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The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's interpretation of a will's residue clause using the armchair rule.
The appellant, Miriam Young, appealed the application judge's interpretation of the residue clause in the last will and testament of Saul Jonas, specifically the meaning of 'in equal shares per stirpes' for the 60% portion of the estate designated for grandchildren and great-grandchildren.
The appellant argued for an interpretation that would benefit the children more, while the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) advocated for an equal division among the grandchildren.
The Court of Appeal applied the 'armchair rule' and upheld the application judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in her assessment of the testator's intention to ensure equal distribution within the beneficiary classes.
The appeal regarding the will's interpretation was dismissed.
The appellant also sought leave to appeal a costs order, which was granted, but that appeal was also dismissed, with a portion of the costs payable personally by the appellant.
Constructive trust granted over insurance proceeds after unjust enrichment was established.
The appellant sought life insurance proceeds after paying premiums under an oral separation agreement that required maintenance of her beneficiary designation.
The insured later redesignated a new spouse as irrevocable beneficiary, and the proceeds were paid accordingly.
The majority held the respondent was unjustly enriched at the appellant’s expense and found no juristic reason under the Insurance Act to defeat restitution.
A remedial constructive trust over the full proceeds was imposed because a personal remedy was inadequate in the circumstances.
The dissent would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that statutory beneficiary protections supplied a juristic reason and that corresponding deprivation was not established.
The court narrowed the scope of documentary disclosure in a guardianship dispute to ensure proportionality.
The applicant, Joanne Chuvalo, brought a motion for directions in a guardianship application concerning George Chuvalo.
She sought extensive disclosure of medical, financial, and legal records, and orders to revoke powers of attorney for property and personal care held by George's children, Mitchell and Vanessa Chuvalo.
The court narrowed the scope of disclosure, limiting medical records to periods surrounding the creation of the powers of attorney and dismissing most requests for financial and legal records as premature or disproportionate.
The primary issues were identified as the validity and potential revocation of the 2014 and 2016 powers of attorney.
Costs were reserved to the judge hearing the main guardianship application.
Appeal allowed to grant leave to amend a statement of claim regarding an oral property agreement.
The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision striking their statement of claim without leave to amend.
The claim sought to set aside a transfer of real property to the respondent, alleging an oral promise by their parents to gift the property to the appellants' company.
The Court of Appeal found the motion judge's reasons sufficient and agreed with the characterization of the claim as a promise to make a gift.
However, the Court held that the motion judge erred by failing to grant leave to amend the pleading under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The appeal was allowed, and the appellants were granted leave to amend their statement of claim to plead an oral agreement concerning the property.
Motion to strike allowed where plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge property gift.
The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs’ claim concerning a transfer of real property allegedly gifted by the parties’ parents to the defendant.
The plaintiffs alleged the transfer should be voided based on mental incapacity of the donors, undue influence, and alleged oral promises that the property would pass to them as part of an estate plan.
The court reviewed the test for striking pleadings under Rule 21 and the “plain and obvious” standard.
While certain arguments based on the Statute of Frauds and evidentiary issues were premature at the pleading stage, the court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the pleadings could not sustain the relief sought.
The motion to strike was allowed and costs were awarded to the defendant.