R. v. Lee-Jones, 2019 ONSC 7603

Court File No. 19-89503 CITATION: R. v. Lee-Jones, 2019 ONSC 7603

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

v.

CHRISTOPHER LEE-JONES

REASONS FOR DECISION

BY THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE A. LONDON-WEINSTEIN on November 20, 2019, at OTTAWA, Ontario

APPEARANCES:

J. Thompson Counsel for the Federal Crown J. Langevin Counsel for Christopher Lee-Jones

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Transcript Ordered: . . . . . . . . . . . . . June 24, 2021 Transcript Completed: . . . . . . . . . . . . June 24, 2021 Ordering Party Notified: . . . . . . . . . . June 25, 2021

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2019

REASONS FOR DECISION

LONDON-WEINSTEIN, J. (Orally):

Mr. Christopher Lee-Jones sought review of the prior bail review judge’s determination on July 5th, 2019 that the detention of Mr. Lee-Jones continue to be necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. Mr. Lee-Jones had been ordered detained by Dorval, J. in the Ontario Court of Justice in April of 2019 on the tertiary ground.

The allegations against Mr. Lee-Jones are as follows: In the pre-dawn hours of April 11, 2019, Mr. Lee-Jones’ vehicle was stopped by police. An outstanding warrant existed in Quebec. Police searched Mr. Lee-Jones vehicle extensively for registration of the vehicle and ownership. The registration was located in the glove box of the vehicle. Police searched the center console of the vehicle and discovered a firearm. The firearm was loaded with a prohibited over-sized magazine. A quantity of marijuana and cocaine were located in the vehicle. As a result of this incident, Mr. Lee-Jones is charged with unlawful possession of a loaded restricted firearm, careless carry of a firearm, possession of a weapon for dangerous purpose, possession of prohibited firearm, unlawful possession of a restricted weapon, possession of a prohibited ammunition, possession of a restricted weapon in a motor vehicle, possession of a firearm knowing the serial number is removed, possession of proceeds to a crime under 5,000, and possession for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to Section 5(2) of the CDSA, and unlawful possession of cannabis, contrary to Section 10(5) of the Cannabis Act.

History of the Proceedings – The Initial Bail Hearing

I appreciate that my reasons just deal with the review, which was done by the reviewing justice, but, just for the purposes of completeness, I’m going to just go through the history of the proceedings including the initial bail hearing.

Mr. Lee-Jones had an initial bail hearing before Justice Dorval in the Ontario Court of Justice. He was detained in April of 2019 on the tertiary ground. The defence brought an application, pursuant to Section 520 of the Criminal Code, seeking to review the detention order of Justice Dorval on the basis of a material change in circumstances.

The reviewing judge of the Superior Court found that the newly proposed bail plan with Mr. Robert Jones as his surety was evidence which could have been called at the first bail hearing. The reviewing judge found that two of the four factors in R. v. Palmer [1980] 15 CR 759, were not met, and the evidence presented at the bail review application did not meet the criteria for admissibility.

The defence now brings an application for further view – review under Section 520 of the Criminal Code. Mr. Lee-Jones’ application was heard by me on November 15, 2019. Section 520(1) provides as follows: If a justice makes an order under subsection 515(2), (5), (6), (7), (8) or (12), or makes or vacates any order under paragraphs 523(2)(b) the accused may, at any time before the trial of the charge, apply to a judge for a review of the order.

Since the detention order being reviewed was made by the reviewing judge this a review of that decision not the initial bail decision. Although the decision being reviewed was made by a judge of this court, I have the jurisdiction to review that decision, as was made clear in R. v. Durrani[^1]. Section 520 clearly envisions more than one opportunity to bring a bail review application, and contemplates that different judges of the Superior Court will sometimes hear these applications.

The hearing will often be a blending of the original material and the material before the judge on any prior review, and the order made by that judge with new material that has arisen subsequent to the initial hearing. (R. v. Saracino[^2], Ontario High Court per Doherty, J.) In other words, Section 520 of the Code implicitly contemplates that in reviewing an order made at a – a hearing under Section 520, one Superior Court judge may consider the order made by another judge of the same court on a prior review application.

While I have the jurisdiction to conduct a review, Section 520 must not be utilized as a forum in which a disappointed party to the initial review seeks a fresh exercise of judicial discretion, or a redetermination of findings of fact made on the initial review. (R. v. Saracino)

There are generally two circumstances in which it is appropriate for one judge of this court to revisit a determination made by another judge of this court,

(1) where the judge making the first decision made an error of law or an error in principle; and

(2) where there’s been a material change in circumstances.

(Durani, at paragraphs 28 to 30, Saracino at pages 191 to 192)

It should be noted that although this application was framed as a review under Section 520 of the Criminal Code, due to a material change in circumstances, it could also have been brought under Section 525 of the Criminal Code to determine whether detention remain necessary.

The applicant submits that there’s been a material change in circumstances since the order for the continued detention of Mr. Lee-Jones made by the original reviewing judge in July of 2019. The applicant has proposed a second added surety. The plan is that the applicant would live with his father but not work. The GPS ankle bracelet is still included as it was last time, and a $30,000 bond is being pledged by the father, Mr. Robert Jones.

In addition, I had the benefit of new evidence on this hearing from Mr. Lee-Jones explaining the breakdown in his relationship with his father, and why he initially selected a surety which would permit him to work in the city. I also heard evidence regarding the impact that seven months of incarceration in maximum security have had on Mr. Lee-Jones’ state of mind, vis-à-vis living with his father in a remote area and not working.

The reviewing judge found that the addition of Mr. Robert Jones, in substitution for Ms. Cormier, as a surety, would not have materially affected the result of the bail review in addition to finding that the decision to have Mr. Robert Jones act as a surety could have been made at the first bail hearing. For those reasons, the reviewing judge found that the Palmer test had not been met within the context of the bail review, and she ordered the continued detention of Mr. Lee-Jones.

The reviewing judge did not have the benefit of hearing from Mr. Lee-Jones regarding his explanation as to why his relationship with his father had broken down, nor did she have evidence, except from the father, as to why he had not initially been selected as the surety. The reviewing judge was troubled by the lack of evidence regarding the breakdown in the relationship. This evidence was not available at the time. It required the passage of time.

Mr. Lee-Jones testified in this bail review. He testified that he’s been in maximum security at Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre for seven months. Mr. Lee-Jones has never been incarcerated prior to his arrest in April. Mr. Lee-Jones testified he chose initially to not choose his father as a surety for a number of reasons. I found him to be candid in his evidence before the court.

Mr. Lee-Jones testified that his relationship with his father had been estranged for several years, prior to his arrest. His mother has died, but before she passed Mr. Lee-Jones lived with her after his parents divorced. He was a handful, according to his father, as a teenager. Eventually, his mother found she was having difficulty managing his behaviours, and she asked Mr. Robert Jones to live with the boy. Mr. Robert Jones lived with Christopher Lee-Jones when Christopher was 18. After a year of living together, Mr. Robert Jones moved out, and he continued to pay the rent for Christopher. Both men agreed that the tension in the apartment made the living arrangements not very tenable, in the long term. There were some arguments but nothing physical.

Mr. Lee-Jones has not lived with his father since that time in 2006 to 2007. He explained that due to the estrangement he’s experienced with his father he was reluctant to select his father as a surety. He also had concerns about living in such a remote area. Mr. Robert Jones lives in a very remote area in Quebec. Prior to his arrest, Mr. Lee-Jones had been living in urban Ottawa. He also felt that it would be a good idea for him to work while on bail. There are no realistic opportunities for employment in the area where Mr. Jones lives.

Mr. Lee-Jones also testified that he felt badly about imposing on his father to ask him to be a surety after they had been estranged for a number of years, and I accepted his evidence. I accepted that Mr. Lee-Jones thought it would be a good idea to be employed while on bail, and that for a number of reasons his first choice for a surety was not his father. Since that time, he’s been in maximum security at the OCDC for seven months.

Mr. Lee-Jones testified that the conditions in the jail have had an effect on his outlook. He’s now willing to have his father act as a surety, and to live in a remote area under conditions of house arrest with a GPS bracelet, and not to work prior to his trial.

Mr. Jones is proposing a $30,000 bond. It is also now being suggested that a long-time friend of Mr. Jones act as a co-surety in the event that Mr. Lee-Jones need to – needs to be escorted somewhere and his father is, for some unforeseen reason, not able to attend to this duty. Mr. Gauthier, the proposed alternate surety, is a retired worker for Canadian Pacific. He lives a short distance from Mr. Jones. He’s been a friend of Mr. Jones from – for some 30 years. He has no criminal record.

The GPS bracelet is again being proposed as it was at the review before the reviewing judge.

The evidence of Mr. Lee-Jones is new evidence, which was not available at the time to the reviewing justice; particularly, in relation to the effect that being in custody for seven months has had on Mr. Lee-Jones. I found that the evidence constitutes a material change in circumstances, which meets the Palmer criteria when applied within the context of the analysis mandated in a review for the purposes of a bail review.

The Palmer criteria are:

(1) the evidence should generally not be admitted if by due diligence it could’ve been adduced at trial or at the previous hearing;

(2) the evidence must be relevant, in the sense that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue in the hearing;

(3) the evidence must be credible, in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief; and

(4) it must be such that if believed it could reasonable, when taken with the other evidence adduced, be expected to have affected the final result.

The reviewing judge found that number (2), the relevance of the evidence, and number (3), the credibility of the evidence had been met, and I find that they have been met in this case, as well.

Mr. Robert Jones was asked in the hearing before the reviewing judge why he was not the first surety proposed at the original bail hearing. He indicated that his son did not want to live at the lake, and that he did not want his father to be a surety. The reviewing judge found that Mr. Lee-Jones exercised due diligence about who would be his choice of surety. As a result, since Mr. Jones could’ve been proposed as a surety at the initial bail hearing, the reviewing judge found he’d not met the first prong of the Palmer test. She found that the proposed evidence of Mr. Robert Jones as a surety failed the fourth prong of the Palmer test, as it could not reasonably be expected, in her view, to have affected the result.

The reviewing judge indicated that because both Mr. Robert Jones and the formally proposed surety, Ms. Cormier, had little knowledge of Mr. Lee-Jones’ day to day existence at that time that it would be naïve of either of them to believe they could fulfil the role of surety. The reviewing justice was also not convinced that Mr. Jones would be able to rebuild his relationship with his son in the rural setting in which he lives with his wife. The reviewing justice was also not convinced that employment was available.

On the hearing before me, I heard evidence from Mr. Lee-Jones as to the affect that incarceration in maximum security has had on his state of mind. Suffice to say, that while when initially arrested he wished to work and live in the city where work is available, and he did not want to live with his father for reasons he outlined credibly to the court, he now finds himself willing to impose himself on his father, and to not work as he awaits trial.

I find that his change of mental state regarding being willing to live in rural isolation with his father, after seven months in maximum security, is a material change in circumstances. The evidence of Mr. Lee-Jones was not available to the reviewing judge nor could it have been. It took the passage of time for Mr. Lee-Jones to realize that his options were extremely limited regarding bail, and he would be required to adjust his expectation about what life on bail for a charge this serious would look like.

I find the new evidence relevant to the strength of the bail plan and credible. I note that, given the passage of time, this review could have been framed as a Section 525 review to determine if the continued detention of Mr. Lee-Jones continued to be necessary. Although, in a somewhat different context, the Supreme Court in R. v. Myers, 2019 SCC 18, reminded reviewing judges that the passage of time is a relevant fact when engaging in any weighing of factors conducted by the initial judge, along with any other relevant considerations.

I return again to the issue as to whether there has been a material change in circumstances. In R. v. St-Cloud, the Supreme Court held that the Palmer criteria must be applied with some flexibility, given that bail hearings are expeditious and based on preliminary and incomplete information.

In the case of Mr. Lee-Jones, he has never been to jail before, and he has never been charged with a serious offence. In his mind, at the time, he said that the initial surety would allow him to be employed. When it became apparent that Ms. Cormier was not going to be a suitable surety, he agreed to live with his father.

In the first part of the test, the reviewing judge determines whether the evidence was not available at the time, or was not tendered at the original bail hearing despite its availability for some reason that was legitimate and reasonable.

Mr. Lee-Jones testified that he wanted to work, and that was the focus of his original bail plan. He was also estranged from his father and did not want to impose on him after so many years of estrangement. This sounds legitimate and reasonable to me. However, having been detained, because the Court felt that a plan with a younger surety, who did not know him well, would not be a suitable surety, and having spent seven months in maximum security, Mr. Lee-Jones is now willing to not work, to live in isolation with his father, and to remain on house arrest with an ankle bracelet.

The fourth criteria for admissibility is whether the proposed evidence, when taken with the other evidence, could reasonably be expected to have affected the result. The reviewing judge found that Mr. Jones was naïve for thinking he could supervise his son after being estranged from him for an extended period of time. She was rightfully troubled about the lack of evidence regarding the breakdown of Mr. Jones’ relationship with his son.

Some time has passed since that review in July. Mr. Lee-Jones has, as I have mentioned several times, been in maximum security for seven months. His father has remained in contact with him throughout. Given the new evidence, regarding Mr. Lee-Jones’ willingness to live under very strict conditions, and his explanation of why he did not choose his father as his initial surety, I am not satisfied that the result of the admission of the evidence would be the same, regardless of admissibility.

I heard evidence about the basis for the breakdown in the relationship, and a very cogent and credible explanation by Mr. Lee-Jones as why he did not want to impose on his father, nor to live in a remote area where he would not be able to work. Although this was not expressed overtly, it’s a reasonable inference that Mr. Lee-Jones wished to work in order to pay counsel for his upcoming trial, and also employment is generally considered to be a positive factor for a judge to consider when imposing sentence if he were to be convicted at trial. In my view, this is evidence which was not available at the time of the hearing by the reviewing justice, which is a material change in circumstances.

When I apply the Palmer criteria, I find that there was a legitimate and reasonable explanation as to why Mr. Lee-Jones did not proffer his father as a surety. I also find that the passage of time, which had not occurred then, has changed Mr. Lee-Jones’ mindset. None of this evidence was available at the hearing before the reviewing judge.

When I consider the fourth criteria, I find that the explanation of why the relationship broke down, and the fresh evidence before me of Mr. Lee-Jones, which was not available to the reviewing justice, satisfy me that new evidence could have reasonably affected the result.

Having found that the evidence properly constitutes a material change in circumstances, vis-à-vis the Palmer test within the context of bail, I turn now to a de novo hearing and the analysis of whether Mr. Lee-Jones should be detained on the tertiary ground.

Mr. Lee-Jones has a minor criminal record. He has a 2014 conviction for unauthorized importing of a restricted weapon, which I was advised was a flare gun. He received a $400 fine and a five year prohibition order. In 2010, he was convicted of possession of a Schedule 2 substance and received a $400 fine. In 2007, he received a conditional discharge for possession of a weapon.

He has been detained on the tertiary ground. The question to be answered is whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. The person to be considering this question is a reasonable person appraised of Charter values and informed as to how the system of bail operates in Canada.

Turning now to the first ground, which is the apparent strength of the Crown’s case. The Crown’s case is extensively strong on its face. However, I note that the analysis of the apparent strength of the Crown’s case begins at a point in time where no credibility findings have been made, and before any weaknesses have been exposed to cross-examination. Although, credibility assessments are often at the core of judicial determinations at trial, they are largely absent within the context of a bail review.

Mr. Lee-Jones was stopped by police. He was arrested on an outstanding warrant in Quebec. Police searched the vehicle for his ownership and registration. They were located in the glove box. However, the center console of his vehicle was removed and disassembled outside of the vehicle, despite the ownership and registration being located in the glove box. A loaded handgun with an oversized magazine and the drugs were located in the console.

In the context of the analysis of the strength of the Crown’s case, I am required to consider any potential defences. Given that this is a bail review, Mr. Lee-Jones is not required to detail his defences, but, rather, provide enough information that the Court can assess whether there was an air of reality to the defence, such that it should be considered when weighing the strength of the Crown’s case.

Mr. Lee-Jones has scheduled a disclosure application in the Ontario Court of Justice, as it is the position of the defence that the police had information, which they did not disclose, which led them to target Mr. Lee-Jones. Mr. Lee-Jones denies a claim by the Ottawa Police Service that he was observed driving in a reckless manner on April 7th. He maintains that police used the purported traffic stop of April 7th as a ruse to stop and search the vehicle.

The center console was removed from the vehicle, according to the defence, and disassembled. Mr. Lee-Jones produced his driver’s licence at the police station, and further, Constable Zili found the registration of the vehicle and ownership in the glove box. The Crown argues that these elements are irrelevant, as police stopped Mr. Lee-Jones on the strength of the outstanding warrant, that they arrested him on the warrant and that subsequent to arrest they were entitled to search the vehicle.

Of course, counsel are much more familiar with the case then I am, as the bail review judge. However, at this point, I cannot dismiss Mr. Lee-Jones’ argument as being irrelevant. It is for the trial judge to determine whether the officers engaged in a ruse; whether they were honest with the court at trial in regard to the reasons for dismantling the console, and whether they were found to have breached Mr. Lee-Jones’ Section 8 rights. These are matters which must be considered and weighed by the trial judge.

I would not dismiss Mr. Lee-Jones’ potential Charter argument, at this stage, however, as having no merit or being worthy of no weight. There is, in my view, a potential Charter based argument apparent to me. Whether it succeeds or not at trial is a matter for the trial judge. At this stage, however, I’ve considered the potential arguments by the defence when I weigh the strength of the Crown’s case. I would categorize the Crown’s case as strong, but with Charter issues, which may affect the outcome.

Gravity of the offence

The range of the potential sentence, if convicted of a loaded handgun with an oversized magazine in the vehicle, in the presence of drugs in this quantity, which I should mention are 72.45 grams of marijuana, and 18.6 grams of cocaine - so an oversized magazine in a vehicle, in the presence of drugs in this quantity, that is the gun can be characterized as a tool of the drug trade, is a penitentiary sentence in the range upwards of three years. Likely, three to six years.

If a Charter breach is found, but the evidence not excluded, the sentence may be somewhat reduced, depending on what happens at trial, and that is R. v. Nasogalvak, 2010 SCC 6, the offence is a serious one involving a firearm in a vehicle, which raises public concerns, given the issues with gun violence related to the drug trade in Ottawa. The circumstances surrounding the offence, it involves a firearm in a vehicle. While the firearm was not fired, it was loaded in a vehicle and with the presence of drugs, it’s clearly linked to the drug trafficking trade, it is very serious, and this factor militates in favour of detention.

The potential for a lengthy period of incarceration

Mr. Lee-Jones has a record but has never been to jail before. At present, he’s already been in custody for seven months. He’s facing a sentence in excess of three years less his dead time of seven months at time and a half. There is the potential for, what I would describe, as a lengthy period of incarceration.

I’ve also considered other relevant circumstances. In R. v. Hall[^3], the Court explained that “[b]ail denial to maintain confidence in the administration of justice is not a mere ‘catch-all’ for cases where the first two grounds have failed. It represents a separate and distinct basis for bail denial not covered by the other two categories. The same facts may be relevant to all three heads, but that does not negate the distinctiveness of the three grounds.” [And that is at Hall, paragraph 30.]

Specific factors supporting a proposed bail plan are not only relevant to secondary ground concerns, but may also be relevant to tertiary ground concerns. A reasonable person’s confidence in the administration of justice could be affected by knowing that very stringent terms of release are being proposed versus very few conditions being imposed. This may have particular significant in closed cases. The public may very well, for example, lose confidence in the administration of justice upon learning that an individual charged with a serious offence was released with few conditions.

However, that confidence may not be undermined if the public were aware that very significant restrictions and continuous supervision were in place. The conditions imposed by the Court are directly relevant to public perception of the administration of justice.

While conditions of release are directly relevant to secondary ground concerns they also may be relevant to tertiary ground concerns, as I found they were in this case. I have not conflated the secondary ground analysis with the tertiary ground analysis.

In my view, the fact that Mr. Lee-Jones will be on conditions of house arrest, living in a remote area with his father, wearing an ankle bracelet, with a 30,000 bond of his father is relevant to how this plan would appear to the public, and how the public would perceive Mr. Lee-Jones being released. This is a very tight plan of bail. And I’ve also considered how the public would perceive the fact that Mr. Lee-Jones has been in maximum security custody for seven months, and is now willing to forego the possibility of employment, and to live with his father in this remote area under the conditions which have been proposed.

I’m required to consider the combined effect of all the circumstances of each case, with a special focus on the four factors singled out by Parliament, to determine whether detention is justified. The question to be answered is whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. The four listed circumstances are simply the main factors, which must be considered together with any other relevant factors. The Supreme Court pointed out, in St-Cloud, at paragraph 70, that detention is not automatic where the four factors are met.

The release of an accused person is the cardinal rule, and detention is the exception, and the Supreme Court cited R. v. Morales, [1992] 35 S.C.R. 711, in St. Cloud for that authority. To automatically order detention if all four factors are met would be contrary to the basic entitlement to be granted reasonable bail unless there is just cause to do otherwise as guaranteed by the Charter.

This entitlement rests on the cornerstone of Canadian and criminal law; namely, the presumption of innocence that is guaranteed by Section 11(d) of the Charter, as discussed in Hall, paragraph 13. These fundamental rights require the justice to ensure that interim detention is truly justified having regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case.

The perspective of the public is a reasonable person who is properly informed about “the philosophy of the legislative provisions, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case.”

As Justice Trotter, as he then was, pointed out in R. v. Dang[^4]:

A reasonable and knowledgeable member of the community may take a different view of a case in which a person charged with a violent offence is released into the community with no supervision versus a situation where a strict plan has put in – put in place to monitor the accused. The plan goes to the core of 515(10(b), but may also impact on the application of the tertiary ground, 515(10)(c).

I’ve also considered that Mr. Lee-Jones is due to have his trial early in the New Year. I appreciate that there are sound reasons, given the closeness of the trial, and a final adjudication on the matter to not make a judicial determination regarding his custodial status. However, I’ve also considered that the ability to prepare a defence is hampered for an individual in custody. These charges are serious.

In this matter alone, Mr. Langevin was not able to get access to the jail to have affidavits signed for the bail review. Access to the phones to be able to speak with counsel is limited. I’ve considered that Mr. Lee-Jones has already spent a considerable time in custody, which a reasonable member of the public would also consider. He will be under the strictest of conditions for a short period of time before his trial.

In my view, a reasonable member of the public would find that the brief period with which he will be on bail, and the importance of being able to prepare his defence by being able to meet with his lawyer is a relevant consideration militating in favour of his release.

I have also given consideration to the fact that Mr. Robert Jones, his father, is an extremely capable individual with an accomplished career working for the Canadian International Development Association. He spent much of his career in the world’s trouble spots putting out fires, including Rwanda and Guatemala. While he has been estranged from his son in the past, given his current circumstances, and the evidence I’ve heard on the reasons for the estrangement, I am satisfied he will be able to fulfil his duties as a – as a surety towards his son.

I appreciate he has not been aware of the details of his son’s life. Unfortunately, sometimes adult children conceal their activities from parents in order to avoid disapproval. Mr. Jones is not to be faulted for the fact that his son concealed his lifestyle from his father. The past estrangement and Christopher’s hiding of his lifestyle are factors which would be of limited importance to an informed member of the public when balanced with the evidence I heard about Christopher’s time in custody and the very stringent nature of the bail plan proposed.

Mr. Robert Jones is retired with the time, energy, capability and desire to act as a surety for his son. I do not find that the fact that he was unaware of his adult son’s lifestyle to be a bar to him supervising him in his own home. I’ve also considered that this arrangement will be for a short period of time before trial, which reduces the potential for any tensions or personality problem which may have arisen if this arrangement had to go on for an overly extended period of time. The area is very remote, which eliminates potential contact with unwanted urban influences. Mr. Jones is demonstrating his confidence in his ability to act as a surety by pledging a $30,000 bond and by paying for the GPS ankle bracelet, which Christopher Lee-Jones will wear.

Mr. Lee-Jones has also experienced seven months in maximum at OCDC. I believe he will follow the conditions I impose and behave appropriately at his father’s home. I’m aware of the limitations of the GPS monitoring systems, as discussed in the case law. No bail plan reduces risk to zero, and while this was a bail review regarding the tertiary grounds, for reasons already outlined, the strength of the bail plan, as part of all of the circumstances of the case, as indicated in St-Cloud, is relevant to the tertiary ground analysis. The addition of the ankle bracelet would strengthen public confidence in the plan. For that reason, I’ve included it.

I have not added Mr. Luke Gauthier as an alternate surety. I found him to be a credible and reliable witness with the very best of intentions. However, he does not know Christopher at all. For that reason, I was of the view that the plan could not include a relief surety. Mr. Jones is going to have to act as a sole surety until trial. It will be an imposition, but I am satisfied that he is more than qualified for the task, and will turn his son over to authorities if the plan of bail is breached.

For all the reasons discussed, I am satisfied that a reasonable person’s confidence in the administration of justice would not be undermined if Mr. Lee-Jones were to be granted interim judicial release. He shall be released on a recognizance with Mr. Robert Jones as his surety on the following terms: number 1, reside with Robert Jones at 3302 Nazareth, Wentworth-Nord, Quebec, J0T 1Y0. Do not possess any weapons. Do not be in possession of any drugs as outlined in the CDSA. Do not be in the seat of a motor vehicle. Do not be more than 250 feet from the inside of 3302 Nazareth, Wentworth-Nord unless in the presence of your surety, Robert Jones. Be fitted for the Recovery Science GPS ankle bracelet and wear it at all times. Not to be more than 50 kilometers from the address of 3302 Nazareth unless for a medical emergency, to attend court, to attend meeting with counsel, or to attend for the necessities of life, i.e. grocery shopping, running errands, once a week on Saturdays from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. while in the company of your surety. For clarity, in all cases, to be in the presence of your surety unless you are less than 250 from the home at 3302 Nazardeth (ph) – Nazareth.

If Mr. Jones, Sr. has to leave the address for an unforeseen appointment this matter can be brought before me to seek a variation by contacting my assistant, and I will hear the matter on an expedited basis, given that I appreciate that the terms which I have imposed are very rigid.

Are there any additional conditions which you would like to see?

MR. THOMPSON: No additional conditions, Your Honour. I’m just not – I was taking notes. I’m not sure in the “do not be in the seat of a motor vehicle” how that’s to be....

THE COURT: The driver’s seat. MR. THOMPSON: The driver’s seat. THE COURT: Right.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay, thank you.

THE COURT: Yeah, thank you for that. I intended it to be the driver’s seat. So there will be no driving. You are to be a passenger, Mr. Lee-Jones. All right? So I am going to leave these conditions with Madam Registrar. I’m going to step out the back and I’ll sign the relevant paperwork when it’s required.

Mr. Lee-Jones, I’m giving you a chance here. I believe that you have demonstrated to me – stand up, sir. You’ve demonstrated to me through your evidence that you’re willing to obey the terms that have been proposed, which are very strict. It’s a very strict bail, and the fact that your trial is coming up so quickly, I – I considered that, because for a young person, like yourself, you are going to find these terms onerous. You have to do everything that your dad says. You have to follow the terms to the letter, or you are going to wind up back in custody, which will really affect your ability to sort of meaningfully interact with your lawyer and mount a defence to this. So, you’ve provided me with the evidence, but I’m really counting on you to follow the terms that I’ve imposed. All right?

CHRISTOPHER LEE-JONES: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LANGEVIN: Thank you, Your Honour.

FORM 2 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT (SUBSECTION 5(2)) Evidence Act

I, Linda A. Lebeau, certify that this document is a true and accurate transcript of the recording of Regina v. Christopher Lee-Jones in the Superior Court of Justice, held at 161 Elgin Street, Ottawa, Ontario taken from Recording No. :0411_CR34_20191120_082609 10_LONDONA.dcr which has been certified by T. Phillips in Form 1.

June 24, 2021 Date Linda A. Lebeau

Authorized Court Transcriptionist (ACT) Secretary

[^1]: 2008 ONCA 856, [2008] O.N.C.A. 856 94 O.R. 3rd 350 at paragraph 29 [^2]: 1989 CanLII 7197 (ON SC), [1989] 47 C.C.C. 3rd 185 at 190 to 191 [^3]: 2002 SCC 64, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 [^4]: 2015 ONSC 4254, [2015] O.J. No. 3552, at paragraph 58