Wendy L. A. Pollak

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss a defamation action under section 137.1(3) of the Courts of Justice Act, arguing that their publications regarding childcare practices at a licensed daycare facility related to a matter of public interest.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that the defendants' coordinated campaign of negative online reviews and social media posts were defamatory, malicious, and caused serious reputational and economic harm.

The court found that while the publications related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiffs established substantial merit to their defamation claim and that the defendants had no valid defences.

The court further found that the harm suffered by the plaintiffs outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression, particularly given evidence of a coordinated malicious campaign to shut down the daycare.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant, Janice Antonio, Executrix of The Estate of Inez Antonio, appealed a discretionary decision of an Associate Justice to extend the time to set the action down for trial under rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the Associate Justice correctly identified and applied the legal test, considered the relevant evidence, and exercised discretion appropriately.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The decision concerns claims by the plaintiffs to set aside various transfers of property, shares, and a trademark by the defendant Pooniah Soundrarajan to family members and related companies, on the basis that they were fraudulent conveyances intended to defeat creditors, and also claims of oppression and unjust enrichment.

The court reviews the evidence for badges of fraud, the timing and context of the transfers, and the adequacy of consideration.

The court grants a non-suit on the claim regarding the transfer of the matrimonial home but finds a prima facie case regarding the share and trademark transfers and oppression, ultimately declaring those transfers void as against the plaintiffs.

The court considered a claim by Country Wide Homes Upper Thornhill Estates Inc. against Xiaowan Liu for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a luxury home.

Liu failed to close the transaction, alleging language barriers and misrepresentation regarding environmental issues and a Certificate of Property Use (CPU).

The court found that Liu was an experienced purchaser, had the assistance of a real estate agent, and received all required disclosures, including the CPU.

The court held that the plaintiff met its disclosure obligations under the Environmental Protection Act and that Liu was liable for the shortfall on resale and carrying costs, totaling $741,999.

The counterclaim was dismissed.

The Trustee sought to set aside a transfer of property from Kaldep Singh Gidda to Sunita Rani Saini as a transfer at undervalue under section 96(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or alternatively under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The court found that the transfer occurred within one year of bankruptcy, between non-arm’s length parties, and for no consideration.

The court rejected Ms. Saini’s defences of resulting or constructive trust, finding no evidence of a trust, loan, or gift, and held that her payments for mortgage and expenses did not create an equitable interest.

The Trustee was successful and awarded costs.

The plaintiff, Giuseppe Lisozzi, brought a motion seeking a full accounting of the defendant Montana Holdings Limited's Power of Sale transaction, including documentary proof for claimed deductions and expenses, and payment of proper residual funds.

Montana consented to the accounting but brought a cross-motion for security for costs, arguing the plaintiff was impecunious and the action frivolous.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion for an accounting, finding that the plaintiff was entitled to a significant sum and was not impecunious.

The court dismissed the defendant's cross-motion for security for costs, ruling that imposing security for costs was not a reasonable term or condition for granting the accounting order, as the accounting request was not directly related to the plaintiff's claim of an improvident sale and the plaintiff had no improper motive.

In a trial for conversion, the plaintiff claimed the landlord unlawfully disposed of its racking system after a lease disclaimer.

The landlord argued the racking was deemed abandoned under a court order from bankruptcy proceedings or, alternatively, that its disposal was justified due to the plaintiff's trespass.

The court found that the "deemed abandonment" provision in the liquidation order was a valid defense, and even if not, the landlord acted reasonably in disposing of the racking given the plaintiff's trespass and the high costs of preservation.

The plaintiff's claim for conversion was dismissed.

The landlord's counterclaim for lost rental revenue was also dismissed due to insufficient evidence on damages.

The Ontario Motor Vehicle Industry Council (OMVIC) brought a motion to stay, dismiss, or strike an application filed by Richard and Tracy Grey.

The Greys had been charged by OMVIC with acting as unregistered motor vehicle dealers and sought an order of prohibition from the Superior Court of Justice to prevent their trial in the Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ).

OMVIC argued the application was frivolous and an abuse of process, contending that the Greys' defence should be heard at first instance in the OCJ, with a right of appeal to the Superior Court.

The court dismissed the Greys' application, finding it lacked legal merit, was premature, and constituted a collateral attack on the OCJ's authority, thus being an abuse of process.

Costs were awarded to OMVIC.

This case, originally an application for damages for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) and later converted to a trial, involved the plaintiff's attempt to purchase a gas station from the defendants.

The court found that the defendant seller breached the APS by failing to arrange sufficient financing and not being ready to close the transaction.

However, the plaintiff's claim for damages was dismissed as it failed to prove it suffered any damages, specifically by not establishing the market value of the property at the date of breach and by relying on inadmissible hearsay evidence for lost opportunity damages.

The court declined to award costs, ordering each party to bear its own.