Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Court File No.: CV-18-610944
Date: 2025-05-28

Between:
Country Wide Homes Upper Thornhill Estates Inc. (Plaintiff)
and
Xiaowan Liu (Defendant)

Heard: February 19-21, 2025 and March 11-14, 2025
Counsel:

• Emilio Bisceglia, for the Plaintiff
• Xiaowan Liu, self-represented

Judge: Wendy L. A. Pollak

Reasons for Decision

Basic Facts

[1] The Plaintiff, Country Wide Homes Upper Thornhill Estates Inc. (the “Plaintiff”), is the developer of a project located in the area of Dufferin Street and Major MacKenzie Drive in Vaughan, Ontario. The project is known as “Upper Thornhill Estates,” and the last phase of the project, being exclusive residential estate lots, is known as The Enclave (the “Enclave”).

[2] The Defendant, Xiaowan Liu (“Ms. Liu”), signed an Agreement of Purchase and Sale dated March 16, 2017 (the “APS”), for a four-bedroom home to be built on Lot 003 (with the municipal address of 27 Sofia Olivia Crescent) in the Enclave (the “Property”).

[3] The purchase price for the Property was $3,389,990, subsequently reduced to $3,349,999. The closing date for the transaction was set for December 4, 2018. The Defendant, Ms. Liu, failed to close.

[4] To mitigate its damages, the Plaintiff sold the Property, which closed on May 27, 2021, for $3,200,000. The Plaintiff claims its damages, representing the shortfall in the purchase price plus debt carrying interest and its carrying costs in the amount of $741,999.

[5] Ms. Liu’s position based on her Statement of Defence is that she did not really understand or have a chance to carefully review the APS. She had a language barrier and did not fully understand the APS. Ms. Liu claims that there were representations made to her about the quality of the Property that were misrepresentations, with respect to certain environmental issues. There is a counterclaim with respect to the alleged misrepresentations by the Plaintiff.

[6] Ms. Liu’s main argument is that the existence and meaning of a Certificate of Property Use (“CPU”) issued by the Ministry of the Environment (“MOE”) with respect to the Property was not properly disclosed to her. She testified that she only later understood that the CPU was related to tainted groundwater that might limit her uses of the Property. She is concerned that the Property is not safe for her family, as it is contaminated.

Previous Court Decisions

[7] The evidence of the Defendant, Ms. Liu, and her husband, Yifei Zhu (“Mr. Zhu”), confirmed that she makes the same claims that were unsuccessfully made by other defaulting buyer defendants against this Plaintiff with respect to homes purchased at the Enclave.

[8] The Plaintiff submits that the case of Country Wide Homes Upper Thornhill Estates Inc. v. Cui, 2021 ONSC 4724, is applicable to this case and is determinative of the very same issues before this Court. For the reasons set out below, I agree.

[9] In Cui, at paras. 10-18, the court stated as follows:

Country Wide Homes v. Ge involved the very same Plaintiff as here, where it was also in the role of vendor of a high value home. The Court considered not only the very same arguments about whether otherwise knowledgeable Defendants/purchasers understood what they were buying, but addressed the identical EPA question about the identical CPU as at issue here. At paras 10-12, the unanimous Court of Appeal addressed the issues raised by the Defendants in both cases:

[10] The appellant points to the fact that the APS contained a clause, required by the Ministry of the Environment, that warned about the ground water in the subdivision, and remediation efforts of lands within the development. The appellant argues that the import of that clause was not explained to him. As a Mandarin speaking purchaser, he says that he did not understand the clause. He also argues that he was pressured into the purchase, having been told that an offer would only be considered if there were no conditions attached. Accordingly, the appellant suggests that he was deprived of the ability to have a solicitor review the agreement.

[11] The motion judge correctly concluded that these arguments did not support the suggestion that there had been misrepresentations.

[12] In any event, the appellant had a Mandarin-English speaking real estate agent with whom he was able to fully communicate. He is not a novice to the real estate market. He initialed every page of the APS and its schedules, including the pages containing the Ministry of Environment warning. He also specifically initialed the crossing out of the condition involving solicitor review. Finally, each page of the APS contained the following block letter phrase: ‘oral representations do not form part nor can they amend this agreement.’ These factors undermine the appellant’s position that he did not know and was misled about the contents of the APS.

There is nothing to the Defendants’ case that was not already considered by the Court of Appeal in Country Wide Homes v. Ge, 2020 ONCA 400. The Defendants fit the Court of Appeal’s description in terms of their experience with real estate, the type of property they were buying, their real estate agent advisor, their review of the APS, the availability of having a solicitor review the APS, the warnings and advisories on the APS, the impact of the Environmental issues in view of the Ministry of Environment warning on the APS, the availability of a bilingual Mandarin-English real estate agent. As the Court concluded, all of these factors combine to counter the Defendants’ position that they were not advised of or were misled as to the terms of the APS.

Under the circumstances, I do not think that one needs to go further than Country Wide Homes v. Ge to find case law that supports dismissing the Defendants’ arguments. That said, two other recent cases cited by Plaintiffs’ counsel also go a long way to answering the Defendants’ complaints about the APS.

In Tribute (Grandview) Inc. v. Zhou, 2021 ONSC 2994, the purchaser, like here, claimed a language barrier to fully understanding an agreement of purchase and sale. The Court found that the fact that the purchaser had an English-Mandarin speaking real estate agent sufficed to counter his defense of non-comprehension of the terms of the agreement.

Similarly, in Grandfield Homes (Kenton) Ltd. v. Li, 2021 ONSC 2670, the Court held that the buyer was sophisticated and experienced in the real estate market. He had previously purchased several properties before contracting for the current valuable property. The Court also noted that he was advised by his own real estate agent, all of which went a long way toward undermining the buyer’s argument that he was not capable of comprehending the agreement of purchase and sale.

I have no doubt from the evidence in the record that the Defendants knew what they were signing and agreed to buy the property under the terms of the APS, including the CPU and the Ministry of Environment advisories. Ms. Zhou executed, and passed on to Mr. Cui (who concedes that when he took his assignment, he inherited all of the terms to which Ms. Zhou had agreed), an Acknowledgement document with respect to disclosure of the environmental issues on the property.

More specifically, in the Acknowledgment the Defendants acknowledge and confirm having received from the Plaintiff (a) the Ministry’s Certificate of Requirement in respect of the property, (b) the Certificate of Property Use, and (c) the Ministry’s Warning Clauses. It also advised then that they must give notice to the Ministry of Environment of any future ownership transfers and advise any future buyer from them to provide notice to the Ministry of all future ownership transfers. It further acknowledged that the Certificate of Requirement is registered on title to the property. This was all explained to the Defendants by the Plaintiff’s agent, Riccardo Del Rosso, before they signed.

During the many months between signing the APS and the closing date, the Defendants never complained about any aspect of the transaction nor sought any more disclosure of the environmental issues. In the meantime, they ordered from the Plaintiff over $160,000 of special changes in the construction. These included a custom-made kitchen area, a master ensuite bathroom, an elevator, a built-in wet bar, etc. These specifications were all to the Defendants’ taste and were built for them; during all of that construction, the Defendants never intimated that they had a complaint that would prompt them not to close and take possession of the home.

As indicated at the outset, the Defendants – or, more accurately, Mr. Cui – failed to close on the appointed closing date. For its part, the Plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to close. [Emphasis added.]

[10] Further, in its costs Endorsement in Cui, the court stated:

As I pointed out in my reasons for judgment, the Defendants’ defense and counterclaim was virtually identical to one that the Court of Appeal has recently ruled on and dismissed. The Defendants’ entire position in the motion before me can be said to have fallen under Rule 57.01(1)(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure – i.e. a set of steps that unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding.

Given this extreme similarity to a case that the Court of Appeal had ruled on shortly before the motion before me, one would think that the Defendants would have re-thought their approach to this case and somehow taken the Court of Appeal’s ruling into account. They did not. In fact, they did not mention the Court of Appeal ruling at all in any of their materials.

It would, of course, have been preferable for Plaintiff’s counsel to have relied on the Ge decision earlier in the process, as that might have discouraged Defendants’ counsel from its all-out pursuit of a defense and counterclaim already roundly rejected by an appellate court. But I do not fault Plaintiff’s counsel for this as much as I fault Defendants’ counsel for vigorously pursuing what was already determined to be a futile legal position: Cui, at paras. 3, 5, and 7. [Emphasis added.]

[11] The Plaintiff notes that the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of the other default buyers of homes in the Enclave, and that of the Defendant, Ms. Liu, are “almost identical”.

[12] Paragraph 4 of Ms. Liu’s Statement of Defence and Counterclaim also states as follows:

This action and related actions involving other purchasers within the same subdivision should be tried together.

[13] The Statement of Defence makes basic pleadings without particulars as follows:

5. Country Wide failed to adequately advise or disclose to [Ms. Liu] that much of the land upon which the subdivision has been built was formerly contaminated land and that restrictions exist with respect to the use and marketability of [Ms. Liu’s land] and neighboring land.

6. Through its marketing, reach out and interaction with purchasers, Country Wide robustly characterized its subdivision as pristine and superior.

7. The circumstances under which [Ms. Liu] signed her APS comprise numerous omissions and misrepresentations of material fact which precluded [Ms. Liu] from gaining an understanding of the nature of the complex document placed before her and the subject land.

8. As controlling drafters of the APS, Country Wide employed self-serving, uncompromising language thereby creating a take it or leave it, pressurized encounter that ultimately saw the purchaser “offering” back to the builder its own compelled terms and conditions absent legal and factual appreciation.

9. As a result thereof, inter alia, Country Wide, through and by its officers and directors has breached its duty of good faith to [Ms. Liu], the conduct particulars of which include but are not limited to the following: (a) not being open and transparent with respect to actual characteristics of particular lot and subdivision property; (b) little to no English language accommodation with respect to purchasers; (c) arbitrariness involved in APS provisioning; (d) creation of a sales platform that targeted and sprinted unfairly, enabling comprehension deficits; and, (e) restriction or elimination of contract review and counsel.

10. [Ms. Liu] asserts that Country Wide failed to properly address or abide by the Financial Approval and Solicitor’s Review provisions of the APS and that the APS became null and void according to its terms. [Ms. Liu] never provided an informed, voluntary waiver of either condition to Country Wide. [Ms. Liu] either did rescind the APS or would have rescinded the APS but for the misconduct of Country Wide.

11. [Ms. Liu] asserts that the failure of Country Wide to act fairly is the sole cause of this litigation contrary to the position of Country Wide that the defendants defaulted simply to avoid a properly [sic] loss.

12. [Ms. Liu] would not have signed the APS had Country Wide complied with its obligations of candour and good faith.

13. [Ms. Liu] asserts that her APS is null and void due to the contract formation and performance breaches referenced in this pleading.

14. [Ms. Liu] additionally relies upon the principles of fraudulent, negligent and innocent misrepresentations and breach of contract in this pleading.

15. Country Wide is not entitled to specific performance.

16. This property should be sold immediately at fair market value in accordance with the duty to mitigate. [Emphasis Added.]

[14] These pleadings are almost the same as the pleadings in Country Wide Homes Upper Thornhill Estates Inc. v. Ge, 2020 ONCA 400, as referred to above in Cui.

Defendant's Admissions and Evidence

[15] The Defendant made the following admissions in her cross-examination:

• She was told that she cannot dig a well on the Property but she did not ask questions about it. She thought it was a joke.
• She did not read the Standalone Acknowledgement of CPU before signing it.
• She knew the APS provided that “Oral Representations Do Not Form Part of the APS.”
• She understood that the Financing Condition was being crossed off.
• Financing was not an issue for her.
• She knew at the time of signing the APS that she had until March 21 to have her lawyer review it.
• She did not have a lawyer review the APS because another buyer had a lawyer review it who said it was okay.
• Ms. Lily Zhou (“Ms. Lily”) was the only agent representing the Defendant and the signatures on the documents were the Defendant’s.
• After she signed the Standalone Acknowledgement of CPU, the APS, and the Purchaser’s Agency Disclosure, she obtained a complete copy.
• She left the Sales Office on March 16 and 22 without reading anything.
• Her signature is on the Notice of Fulfilment, and she signed it.
• When she signed the Notice of Fulfilment, it is fair to say that she knew the deal was firm and binding.
• She returned to the Sales Office to pick interiors and colours and materials, and she left further deposits for the upgrades.
• It was Ms. Liu’s decision to purchase the Property and it was in her name as purchaser.
• She decided not to close on the Closing Date in 2018.

[16] The Plaintiff submits that on the basis of these admissions, the Defendant should be held liable for her breach under the APS and the resulting damages.

Obligation Regarding the Certificate of Property Use Under the EPA

[17] With respect to the claims of misrepresentations, Ms. Liu’s view is that she should have been told that the property may be environmentally contaminated and not safe for her family.

[18] She testified that she initially contacted an “expert on property contamination” but did not engage the expert to testify at trial.

[19] Section 197 of the Environmental Protection Act, RSO 1990, c E.19 (“EPA”) requires a vendor to disclose to a purchaser any CPU regarding a property. As set out in s. 197:

Disclosure of orders and decisions

197 (1) A person who has authority under this Act to make an order or decision affecting real property also has authority to make an order requiring any person with an interest in the property, before dealing with the property in any way, to give a copy of the order or decision affecting the property to every person who will acquire an interest in the property as a result of the dealing.

Registration of requirement

(2) A certificate setting out a requirement imposed under subsection (1) may be registered in the proper land registry office on the title of the real property to which the requirement relates, if the certificate is in a form approved by the Minister, is signed or authorized by a person who has authority to make orders imposing requirements under subsection (1) and is accompanied by a registrable description of the property.

Same

(3) A requirement imposed under subsection (1) that is set out in a certificate registered under subsection (2) is, from the time of registration, deemed to be directed to each person who subsequently acquires an interest in the real property.

Dealings voidable

(4) A dealing with real property by a person who is subject to a requirement imposed under subsection (1) or (3) is voidable at the instance of a person who was not given the copy of the order or decision in accordance with the requirement.

Registration of withdrawal of requirement

(5) A certificate of withdrawal of a requirement imposed under subsection (1) or (3) may be registered in the proper land registry office on the title of the real property to which the requirement relates, if the certificate is in a form approved by the Minister, is signed or authorized by a person who has authority to make orders imposing requirements under subsection (1) and is accompanied by a registrable description of the property.

Same

(6) On the registration under the Registry Act of a certificate of withdrawal of a requirement in accordance with subsection (5), the land registrar may delete the entries in the abstract index of the certificate setting out the requirement and the certificate of withdrawal of the requirement.

Same

(7) Registration of a certificate of withdrawal of a requirement in accordance with subsection (5) has the effect of revoking the requirement.

Transition

(8) This section, as it read immediately before the day subsection 2 (50) of the Brownfields Statute Law Amendment Act, 2001 came into force, continues to apply in respect of prohibitions issued under this section before that day.

[20] In Cui, this court considered s. 197 and held as follows:

The Defendants’ central argument is not so much that they did not understand the ordinary terms of the APS. As indicated, they were experienced property buyers and generally knew what to look for in a real estate purchase. Indeed, they initialed every page of the APS. Rather, they contend that the existence and meaning of a Certificate of Property Use (“CPU”) issued by the Ministry of the Environment (“MOE”) with respect to the property in issue were not properly disclosed to them. They contend that they only understood later that this related to tainted groundwater that might limit certain uses of the property.

Section 197 of the Environmental Protection Act, RSO 1990, E.19 (“EPA”) imposes disclosure requirements with respect to a CPU, and section 168.1(4) of the EPA requires this disclosure to be made on an ongoing basis to everyone who acquires or occupies the property. Defendants’ counsel stresses that the real question here is whether these statutory disclosure obligations were fulfilled by the Plaintiff prior to the Defendants entering into the APS: at paras. 6-7.

[21] In Cui, the court held that the Defendants had knowledge of the CPU and were aware of what they were signing, notwithstanding arguments of language barriers and explanations through agents.

[22] In Ge, the same arguments were made by the defaulting purchaser. At paras. 10-13, the court upheld the trial judges’ decision as follows:

The appellant points to the fact that the APS contained a clause, required by the Ministry of the Environment, that warned about the ground water in the subdivision, and remediation efforts of lands within the development. The appellant argues that the import of that clause was not explained to him. As a Mandarin speaking purchaser, he says that he did not understand the clause. He also argues that he was pressured into the purchase, having been told that an offer would only be considered if there were no conditions attached. Accordingly, the appellant suggests that he was deprived of the ability to have a solicitor review the agreement.

The motion judge correctly concluded that these arguments did not support the suggestion that there had been misrepresentations.

In any event, the appellant had a Mandarin-English speaking real estate agent with whom he was able to fully communicate. He is not a novice to the real estate market. He initialed every page of the APS and its schedules, including the pages containing the Ministry of Environment warning. He also specifically initialed the crossing out of the condition involving solicitor review. Finally, each page of the APS contained the following block letter phrase: “oral representations do not form part nor can they amend this agreement.” These factors undermine the appellant's position that he did not know and was misled about the contents of the APS.

The appellant also argues that the motion judge erred by failing to consider the impact that expert evidence may have had on calculating the decrease in property value arising from the Ministry of Environment warning. Yet, the appellant did not file any expert evidence on the motion, as would have been his right. He cannot now complain that the motion judge did not take into account something that may or may not materialize in the future. He was required to put his best foot forward on the motion.

[23] All of these circumstances were present in this action.

[24] The issue of the level of disclosure required under s. 197 of the EPA was also considered and adjudicated in the decision of Crosslink Bridge Corp. v. Canada National Railway, 2013 ONSC 6540, aff’d 2014 ONCA 247, with the Court finding that all that was required was that a copy of the CPU was to be provided to the purchaser prior to closing. At paras. 7-10, and 56, the court held:

Section 197(4) of the EPA provides that the consequences of failing to provide a purchaser with a copy of the Director’s Order makes a sale of property voidable at the instance of the purchaser.

Crosslink purchased property from CN in 2008. Crosslink says it was never provided with a copy of the Director's Order before it purchased property from CN. According to the applicant, it was not until November 23, 2012, that Penuvchev and Cocovski became aware of the Director's Order dated December 18, 2006, when representatives of the Ministry of the Environment provided Crosslink with a copy of the Order.

Crosslink now seeks to void the property transaction of 2008 and claims $5.913 million from CN being the costs of purchasing, carrying, maintaining and developing the property.

I agree with the applicant that this case falls to be decided on one factual issue. That issue is: did the respondent CN as the vendor of a property subject to a Director's Order under section 197(1) of the EPA provide a copy of the Director's Order to the purchaser Crosslink prior to the purchase of the property? For reasons set out below, I conclude that CN did provide a copy of the Director's Order to the purchaser.

There is no dispute that the Certificate of Requirement was not only registered on title but was also provided to the purchasers by CN prior to closing. The Certificate of Requirement refers to the Director's Order and provided notice to the purchaser Crosslink that there was a Director’s Order outstanding. However, the registration of the Certificate of Requirement is not the same as giving to the potential purchaser a copy of the Director’s Order. Actual notice of Director’s Order was required not only by specific direction to CN contained in the Director’s Order but also by the relevant provisions of the EPA. As noted above, the Director’s Order mandated disclosure of the Order by CN to any subsequent purchaser… [Emphasis added.]

[25] On the basis of these decisions, I conclude that there was no requirement for the Plaintiff to explain the CPU; rather, all that was required was that a copy of the CPU be provided before closing. The evidence of the Plaintiff’s sales agent, Mr. Del Rosso (“Mr. Del Rosso”), discussed below, was that he provided a copy of the CPU in advance of the APS review and he reviewed the Standalone Acknowledgement of CPU with the Defendant prior to her signing it and before reviewing the APS. He also explained the restriction for use of the property, which is discussed below. Further, the Defendant received a copy of the Standalone Acknowledgement of CPU and she signed the Standalone Acknowledgement of CPU as well as the Embedded Acknowledgement of CPU in the APS, confirming receipt of notice and copy. I find that the conditions of the EPA have been met by the Plaintiff.

Findings and Damages

[57] On the basis of all of the evidence at trial, the jurisprudence I have referred to above, and for the reasons I have given above, I find that the Plaintiff’s claims against Ms. Liu in this action must succeed. The Plaintiff has met its burden of proving that the Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff as a result of her breach of the APS for the damages incurred.

Damages Calculation

[58] Mr. Mariani testified about Country Wide’s damages (as set out in the Damages Calculations of the Plaintiff below) and on the price for the relisting of the Property. He reviewed and testified with respect to all calculations and items for the interest and the carrying costs.

[59] Mr. Del Rosso testified about the Plaintiff’s mitigation of damages. On January 13, 2021, the Plaintiff sold the Property to new purchasers for the purchase price of $3,200,000 of an amount of $711,869, which is less than the purchase price agreed to by the Defendant in the APS. The sale closed on May 27, 2021.

[60] After applying the total deposits of $326,779, the deposit total of $260,000 on the original APS, and the further deposits of $66,779 in paid upgrades on the purchase price, the Plaintiff has suffered a loss of $385,090.

[61] In addition to the loss of $385,090 in purchase price, the Plaintiff has incurred carrying costs associated with the Property from the Closing Date to the date of closing on the resale, as a result of the Defendant’s breach. These costs include interest on the loan amounts, agent’s commission, property taxes, utilities, cleaning, humidifier, insurance, lawn maintenance, and upgraded appliances.

[62] The following is the Plaintiff’s summary of its carrying costs of the Property incurred from the date of the Defendant’s breach to the date of the closing of the resale of the Property:

• Lot 3T Carrying Costs:
  • Closing date scheduled for 12/4/2018
  • Add: Carrying costs from December 5, 2018 to May 27, 2021
  • Interest @ Prime +0.5%: $290,117
  • Broker Commissions: $30,000.00
  • Property Taxes: $8,220.00
  • Utilities: $5,765.00
  • Humidifiers: $1,300.00
  • Insurance: $5,750.00
  • Lawn Maintenance: $2,475.00
  • Unpaid upgraded Appliances ordered by purchaser: $13,282.00
  • Total Carrying Costs: $356,909

[63] On the basis of this evidence, the Plaintiff has suffered a loss of $385,090 and the sale price calculated as follows:

• Original Purchase Price with Xiaowan Ms. Liu: $3,649,990.00
• Upgrades and Extras: $261,879.00
• Purchase Price Total: $3,911,869.00
• New Purchase Price on Resale: $3,200,000.00
• Difference from Original Purchase Price and Resale Price: $711,869.00
• Less Deposits Received, including on Extras: $326,779.00
• Loss on Resale: $385,090.00

[64] Therefore, the total damages suffered by the Plaintiff is calculated as follows:

• Loss of Resale: $385,090.00
• Total Carrying Costs: $356,909.00
• TOTAL DAMAGES: $741,999.00

[65] I find that the Plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of $741,999, plus its legal costs and interest, all of which Ms. Liu is liable for. These damages were suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of Ms. Liu’s breach of the APS in failing to close the purchase/sale transaction.

[66] This Court orders that the deposits paid by the Defendant, Ms. Liu, to the Plaintiff, Country Wide, in the amount of $326,779, in respect of the APS entered into between the parties on March 18, 2017, shall be and are hereby forfeited in favour of the Plaintiff.

[67] Judgment is awarded to the Plaintiff in the amount of $741,999 plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and costs. The Counterclaim of Ms. Liu is dismissed.

[68] This court orders that the Defendant, Ms. Liu, shall pay to the Plaintiff, Country Wide, the sum of $741,999 plus pre-judgment interest on this amount calculated at the rate of 1.5 percent per annum from December 17, 2018, being the date of the commencement of this action, up to the date of this judgment. Post-judgment interest is awarded in accordance with the provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43.

[69] This Court orders that the counterclaim of the Defendant, Ms. Liu, shall be and is hereby dismissed.

Costs

[70] The Plaintiff is the successful party in this action and is entitled to its costs submitted during the hearing, which I find are appropriate and reasonable. I order that the Defendant pay costs on a partial indemnity basis of $94,000. However, if the parties are unable to agree on costs that arise as a result of Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, on Offers to Settle, the Plaintiff may make submissions of no more than two pages, double spaced, sent to the Defendant, uploaded to Case Center, with a copy sent to my assistant Roxanne Johnson at Roxanne.stammers@ontario.ca by June 6, 2025. The Defendant may make submissions of no more than two pages, double spaced, sent to the Plaintiff, uploaded to Case Center, with a copy sent to my assistant by June 17, 2025. No reply submissions will be accepted. If no submissions are received by June 17, 2025, costs will be deemed to be settled.

Pollak J.
Released: May 28, 2025