daughter to attend the maternal uncle's wedding with the applicant, while the son remained with the respondent to attend the paternal cousin's wedding.

No costs were awarded.

The respondent father brought a motion to dismiss the applicant mother's claims for divorce and custody on jurisdictional grounds, and for the return of the children to Dubai.

The mother had fled Dubai with the children, alleging domestic violence, and claimed refugee status in Canada.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction under the Divorce Act because neither party had been ordinarily resident in Ontario for one year prior to the application.

However, the court assumed jurisdiction over custody and access under the Children's Law Reform Act, finding the children were habitually resident in Ontario due to the father's delay and acquiescence, and alternatively, that the children had a real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The plaintiffs in a construction defect action brought a mid-trial motion for leave to file additional and supplemental expert reports.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce a new structural engineering expert to address an allegation of bias raised against their original expert shortly before trial, and to file a supplemental report addressing newly discovered cracks.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that granting leave would cause undue delay and prejudice to the defendants, who would not have sufficient time to obtain responding reports before the trial resumed.

The court also noted that the plaintiffs failed to provide an adequate explanation for the delay in seeking leave.

The moving defendants brought a motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) obtained ex parte by the plaintiffs.

The defendants argued the plaintiffs failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts as required by Rule 39.01(6).

The court reviewed the record and found that the plaintiffs had complied with their disclosure obligations, noting that the alleged misrepresentations were actually triable issues regarding the interpretation of agreements and personal liability.

The motion to discharge the CPL was dismissed.