Calvin Zhang

The moving party sought leave to register a certificate of pending litigation over residential property in support of a claim arising from an alleged unpaid private loan advanced for construction and improvements.

The court held the asserted restriction on sale pending repayment was purely contractual and did not create a proprietary interest in land.

The claim was characterized as one for debt or damages, not constructive trust, resulting trust, or specific performance.

In the alternative, the court held the equitable factors governing certificates of pending litigation also weighed against relief because damages were an adequate remedy, the amount outstanding remained uncertain, and registration could impede financing needed to complete construction.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering repayment of funds advanced by the respondent and dismissing the appellants' counterclaim for defamation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's grant of summary judgment on the loan claim, his rejection of the non est factum defence, or his dismissal of the defamation counterclaim.

However, the court found that the issue of reverse corporate veil piercing to impose liability on the corporate appellants was not properly before the motion judge and may not have been fairly argued.

The appeal was allowed in part: the judgment against the corporate appellants was set aside and remitted for redetermination, but dismissed in all other respects.

The appellants sought an order under s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act to transfer their appeal from the Court of Appeal for Ontario to the Divisional Court and to extend the time for serving and filing a notice of appeal.

The appeal arose from a construction contract dispute where the respondent contractor brought a lien action under the Construction Act after the appellants refused to pay the final invoice.

The trial judge awarded damages in favour of the respondent.

The appellants' counsel had filed the notice of appeal in the wrong court.

The motion judge found that the appellants satisfied the three criteria for transfer: arguable grounds of appeal, manageable prejudice to the respondent, and expeditious action once the jurisdictional error was discovered.

The appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court with an extended deadline for filing the notice of appeal.

The defendant Lijun Fang moved to dismiss the action under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11 on the grounds that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was scandalous, frivolous, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff claimed damages arising from the sale of a farm and disposition of proceeds, alleging that as a 50% beneficial owner, he suffered losses due to Fang's mismanagement as farm manager.

The court partially granted the motion, striking certain claims but allowing others to proceed with amendments.

The court found that the plaintiff had standing to sue despite being a partner rather than a corporation, and that claims for breach of fiduciary duty and punitive damages were not plain and obvious failures.

This decision concerns a dispute over the rightful board of directors of Visionary Holdings Inc. and allegations of fraud and oppression.

The court determined that the Board of Directors as it existed on March 25, 2025, is the lawful board until further order.

The court also found a prima facie case of oppressive conduct and ordered the appointment of an inspector under the Business Corporations Act.

The court granted injunctive relief restraining Fan Zhou from participating in management and 3888 Investment Group Limited from altering the board pending investigation.

The decision concerns claims by the plaintiffs to set aside various transfers of property, shares, and a trademark by the defendant Pooniah Soundrarajan to family members and related companies, on the basis that they were fraudulent conveyances intended to defeat creditors, and also claims of oppression and unjust enrichment.

The court reviews the evidence for badges of fraud, the timing and context of the transfers, and the adequacy of consideration.

The court grants a non-suit on the claim regarding the transfer of the matrimonial home but finds a prima facie case regarding the share and trademark transfers and oppression, ultimately declaring those transfers void as against the plaintiffs.

This costs endorsement addresses the aftermath of Remington Georgetown Inc.'s unsuccessful attempt to set aside an arbitration decision under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The court finds that both the set-aside application and a related Rule 14 application lacked merit, and that the respondent, Tarion Warranty Corporation, is entitled to full indemnity costs.

The court relies on the broad indemnity provision in the parties' Vendor Agreement and established case law regarding costs thrown away.

The endorsement also criticizes the applicant's unfounded allegations of arbitrator bias and concludes that the applicant must pay $212,000 in costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent builder.

The appellants had purchased a newly built home but failed to transfer the closing funds until 9 minutes past the 5:00 p.m. deadline on the extended closing date.

The respondent terminated the agreement relying on a 'time is of the essence' clause, but subsequently offered to revive the agreement for an additional $113,000, which the appellants paid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the 5:00 p.m. deadline was unambiguous, the termination was not unconscionable, the revival fee was part of a new contract rather than an impermissible penalty, and the appellants did not act under economic duress.

The court dismissed Remington Georgetown Inc.'s application to set aside an arbitration award under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The applicant, a residential developer, challenged the arbitrator’s decision on four grounds: excess of jurisdiction, procedural unfairness, bias, and failure to provide reasons.

The court found no merit in any of the grounds, holding that the arbitrator acted within her jurisdiction, provided adequate reasons, and that the applicant’s complaints were attempts to appeal the merits of the decision, which is not permitted under the Act or the arbitration agreement.

The court also addressed the admissibility of affidavit evidence and provided directions for costs submissions.

The plaintiff, Carrie Wei, moved for summary judgment against the defendants (except Zhi Qiang Wang) for $700,000 plus 30% interest, and for dismissal of the counterclaim.

The court found that the loan agreement was clear, that the defendants failed to provide any credible defence or evidence, and that the corporate veil should be pierced due to fraudulent conduct.

The counterclaim for defamation was dismissed for lack of evidence.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiff, including costs.

The decision concerns a motion for summary judgment by the landlord, Parvaneh Ansari Ardabili, against tenants Norman J. Zak and Adina Zak for unpaid rent, utilities, and damages to a residential property.

The court found that the Superior Court had jurisdiction, that the tenants owed $40,250 in unpaid rent at the original lease rate, and awarded additional amounts for utilities and damages, plus costs.

The court clarified the application of the Residential Tenancies Act regarding rent increases and the effect of not challenging increases within the statutory period.

The appellant, Starkman Barristers, sought to appeal an interlocutory order from the Superior Court of Justice that referred their accounts for assessment under the Solicitor's Act.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the proposed appeal because the order was interlocutory, not finally determining the real issue between the parties.

The court reiterated that appeals from interlocutory orders lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed.

The defendant law firm brought a motion to quash an order for assessment of its accounts obtained by the plaintiff, its former client.

The defendant argued the request for assessment was made outside the 30-day statutory period under the Solicitors Act and that no special circumstances existed to warrant assessment.

The plaintiff contended that new invoices brought the matter within the time frame or, alternatively, that special circumstances were present.

The court found that special circumstances, including a lack of detailed billing, inadequate communication regarding accounts, and concerns about overcharging, were sufficient to require the assessment of all accounts.

The defendant's motion was dismissed, and the order for assessment was allowed to proceed.

The plaintiff, as the successful self-represented litigant, was awarded $500 in costs.

The defendants brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to post security for costs on a pay-as-you-go basis, asserting the plaintiff was ordinarily resident outside Ontario.

The court found persuasive evidence supporting the defendants' contention, noting the plaintiff's weak rebuttal evidence and refusal to be examined.

Considering the serious allegations of collusion, fraud, deceit, and conspiracy made by the plaintiff against the defendants, and the potential for substantial indemnity costs if the claims were dismissed, the court determined it would not be unjust to order security for costs.

The motion was granted, and the plaintiff was ordered to post security for the defendants' partial indemnity costs.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, Unionville Education Inc. (UEI), seeking $41,443.46.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering UEI to post $20,000 in security for costs, payable in tranches.

The court found that UEI had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs, satisfying Rule 56.01(1)(d).

The requested amount was reduced because the defendants had asserted a substantial counterclaim and had engaged in unreasonable conduct, including failing to comply with discovery undertakings and serving motion materials late.

The court also set aside a noting in default, granted leave for the defendants to serve a statement of defence and counterclaim, and ordered a further discovery for one of the plaintiff's shareholders.

Costs of the motion were ordered to be absorbed by each party due to the defendants' procedural misconduct.

The Moving Defendants, Fulton Development Inc. and 2580867 Ontario Corp., brought a motion to strike all or portions of the Plaintiffs' statement of claim, which included derivative and oppression claims.

The claims arose from a failed real estate transaction, a $500,000 loan, and the alleged misappropriation and improper distribution of a $327,500 refunded deposit by certain directors.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the derivative and oppression claims viable and noting that the motion constituted an impermissible collateral attack on a prior order granting leave for the derivative action.

On consent, a crossclaim and counterclaim from a related 2019 action were consolidated with the current action, and the balance of the 2019 action was stayed.

The plaintiff landlords brought a summary judgment motion for unpaid rent and an eviction order against the defendant tenants.

The landlords had initially applied to the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) but withdrew the application after the arrears exceeded the LTB's $35,000 monetary limit and the tenants stayed an initial eviction order.

The tenants argued the Superior Court action was barred by section 207(3) of the Residential Tenancies Act, res judicata, and abuse of process.

The court rejected these defences, finding the LTB application was properly withdrawn and no final decision existed.

Summary judgment was granted for $89,773 in arrears, ongoing occupation rent, and a writ of possession.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's affidavits, arguing they contained inadmissible hearsay, opinion, argument, and constituted "fresh evidence" without leave.

The court emphasized the strict rules of evidence for affidavits, noting a troubling trend of non-compliance.

The court struck several paragraphs for inadmissible hearsay due to failure to specify sources and belief, and for inadmissible opinion and argument from lay witnesses.

The court rejected the "fresh evidence" argument, clarifying that the tests for fresh evidence do not apply to evidence filed before the main application hearing.

Leave to amend was granted for some struck paragraphs where deficiencies could be cured, but denied for others, particularly those containing opinion evidence from unqualified affiants.

No costs were awarded due to divided success and unreasonable positions taken by both parties.

The Ouyang defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff under Rules 56.01(1)(a) and (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the defendants failed to prove the plaintiff resided outside Ontario under subrule (a).

However, under subrule (e), the court determined the plaintiff's claim against the Ouyang defendants appeared frivolous and vexatious, as the loan agreement was with a non-party corporation and guaranteed by another defendant, with no legal basis for the Ouyang defendants' liability.

The court also found insufficient evidence of the plaintiff's assets in Ontario.

The motion was granted, and the plaintiff was ordered to post $25,000 in security for costs.

This appeal concerned a failed residential property transaction due to substantial water damage occurring shortly before closing.

The purchasers (respondents) sued the vendors (appellants) for breach of the agreement of purchase and sale (APS), seeking return of their deposit and damages.

The vendors counterclaimed, alleging repudiation by the purchasers.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The motion judge found in favour of the purchasers, ruling that the damage was 'substantial' under s. 18 of the APS, entitling the purchasers to terminate, and that the vendors had not acted in good faith.

The vendors appealed, arguing procedural unfairness regarding the pleading of s. 18, errors in factual findings, and incorrect damages calculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings on s. 18 and good faith, but reduced the damages awarded by the cost of an engineering report.