Jonathan Paul McCauley Collings

The applicants, four great-grandchildren of the deceased, sought a declaration that funds placed in four RESPs by their great-grandfather were impressed with a trust for their post-secondary education.

The respondent, their great-aunt and the subscriber of the RESPs, argued the funds were a gift to her and she had sole discretion over them.

After refusing to release funds for one applicant's tuition and subsequently closing two of the RESPs to take the funds for herself, the applicants brought this application.

The court found the three certainties of trust were met, the claim was not statute-barred, and the respondent breached her fiduciary duty.

The court ordered the respondent removed as subscriber, replaced by a neutral third party, and ordered her to repay the misappropriated funds with investment growth.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellant, acting as estate trustee, transferred $400,000 to herself from her late stepfather's estate, claiming it was an inter vivos gift.

The respondent successfully challenged the transfer at first instance.

On appeal, the appellant argued the application judge erred by excluding the stepfather's investment advisor's notes as hearsay and by finding the gift was incomplete.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the exclusion of the notes as double hearsay under the Evidence Act and affirming the finding that the stepfather lacked a continuing intention to make the specific gift.

The applicant, as estate trustee, sought to remove a co-trustee and recover approximately $689,000 in transfers made by the deceased to the respondents during her lifetime, claiming the transfers were subject to resulting trusts.

The respondents moved for a declaration that the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court determined that the applicable limitation period was the two-year period under the Limitations Act, 2002, not the two-year period under section 38 of the Trustee Act.

The court held that the cause of action arose during the deceased's lifetime when the transfers occurred, and therefore the Limitations Act, 2002 applied.

Since the applications were commenced more than two years after the last impugned transaction, the court dismissed the applications as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Kyrle Blake Farmer, who had served as estate trustee and attorney for property for his aunt, Billie Frances Farmer.

The respondents, his brothers, challenged his distributions and expenses.

The application judge found that Billie lacked capacity to provide instructions, that the appellant’s compensation and expenses were not justified, and that he failed to keep proper accounts.

The appellant was ordered to repay significant sums to the estate.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge’s findings or orders and dismissed the appeal with costs.

This decision resolves an application for directions regarding the administration and distribution of the estate of Yvonne Chieffallo.

The court confirms Elisa Chieffallo and Patrick Briggs as estate trustees, orders equal distribution of the residue among the named beneficiaries, and determines that certain assets (the Valley Drive property, Courtyard Crescent property, and a BMO account) do not form part of the estate.

The court also addresses the doctrine of renunciation and intermeddling, the presumption of resulting trust, and the allocation of proceeds from the sale of a vehicle.

The applicant, Heather Ann Hugginson, sought a declaration that a $400,000 inter vivos gift allegedly given by the deceased, Glenn Poole, to the respondent, Sandra Hugginson, was invalid and that the funds should be returned to the estate.

The court found that Sandra failed to prove Glenn’s specific intent to make the gift or that he delivered the gift before his death.

The court also rejected the argument that the gift was perfected when Sandra became estate trustee, finding the rule in Strong v. Bird did not apply.

The application was granted and Sandra was ordered to return the $400,000 to the estate.

The plaintiff sought damages for losses arising from the defendant’s failure to complete a real estate purchase.

The court found the plaintiff acted reasonably in re-listing and selling the property after the defendant’s breach, rejected the defence of failure to mitigate, and awarded damages and costs to the plaintiff.

The court also addressed the admissibility of evidence from the plaintiff’s real estate agent as a participant expert.

This appeal concerned a dispute over specific performance of a property transfer agreement between a son (respondent) and his father and stepmother (appellants).

The trial judge had dismissed the appellants' claim for specific performance, finding no uniqueness in the property and delay by the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the subjective uniqueness of the property as the appellants' established home and the unique nature of the transaction.

The Court also found no unreasonable delay by the appellants in seeking specific performance, as the respondent had repudiated the agreement.

Specific performance was ordered, along with an accounting of expenses and a reassessment of costs in favour of the appellants.

The estate trustees appealed a decision finding the deceased's grandson to be a dependant and ordering the transfer of the deceased's home to him as support.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of dependency, noting the deceased provided shelter, moral guidance, and some financial support to the vulnerable grandson.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the issue of remedy, finding the application judge failed to consider the deceased's testamentary intentions regarding the family home.

Instead of transferring the property, the court ordered a monetary award of $152,000 to be paid from the estate.

Eric Linseman, the grandson of the deceased Raymond Edward Linseman, brought an application for dependant support from his grandfather's estate under the Succession Law Reform Act.

Eric, who had lived with his grandfather for many years due to his own challenges and his mother's inability to provide care, argued he was a dependant.

The estate trustees (Eric's mother and uncle) opposed, asserting Eric was not dependent and had received sufficient funds outside the will.

The court found a clear relationship of dependency, noting the grandfather's consistent support and the inadequacy of the existing trust fund for Eric's long-term needs.

The court also criticized the executors' conduct, including the wrongful transfer of estate property and destruction of documents.

The application for dependant support was granted, including the transfer of the deceased's property to Eric, but the claim for retroactive child support against Eric's mother was dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The court issued a costs endorsement following a determination of claims and counterclaims.

Applying principles of fairness, reasonableness, and access to justice, and considering Rule 57 factors, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendants.

The court found the defendants' claimed hours and rates excessive compared to the plaintiff's counsel, fixing fees at $30,000 plus HST and disbursements at $3957.74, payable by the plaintiff to the defendants.

The plaintiff son brought an action to set aside an agreement to transfer his house to his defendant father and stepmother, claiming he signed it under duress.

The defendants counterclaimed for specific performance of the agreement.

The court found the plaintiff was not a credible witness and dismissed the claim of duress, holding the agreement was valid and enforceable.

However, the court declined to order specific performance, finding the property was not unique to the defendants and damages were an adequate remedy.

The defendants were awarded $48,384.72 in damages for loans, rent, and property expenses, and were ordered to vacate the premises within six months.

The defendants 1995636 Ontario Inc. and Lisa Bailey brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings due to the plaintiff's alleged failure to timely disclose multiple settlement agreements with another defendant, 2495048 Ontario Inc. In the alternative, they sought severance of claims against them, arguing their involvement was discrete.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the undisclosed agreements did not "entirely alter the landscape of the litigation" or change the adversarial position of the parties into a cooperative one.

The court also dismissed the motion for severance, determining that the test for joinder was met due to common questions of fact and law and interconnectedness between the claims across multiple properties, promoting efficiency and avoiding inconsistent judgments.

The court-appointed Receiver and certain plaintiffs brought motions to interpret or amend a 2017 costs order made by Justice Kane.

The costs order, as drafted, appeared to make Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 396 (CCC 396) jointly and severally liable with the Burdet Group defendants to pay $410,000 in costs to the plaintiffs.

However, the same order also awarded CCC 396 $220,000 in costs payable by the plaintiffs.

The court found that the costs order contained an accidental omission and was inconsistent with Justice Kane's written costs decision.

Applying Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court amended the costs order to explicitly exclude CCC 396 from the defendants liable to pay costs to the plaintiffs.

The applicant, as estate trustee, brought a motion for directions seeking an order for a formal passing of accounts by the respondent for his time acting as their mother's Power of Attorney for Property.

The applicant also sought to have issues regarding a mortgage held in the respondent's name tried jointly.

The court dismissed the motion for a formal passing of accounts, finding that the respondent had already provided extensive informal accounting and the applicant failed to raise any significant concern or specific allegations of misfeasance to warrant a formal passing.

A case conference was ordered to address the remaining mortgage issues.

The defendants sought costs after successfully moving to dismiss the plaintiff's action as an abuse of process.

The court had previously found that the action was commenced under a pseudonym by a declared vexatious litigant who required leave to start an action.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the CBC defendants and another defendant, finding the plaintiff's conduct justified elevated costs.

The court also noted inappropriate submissions made by the plaintiff's counsel.

The applicant, a 50% shareholder and director of a restaurant corporation, brought an application for an oppression remedy against his brother (the other 50% shareholder) and his sister-in-law.

The respondents had negotiated a lease buyout without the applicant's knowledge, deposited the proceeds into a separate account, and diverted funds to the sister-in-law under a fabricated security agreement.

The court found that the respondents' actions breached the applicant's reasonable expectations under the unanimous shareholder agreement and constituted oppression.

The court ordered an accounting, the discharge of the security agreement, and the return of diverted funds to a trust account.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss a $20 million libel action, alleging the plaintiff was actually a declared vexatious litigant using an alias to circumvent a court order requiring leave to commence proceedings.

The plaintiff repeatedly failed to comply with court orders to produce government-issued identification.

The court drew an adverse inference from this failure, concluding the plaintiff was indeed the vexatious litigant using an alias.

The action was dismissed as an abuse of process and for failing to obtain the required leave.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order that varied a 2000 judgment concerning a right-of-way and the removal of gates.

The motion judge, applying Rule 59.06, corrected a "slip" in the original judgment and further amended it to exempt an additional gate ("gate located at the lake") from removal, based on the original judge's manifest intention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's interpretation of the original order and application of Rule 59.06 to be reasonable and within the scope of amendment powers.