Christopher J. Edwards

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation claim.

The plaintiff, former Executive Director of the local Chamber of Commerce, sued the defendants after they wrote letters to various organizations criticizing her job performance and calling for her termination.

The court found that while the expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff's claim had substantial merit and there were grounds to believe the defences of qualified privilege and fair comment would fail.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by the plaintiff outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions, which were vitriolic and motivated by personal animus.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for default judgment after the defendants misappropriated $325,000 in investment funds and failed to defend the action.

The defendants, acting as financial advisors, repeatedly evaded requests to return the funds and provided fabricated portfolio reports.

The court granted judgment for the represented portfolio value of $345,071.45, continued a Mareva injunction, and awarded $100,000 in punitive damages due to the defendants' deceitful and callous conduct.

The defendant school board brought a motion to dismiss or stay the plaintiff's action for negligent administration of long-term disability benefits, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute was subject to grievance and arbitration under a collective agreement.

The court found that the essential character of the dispute involved the duties regarding enrolment in the benefits plan, which the collective agreement was silent on.

The court concluded it had jurisdiction and dismissed the defendant's motion.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against the plaintiff's controlling mind, Mr. Beach, for allegedly violating previous court orders, and an interlocutory injunction to restrain him from interfering in the management of joint venture development projects.

The court dismissed the motion for an injunction, finding it unnecessary as the parties had reached an understanding regarding the interpretation of the joint venture agreements.

The court also declined to make a finding of contempt, noting that while Mr. Beach's conduct was not condoned, it did not rise to the level requiring a contempt order and would be better addressed through costs.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for the appointment of a receiver and an interlocutory injunction, the parties could not agree on costs.

The defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis of $290,313.82, alleging improper conduct by the plaintiff.

The court found no reprehensible conduct warranting substantial indemnity costs.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, including the overriding principle of reasonableness and the defendants' divided success on their own motion, the court fixed costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendants at $120,000.

The plaintiff insurance brokerage sought an interim interlocutory injunction restraining former employee producers and their new employer from soliciting or dealing with certain customers pending a full motion hearing.

The court applied the three‑part test from RJR–MacDonald for interlocutory injunctions.

While there appeared to be a strong prima facie case against one former employee, the evidence against the others was largely speculative, and the alleged harm was found to be quantifiable through damages given the nature of the brokerage business.

Considering the balance of convenience, delay by the plaintiff, and the availability of undertakings proposed by the defendants, the court declined to grant the requested interim injunction and instead accepted undertakings pending the return of the motion.

Correctional officers sued a union official and the union for defamation arising from statements made in a regional president’s report delivered at a national union assembly describing the plaintiffs as conducting a campaign of “lies and untruths” during a union raiding effort.

The court found the statements were defamatory and made on an occasion of qualified privilege because they were delivered by a union officer to union members regarding union affairs.

However, the privilege was defeated because the language accusing the plaintiffs of lying was irrelevant to the reporting duty and motivated by an ulterior purpose to discredit and intimidate those attempting to challenge the union’s bargaining status.

The court also found actual malice based on a coordinated effort to label opponents as liars during the raid.

Each plaintiff was awarded $25,000 in general damages and $7,000 in aggravated damages.

On the counterclaim, defamatory internet publications about the union were proven but resulted only in nominal damages to the union.