Arad Moslehi

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss a defamation action under section 137.1(3) of the Courts of Justice Act, arguing that their publications regarding childcare practices at a licensed daycare facility related to a matter of public interest.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that the defendants' coordinated campaign of negative online reviews and social media posts were defamatory, malicious, and caused serious reputational and economic harm.

The court found that while the publications related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiffs established substantial merit to their defamation claim and that the defendants had no valid defences.

The court further found that the harm suffered by the plaintiffs outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression, particularly given evidence of a coordinated malicious campaign to shut down the daycare.

The motion was dismissed.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order that dissolved a previously granted Mareva injunction.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, stayed the impugned order, and restored the Mareva injunction pending the final disposition of the appeal.

The court also ordered an expedited schedule for the exchange of appeal materials and awarded costs of the motion to the moving parties.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the amount of $10,000.

This decision concerns the penalty for civil contempt by the defendants, who breached a Mareva order by failing to disclose real property in Spain and denying ownership under oath.

The court finds that the appropriate sanction is to prohibit the defendants from dealing with the Spanish property and to require that net rental income from the property be paid to the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice until personal liability is determined.

The court also awards full indemnity costs to the plaintiffs for the contempt motion, with a set-off for costs on the motion to set aside the Mareva injunction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of J.P. Thomson Architects Ltd., holding that the application judge erred in interpreting the dispute resolution clause (GC18) in the parties’ contract.

The Court found that GC18 did not require mediation to be sought within 30 days of a dispute arising, but rather set a minimum 30-day period for informal resolution before mediation could be requested.

The Court also held that the application judge erred by making findings about the scope of the parties’ dispute, which should have been left to the arbitrator.

The Court ordered mediation to proceed within 60 days, with the right to seek arbitration preserved.

This decision concerns a dispute over millions of dollars lent to Trip Support Inc., a failed “Book Now, Pay Later” airline ticket financing business.

The plaintiffs sought a contempt order for the defendants’ failure to disclose assets as required by a Mareva injunction, while the defendants moved to set aside the injunction for inadequate disclosure by the plaintiffs.

The court found the defendants in contempt for failing to disclose Spanish property, but also set aside the Mareva injunction due to the plaintiffs’ significant omissions in their ex parte motion materials.

The decision addresses the standards for contempt and the duty of full and frank disclosure in urgent injunction proceedings.

The appellant sought to appeal a lower court judgment that recognized two Florida judgments requiring him to pay the respondent approximately $1.6 million (Canadian).

The sole issue on appeal was whether the application judge erred in declining the appellant’s request to adjourn the hearing, which was made nine days after the appellant discharged his counsel.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle or unreasonable exercise of discretion in the application judge's decision, noting that the appellant's previous counsel had already filed an application record and factum, and the judge ensured all grounds were addressed.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment requiring them to pay damages to the respondent, Rosehaven Homes Limited, for failing to complete an agreement of purchase and sale for a new home.

The appeal focused on the motion judge's admission and reliance on Rosehaven's expert report concerning property valuation and Rosehaven's mitigation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision to admit and rely on the expert report, noting it was verified by affidavit and the appellants did not object or provide competing admissible evidence.

The court also found no palpable and overriding errors in the assessment of Rosehaven's mitigation efforts or the quantification of damages.

The applicants sought an order directing the substituted buyer to transfer title of a pre-construction property to them.

The respondent had assigned his Agreement of Purchase and Sale to the applicants but failed to seek the builder's consent or pay the required fees.

Instead, as the property value rose, the respondent amended the agreement to substitute his realtor's wife as the buyer.

The court found that the respondent breached his duty of good faith by failing to take reasonable steps to complete the assignment.

The court ordered the substituted buyer, who held title in trust, to transfer the property to the applicants upon payment of the originally agreed purchase price.

The applicant, a former corporate director, sought judicial review of a decision refusing to recommend remission of tax, interest, and penalties owed for unremitted source deductions.

The corporate business paid severance instead of remitting deductions, relying on anticipated asset sales.

Third-party purchasers later breached agreements and failed to pay the tax liabilities.

The applicant argued extenuating circumstances, CRA negligence, and unintended legislative consequences.

The Federal Court held the decision was reasonable, finding the tax debt arose from the directors' voluntary decision to prioritize other payments over statutory trust obligations and that third-party conduct did not warrant remission.

The Minister of National Revenue brought a summary application seeking a compliance order under section 289.1 of the Excise Tax Act to compel three related corporate respondents to provide outstanding information and documents requested during a "high risk" audit.

The respondents argued they had provided some information, sought extensions due to the pandemic, and claimed the proceedings were an abuse of process given overlapping tax disputes.

The Federal Court rejected the respondents' arguments, finding they failed to establish valid reasons for the delay or evidence of abuse of process.

The Court granted the compliance order, directing the respondents to produce the outstanding materials within 45 days, and awarded a lump sum of $1,000 in costs to the Minister.

The appellants, husband and wife, were equal shareholders of a corporation that paid them dividends between 1998 and 2013.

The Minister assessed them under section 160 of the Income Tax Act, making them jointly and severally liable for the corporation's tax debt.

The appellants argued that the dividends were part of the compensation for services they provided to the corporation, and thus they gave consideration for the property transferred.

The Tax Court of Canada rejected this argument, following Supreme Court precedent that a dividend is related to shareholding and not to any other consideration.

However, the appeals were allowed in part on consent to reduce the underlying liability to $86,848.04.

The defendants (vendors) moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's (purchaser's) claim for the return of a $150,000 deposit and to grant their counterclaim for damages of $900,000 following an abortive real estate transaction.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidentiary record was inadequate and that there were numerous genuine issues requiring a trial, including alleged physical defects in the property and whether an oral agreement to reduce the purchase price was reached.

However, the court exercised its jurisdiction under Rule 20.05 to specify certain material facts not in dispute, such as the original purchase price being $2,250,000.