Chaim David Freedman

The applicant, as estate trustee, sought to remove a co-trustee and recover approximately $689,000 in transfers made by the deceased to the respondents during her lifetime, claiming the transfers were subject to resulting trusts.

The respondents moved for a declaration that the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court determined that the applicable limitation period was the two-year period under the Limitations Act, 2002, not the two-year period under section 38 of the Trustee Act.

The court held that the cause of action arose during the deceased's lifetime when the transfers occurred, and therefore the Limitations Act, 2002 applied.

Since the applications were commenced more than two years after the last impugned transaction, the court dismissed the applications as statute-barred.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal three interlocutory orders made by the case management judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal the order for production of documents, awarding costs to the responding parties.

The court granted leave to appeal the order requiring an assessment of capacity to instruct counsel and stayed that order pending the appeal.

The motion for leave to appeal the suspension of counsel's appointment pending the assessment was dismissed.

The deceased was subject to court orders requiring him to pay spousal and child support and to maintain his wife as the irrevocable beneficiary of his life insurance policy.

After separation, the deceased entered into a relationship with another woman whose child was born three months after his death.

The deceased left an insolvent estate.

The other woman brought an application for dependants' relief seeking to claw back the life insurance proceeds into the estate under section 72(1)(f) of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The wife sought a declaration that the policy did not form part of the estate or that she was a creditor whose rights were protected under section 72(7) of the Act.

The trial judge and Divisional Court held the policy formed part of the estate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 72(7) excludes from the claw back the amount of proceeds required to satisfy the deceased's court-ordered spousal and child support obligations where the support recipient was designated as the irrevocable beneficiary.

The appellant, a grandchild of the deceased, appealed the dismissal of her application to remove the named executors and trustees of the deceased's estate.

The executors were the deceased's two sons.

The appellant claimed the executors would not treat her fairly and had breached their fiduciary duties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence supporting the appellant's claims.

The court noted that the key property at issue had been sold, the executors had honored the deceased's non-binding request regarding the cottage, and the mere existence of friction between the executors and the appellant's mother did not justify removal.

The deceased was aware of existing tensions but nonetheless named the respondents as executors.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following an unsuccessful application by the applicant to remove the respondents as estate trustees and a related motion for leave to introduce additional affidavits.

The respondents sought costs on a full indemnity basis, arguing the applicant pursued personal interests and made unfounded allegations.

The applicant argued for partial indemnity costs, denying egregious conduct and challenging the quantum.

The court, applying public policy considerations in estate litigation, found the applicant's actions undermined the testator's choice of trustees and proper estate administration.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the respondents for both the application and the motion, to be paid personally by the applicant.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision striking their statement of claim without leave to amend.

The claim sought to set aside a transfer of real property to the respondent, alleging an oral promise by their parents to gift the property to the appellants' company.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge's reasons sufficient and agreed with the characterization of the claim as a promise to make a gift.

However, the Court held that the motion judge erred by failing to grant leave to amend the pleading under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellants were granted leave to amend their statement of claim to plead an oral agreement concerning the property.

The appellants appealed a trial decision finding that a $1 million life insurance policy was part of the deceased's estate and available for dependant support claims under the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA).

The deceased had been ordered on consent to maintain his former spouse as the irrevocable beneficiary of the policy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the deceased still 'owned' the policy under s. 72(1)(f) of the SLRA despite the irrevocable designation.

The Court further held that the former spouse did not have 'creditor rights' under s. 72(7) because the designation did not create a security interest, and she was not entitled to damages for breach of contract.

Following earlier reasons determining that insurance proceeds formed part of an estate and that a claimant qualified as a spouse under s. 57 of the Succession Law Reform Act, the court addressed costs of the proceeding.

The applicants sought full indemnity costs payable from the estate after partial success at trial and on an earlier motion.

The respondents argued the requested costs were excessive and should be denied or reserved.

The court held that a proper costs determination required resolution of outstanding issues, including whether the claimant qualified as a dependant and the amount and form of support to be ordered.

Costs of the prior motion, preliminary motion, and trial phase were therefore reserved to the judge who will ultimately determine the remaining issues.

The applicants, the deceased's common-law partner and their child, sought dependants' relief from the deceased's estate.

The central issue was whether a $1 million life insurance policy, which the deceased had been ordered to maintain with his estranged wife as the irrevocable beneficiary in prior family law proceedings, was available to all dependants under s. 72(1)(f) of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court held that the deceased still 'owned' the policy despite the court orders, and the estranged wife was not a 'creditor' under s. 72(7).

The policy proceeds were therefore deemed part of the estate for dependants' relief purposes.

The court also found the common-law partner met the definition of 'spouse' under the Act.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs’ claim concerning a transfer of real property allegedly gifted by the parties’ parents to the defendant.

The plaintiffs alleged the transfer should be voided based on mental incapacity of the donors, undue influence, and alleged oral promises that the property would pass to them as part of an estate plan.

The court reviewed the test for striking pleadings under Rule 21 and the “plain and obvious” standard.

While certain arguments based on the Statute of Frauds and evidentiary issues were premature at the pleading stage, the court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the pleadings could not sustain the relief sought.

The motion to strike was allowed and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The applicant, who was pregnant with the deceased's child at the time of his death, brought a motion for interim support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The deceased's ex-wife opposed the motion, arguing the applicant was not a dependant and that the deceased's life insurance policy was not available for support due to an irrevocable beneficiary designation in her favour.

The court held that the applicant was a dependant and that the life insurance proceeds were available to satisfy the support claim under s. 72 of the Act.

The court ordered $20,000 in interim support to be paid from the insurance proceeds.

Following a successful motion by certain beneficiaries to strike a will challenge on the basis of estoppel, the court determined costs arising from the motion.

The unsuccessful parties argued that costs should be paid from the estate due to the alleged novelty of applying estoppel to bar a will challenge within the limitation period and contended the claimed costs were excessive.

The court rejected that position, emphasizing the modern principle that estate litigation costs are not automatically payable from the estate.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed partial indemnity costs for the successful moving parties and reduced certain billed amounts for duplication and excess.

Costs were ordered payable personally by the unsuccessful challengers rather than from estate assets.

The moving parties sought to strike a will challenge brought by an estate trustee and her son concerning the validity of the deceased’s 2010 primary and secondary wills.

The estate trustee had administered aspects of the estate for over a year, including paying significant estate taxes, relying on the wills in dealings with third parties, and exercising authority as estate trustee.

The court held that her conduct created an assumption among the parties that the wills were valid and that others relied on that assumption to their detriment, particularly in relation to complex estate planning transactions and tax consequences arising from an estate freeze.

Applying the doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention, the court concluded that the estate trustee was barred from challenging the wills.

The son’s parallel challenge was also struck because he lacked independent knowledge of the estate and acted as a proxy for the trustee.