N.M. Mossip

The plaintiffs, purchasers of a property, sued for the return of their $50,000 deposit after the real estate transaction failed to close.

The defendant vendor counterclaimed for damages and forfeiture of the deposit.

The core issues were whether the vendor provided good and marketable title, specifically regarding the discharge of a private mortgage and the vendor's non-resident status under the Income Tax Act.

The court found that the vendor breached the Agreement of Purchase and Sale by failing to provide an executed discharge of the private mortgage on or before closing, as a lawyer's personal undertaking is not acceptable for private mortgages under Law Society of Ontario guidelines.

This breach entitled the purchasers to treat the contract as ended.

The court did not rule on the non-resident declaration issue.

The plaintiffs were awarded the return of their deposit plus pre-judgment interest, and the counterclaim was dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident while a passenger in a taxi.

The taxi collided with a vehicle owned by the defendant mother and driven by her unlicensed, intoxicated son.

The mother's insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's uninsured coverage claims, arguing the son had implied consent to drive.

The mother brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action against her, arguing her son drove without consent.

The court found the mother had explicitly forbidden her son from driving her vehicle years prior, kept the keys in their usual place, and had no reason to suspect he would take the car while she was on vacation.

The court concluded the son did not have implied consent, dismissing the action against the mother and dismissing the insurer's motion.

The accused, a Traditional Chinese Medicine practitioner, was charged with three counts of sexual assault against three former patients.

The Crown alleged the accused touched the complainants in a sexual manner under the guise of 'energy work' and medical treatment.

The court dismissed the Crown's similar fact application, finding the evidence across counts was either not probative of the sexual nature of the touching or too dissimilar.

The court acquitted the accused on all counts, finding the testimony of one complainant unreliable and harbouring a reasonable doubt as to whether the touching of the other two complainants was of a sexual nature rather than for a clinical purpose.

K.J. was found guilty of sexual assault against J.C., a 34-year-old woman with the functional capacity of a 5-9 year old.

The sentencing hearing addressed disputed facts, including the extent of sexual misconduct and a history of abuse, which the court found not proven beyond a reasonable doubt except for one incident.

The court considered aggravating factors such as K.J.'s prior sexual misconduct convictions, J.C.'s vulnerability, a trust-like relationship, and the severe impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors were few.

The court applied sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, imposing a sentence of 6 years imprisonment along with ancillary orders.

The applicant sought to vary a consent order regarding custody, access, and child support for two children, requesting equal time-sharing and divided decision-making.

The respondent opposed any changes.

The court found a material change in circumstances, primarily due to the applicant's significantly improved mental health and the children's expressed wishes for more time with their mother.

Applying the 'best interests of the child' test, the court granted the variation, ordering joint custody with equal time-sharing and divided decision-making authority for medical, dental, and educational matters.

Child support was reserved for further agreement or hearing.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following a 9-day trial where the applicant, Joan Ann Mary Fox, was largely successful in her claims for spousal and child support arrears.

The court found the respondent, James Henry Fox, acted in bad faith due to extensive financial non-disclosure, deliberate destruction of business records, and causing extraordinary delay in the litigation.

The respondent's offers to settle were deemed unreasonable, partly because they did not include costs and were made without adequate financial disclosure.

Consequently, the applicant was awarded costs on a full recovery basis, subject to minor adjustments for duplication of counsel work, travel time, previous counsel's fees, and a small amount for the respondent's limited success on four minor issues.

In a voir dire during a criminal prosecution for importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown sought a ruling that the accused’s videotaped police statement was voluntary and admissible.

The defence argued the statement was improperly induced because police referenced the accused’s family being in trouble due to the intercepted drug package.

Applying the confessions rule and the contextual approach from leading Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court considered whether police conduct amounted to a threat or promise capable of overbearing the accused’s will.

The court found no quid pro quo or inducement linking the accused’s cooperation to leniency for himself or his family.

The videotaped statement was therefore found to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt and admissible at trial.

The accused brought a Charter application under s. 8 seeking exclusion of evidence obtained from his cellular phone following his arrest.

Police seized the phone from a relative in the parking lot of the police detachment shortly after the accused surrendered and conducted a cursory search of text messages without a warrant.

The court held that the seizure and search were lawful as searches incidental to arrest, given the temporal and geographic proximity to the arrest and reasonable grounds to believe the phone contained evidence of the offence.

The search was limited and focused on relevant messages.

In the alternative, the court held that even if a Charter breach occurred, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) following the Grant framework.

The accused applied under ss. 8, 9, and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude drugs found in the trunk of a vehicle following his arrest for multiple counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The defence alleged the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds and argued that officers fabricated surveillance observations and notes after the arrest.

The court rejected the defence theory, finding that key allegations of fabrication were never put to the officers in cross‑examination contrary to the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

After reviewing the surveillance evidence, confidential informant information, and officer testimony, the court concluded that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and that the search of the vehicle was lawful as incidental to arrest.

The evidence of the accused and a co‑accused was rejected as improbable and inconsistent with the credible testimony of the officers.

Following the breakdown of a 14‑year common law relationship with two children, the applicant sought determinations regarding retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support, imputation of income to the respondent, allocation of section 7 expenses, accounting of joint financial dealings, and disposition of the jointly owned home.

The court found the respondent to be an unreliable witness and imputed income of $130,000 pursuant to s. 19 of the Child Support Guidelines.

Spousal support was ordered on both compensatory and non‑compensatory bases, reflecting the applicant’s long absence from the workforce to raise children and support the respondent’s career.

Retroactive support was recalculated to the date of separation, resulting in arrears after credits and adjustments.

Claims by the respondent for occupation rent, resulting trust over joint assets, and reimbursement for mortgage payments from inherited funds were dismissed, while the applicant received credits for certain expenses and property taken by the respondent.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young child.

The Crown relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, who adopted videotaped police statements admitted pursuant to s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the reliability and credibility of the child witness based on inconsistencies and prior admitted lies about unrelated matters.

Applying governing jurisprudence on the assessment of child witnesses, the court held that inconsistencies on peripheral matters did not undermine the reliability of the core allegation.

Finding the complainant credible and reliable and noting the absence of any motive to fabricate, the court concluded the Crown had proven the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant father brought a motion for contempt and a motion to change a prior custody and access order, alleging the respondent mother had wilfully breached an earlier court order governing parenting time and decision‑making.

After a lengthy trial, the court found the evidence did not establish deliberate or wilful disobedience of the order beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court concluded that the family dynamics involved a combination of unintended parental influence and realistic estrangement arising from the child’s own experiences with the father, rather than deliberate parental alienation.

Given the deteriorated family relationships and the child’s resistance to rigid access enforcement, the court rescinded significant portions of the earlier order and replaced it with a more flexible arrangement recognizing the child’s maturity and autonomy.

Joint custody was maintained with primary residence with the mother and parenting time to be arranged directly between the father and the child.

The applicant, a resident and taxpayer of Mississauga, sought judicial review of the Report of the City of Mississauga Judicial Inquiry.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the application on the basis that the applicant lacked standing.

The court found that the applicant had no direct, personal interest in the inquiry's findings and therefore lacked private standing.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicant did not meet the test for public interest standing, as he was not directly affected and there were other individuals with a greater interest who could have challenged the inquiry.

The motion was granted and the application for judicial review was quashed.