Charles D. Hammond

Three consolidated actions arising from a joint venture between 2264052 Ontario Inc. and HarbourEdge Realty Administration Corporation for the development of 14 homes at Brockwoods subdivision in Brockville, Ontario, and a mortgage advanced by HarbourEdge Mortgage Investment Corporation.

The joint venture was terminated in August 2015.

The court determined that the joint venture's net profit was $838,865, entitling the plaintiff to $419,432.50 (50% share).

The court rejected the defendant's deduction of $561,270 for land contribution and excluded $235,902 in construction costs not intended to be borne by the joint venture.

The court awarded the mortgage lender $370,000 principal but rejected claims for $154,552.62 in expenses and $118,100 in fees.

Prejudgment interest was awarded at 10% per annum, compounding semi-annually, on both awards, with set-off ordered between the actions.

Three consolidated actions arising from a joint venture between 2264052 Ontario Inc. and HarbourEdge Realty Administration Corporation for the development of 14 homes at Brockwoods subdivision in Brockville, Ontario, and a mortgage advanced by HarbourEdge Mortgage Investment Corporation.

The joint venture was terminated in August 2015.

The court determined that the joint venture's net profit was $838,865, entitling the plaintiff to $419,432.50 (50% share).

The court rejected the defendant's deduction of $561,270 for land contribution and excluded $235,902 in construction costs not intended to be borne by the joint venture.

The court awarded the mortgage lender $370,000 principal but rejected claims for $154,552.62 in expenses and $118,100 in fees.

Prejudgment interest was awarded at 10% per annum, compounding semi-annually, on both awards, with set-off ordered between the actions.

The self-represented defendant, Lucy Shaver, brought a motion seeking release from a prior settlement agreement that required her to transfer a residential property to the plaintiff, Shaver-Kudell Manufacturing Inc. The court dismissed her motion, refusing an adjournment request and finding no legal basis for the relief sought.

The judge noted Lucy Shaver's failure to provide supporting evidence and emphasized that her motion was an improper attempt to circumvent the appeal process for a previous decision by McVey J.

Eric Linseman, the grandson of the deceased Raymond Edward Linseman, brought an application for dependant support from his grandfather's estate under the Succession Law Reform Act.

Eric, who had lived with his grandfather for many years due to his own challenges and his mother's inability to provide care, argued he was a dependant.

The estate trustees (Eric's mother and uncle) opposed, asserting Eric was not dependent and had received sufficient funds outside the will.

The court found a clear relationship of dependency, noting the grandfather's consistent support and the inadequacy of the existing trust fund for Eric's long-term needs.

The court also criticized the executors' conduct, including the wrongful transfer of estate property and destruction of documents.

The application for dependant support was granted, including the transfer of the deceased's property to Eric, but the claim for retroactive child support against Eric's mother was dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The plaintiff brought an unopposed summary judgment motion against the defendant to determine the quantum of damages following a liability trial where the defendants were found liable for breach of confidence and misappropriating trade secrets.

Relying on uncontradicted expert evidence, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and awarded the plaintiff $776,000 in economic damages for lost sales and inability to increase prices, plus prejudgment interest and costs.

The applicants sought a declaration that the respondent had no claim to an interest in a property following his alleged failure to close a real estate transaction.

The respondent argued the seller lacked authority to convey title, despite a Vesting Order being obtained.

The court found the respondent failed to close and the applicants were ready, willing, and able.

The Vesting Order was deemed valid.

The court dismissed the respondent's arguments, stating he had no right not to close and was not entitled to specific performance as the property was not unique and he was not ready, willing, and able to close.

The application was granted, declaring the respondent had no interest in the property.

The appellant, Heritage Preservation Holdings, appealed a judgment requiring it to close the sale of a hotel property and allowing a holdback for deficiencies.

The appeal raised three issues: contract formation, an implied term regarding the first mortgage amount, and responsibility for certain property deficiencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the contract formation and implied term grounds, finding a binding agreement was formed and no such term could be implied.

However, the appeal was allowed in part regarding the deficiencies issue, specifically finding the appellant was not responsible for certain fire separation, kitchen exhaust, and fire suppression system deficiencies under the Agreement of Purchase and Sale's disclosure clause.

The holdback was maintained, but only for repairs for which the appellant was responsible.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed a motion judge's decision that a debt arising from misappropriation of trade secrets would survive bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

The motion judge erred by interpreting "false pretences" too broadly, including lying during discovery and generally morally objectionable conduct, rather than requiring a deceitful statement by which the debtor obtained property or services.

The Court clarified that s. 178(1)(e) requires a direct causal link between a deceitful statement and the obtaining of property/services.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the declaration regarding s. 178(1)(e) and varying the stay of proceedings to allow quantification of claims for bankruptcy purposes and enforcement of injunctive relief, but not monetary judgments outside of bankruptcy.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a lower court order that declared his debts would survive bankruptcy and lifted a stay of proceedings.

The respondent opposed the extension, arguing there was no right to appeal without leave and that the appeal lacked merit.

The respondent also brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time, finding that the appellant had a right to appeal under sections 193(c) and 193(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and that the proposed appeal had arguable merit.

The court dismissed the respondent's cross-motion for security for costs, concluding that the "other good reason" test under Rule 61.06(1)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure was not met, given the appellant's impecuniosity and the arguable merit of the appeal.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a declaration that the defendant's liability for misappropriating trade secrets would not be released upon his discharge from bankruptcy, and for an order lifting the bankruptcy stay to proceed with the damages trial.

The court found that the defendant's conduct in knowingly using the plaintiff's confidential information to manufacture competing products constituted 'false pretences' under section 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court granted the declaration and lifted the stay without terms, allowing the plaintiff to proceed with the damages phase of the trial.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that a first promissory note, which required repayment of a loan upon the deceased's death, was valid and enforceable, rather than a second note that forgave the loan.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in rejecting witness testimony and finding an email purportedly from the deceased was not sent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding that the proposed fresh evidence regarding the email did not meet the test for admission and would not have changed the outcome.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs, primarily based on two unpaid costs awards totaling $125,000.

The court applied Rule 56.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the holistic "justness" principle from Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation.

The court found the defendants satisfied the initial onus due to the unpaid costs.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that an order for security would be unjust, particularly regarding impecuniosity, the merits of its claim, and its dilatory conduct in litigation.

The court granted the motion, ordering the plaintiff to post $150,000 security for costs, with a provision to reduce the amount to $20,000 if the outstanding costs awards plus accrued interest were paid within 60 days of the motion hearing.

The plaintiff mortgagee sought summary judgment on multiple defaulted mortgages granted to the defendants to fund a joint venture land development project.

The defendants argued the mortgages were unenforceable due to an oral agreement that the loans would only be repaid from future lot sales, and disputed the amounts owing.

The court granted summary judgment, holding that the alleged oral agreement was barred by the Statute of Frauds and the doctrine of part performance did not apply.

The court also declined to stay the enforcement of the judgments under Rule 20.08, finding the defendants' counterclaims lacked merit and the prejudice to the plaintiffs in delaying recovery was significant.

The defendants brought a motion to consolidate several debt enforcement actions with a related action they commenced against the plaintiff and others, arising from a failed joint venture.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the debt enforcement actions were capable of summary determination and that the balance of convenience did not favour consolidation, as it would unnecessarily delay the adjudication of the debt claims.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against the plaintiff's controlling mind, Mr. Beach, for allegedly violating previous court orders, and an interlocutory injunction to restrain him from interfering in the management of joint venture development projects.

The court dismissed the motion for an injunction, finding it unnecessary as the parties had reached an understanding regarding the interpretation of the joint venture agreements.

The court also declined to make a finding of contempt, noting that while Mr. Beach's conduct was not condoned, it did not rise to the level requiring a contempt order and would be better addressed through costs.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for a certificate of pending litigation to stop power of sale proceedings, the successful parties sought costs.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis, finding that the defendants' pursuit of the motion without evidence or pleading of fraud in relation to the mortgages was reprehensible conduct.

The court fixed the costs at $24,500, noting that the amount was fair and reasonable given the urgency and complexity of the inter-related actions.

The defendants in a mortgage enforcement action brought a motion for a certificate of pending litigation over nine parcels of land to stop power of sale proceedings.

They alleged that the mortgages were unenforceable due to the plaintiffs' breach of joint venture agreements and bad faith.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants had no reasonable claim to an interest in land, had not offered to redeem the mortgages, had not pleaded fraud affecting the right to redeem, and that damages would be a sufficient remedy.

The appellant sought to be added as a necessary party to an action under Rule 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge dismissed the application, and the appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, finding that the appellant's status as a creditor of the successful plaintiff and his role as an expert witness at arbitration did not make him a necessary party to the action for purposes of enforcing the plaintiff's judgment.

The court also clarified that Rule 60.06 does not provide a basis for adding parties to an action.

The appellant, Cornerstone Builders Ltd., appealed a partial summary judgment granted by the motion judge in favour of the respondent, 1652620 Ontario Inc. The motion judge awarded payment of monies due under a promissory note and struck out portions of the counterclaim.

The core dispute arose from a shareholders' agreement requiring a non-competition agreement upon cessation of shareholding.

After the appellant purchased the respondent's shares in 2011, a falling out occurred and the respondent's principal established a competing business without signing the non-competition agreement.

The appellant ceased making payments on the promissory note.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding errors in the motion judge's approach to the stay of execution, the adjournment of the summary judgment motion, and the striking of counterclaim allegations.

The defendants brought a motion to stay or transfer two Small Claims Court actions commenced by the plaintiff to the Superior Court, where a related misrepresentation action was pending.

The Superior Court action alleged misrepresentations inducing the franchise agreement, while the Small Claims Court actions alleged post-agreement contractual breaches regarding a promotion fund and fee reductions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the actions were factually and legally distinct, and that transferring the smaller claims would impose an unnecessary financial burden on the plaintiff.