David M. Smith

This case involved two consolidated applications concerning the Estate of William R. Harper.

The primary dispute was over the beneficiary designation of a Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) and a Life Income Fund (LIF) held with National Bank Financial Inc. (NBF).

Erin Forsyth claimed to be the beneficiary of both, based on a disputed beneficiary designation form.

Dona Jean Murphy, as Estate Trustee, argued the Estate was the beneficiary and challenged Forsyth's designation on grounds of undue influence and lack of capacity.

The court found the disputed form valid for the RRSP only, designating Forsyth as beneficiary, and dismissed claims of undue influence and lack of capacity.

The LIF was determined to be part of the Estate.

This case involved two consolidated applications concerning the Estate of William R. Harper.

The primary dispute was over the beneficiary designation of a Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) and a Life Income Fund (LIF) held with National Bank Financial Inc. (NBF).

Erin Forsyth claimed to be the beneficiary of both, based on a disputed beneficiary designation form.

Dona Jean Murphy, as Estate Trustee, argued the Estate was the beneficiary and challenged Forsyth's designation on grounds of undue influence and lack of capacity.

The court found the disputed form valid for the RRSP only, designating Forsyth as beneficiary, and dismissed claims of undue influence and lack of capacity.

The LIF was determined to be part of the Estate.

The appellant, Peter Childs, appealed a motion judge's decision denying him standing in the passing of accounts for his incapable mother, Eileen Childs.

The motion judge had found the appellant to be a vexatious litigant attempting to relitigate previously decided issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the finding of vexatious litigation and abuse of process.

The court also issued an order prohibiting the appellant from filing further motions in the passing of accounts proceeding without leave.

The appellant sought life insurance proceeds after paying premiums under an oral separation agreement that required maintenance of her beneficiary designation.

The insured later redesignated a new spouse as irrevocable beneficiary, and the proceeds were paid accordingly.

The majority held the respondent was unjustly enriched at the appellant’s expense and found no juristic reason under the Insurance Act to defeat restitution.

A remedial constructive trust over the full proceeds was imposed because a personal remedy was inadequate in the circumstances.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that statutory beneficiary protections supplied a juristic reason and that corresponding deprivation was not established.

The applicant and respondent were former spouses who entered into an oral agreement that the respondent would pay premiums on a life insurance policy and receive the proceeds upon the deceased's death.

The deceased subsequently designated the applicant as an irrevocable beneficiary under the policy without informing the respondent, who continued paying premiums.

Upon the deceased's death, the respondent claimed entitlement to the proceeds based on unjust enrichment and sought a constructive trust.

The application judge ruled in the respondent's favour, finding an equitable assignment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge erred in relying on the doctrine of equitable assignment, which was neither pleaded nor argued.

The court found that the irrevocable beneficiary designation provisions of the Insurance Act provided a valid juristic reason for the applicant's receipt of the proceeds, making unjust enrichment unavailable.

The applicant brought an application for directions under Rule 75.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to challenge the validity of a will and codicils based on undue influence and lack of capacity.

The respondents moved for summary judgment to dismiss the application, arguing the underlying claims were statute-barred.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, holding that such a motion is generally not available in an application unless specifically authorized by a procedural order, and that the court could not achieve a full appreciation of the evidence at this early stage.

The applicant brought a motion for partial summary judgment in an estates application seeking declarations that a will and codicils were invalid due to undue influence and that certain joint assets formed part of the estate.

The motion sought a determination that any claims against the respondents regarding their handling of assets received by right of survivorship or as designated beneficiaries were barred by operation of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The respondents argued that the application implicitly sought relief against them, including declarations of breach of fiduciary duty and an order requiring remedy.

The court expressed concerns regarding the appropriateness of the motion in the context of the relief sought in the application.

The court directed the parties to appear at a further hearing to address those concerns before determining the motion.