Jason Albert Wadden

The court considered whether the Receiver could disclaim an agreement of purchase and sale for a condominium unit, where the purchaser (Berry) claimed entitlement to specific performance and an equitable interest in the unit.

The Receiver, supported by the senior secured creditor, sought to maximize recovery for creditors.

The court found that Berry had not paid the full purchase price, that the supplementary and "as is, where is" agreements were not enforceable, and that the equities did not support a preference for Berry over other creditors.

The Receiver was authorized to disclaim the agreements.

This decision concerns the interpretation and distribution of proceeds from a Legal Expense Insurance (LEI) policy following the unsuccessful outcome of a personal injury trial.

The court considered whether the applicant (Spencer and Elite Insurance Company) or the respondent (Belton) was entitled to the policy funds, and whether the funds should be shared pro rata between costs and disbursements.

The court held that the policy funds were to be paid to the applicants to offset their costs, as the law firm (MHA) had abandoned its claim for disbursements, and that Belton was not a beneficiary entitled to direct the use of the funds.

The Debtors (corporate and individual) sought leave to appeal two orders made in a receivership proceeding: an Approval and Vesting Order (AVO) for the sale of two residential properties and a Sale Procedure Order (SPO) for vacant development lands.

The Court of Appeal considered whether leave to appeal was required under s. 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and, if so, whether it should be granted.

The court concluded that leave was required under s. 193(e) as the orders did not fall under categories allowing appeal as of right (ss. 193(a)-(d)), primarily because they concerned present rights and methods of asset realization rather than affecting future rights or the value of property in a way that would trigger an automatic right of appeal.

The court further determined that leave should not be granted, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious, as the lower court's discretionary decisions were entitled to deference, and the appeal did not raise issues of general importance.

Granting leave would also unduly hinder the insolvency proceeding.

The Noble Defendants brought a motion to dismiss or stay the action, alleging abuse of process due to the plaintiffs' failure to immediately disclose a settlement agreement (the "Bowen Agreement") with co-defendant David Bowen.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to disclose key terms of the Bowen Agreement, which changed the adversarial dynamic between the plaintiffs and Bowen, thus constituting an abuse of process.

Despite the judge's personal reservations about the Noble Defendants' conduct, the court was bound by Court of Appeal jurisprudence to stay the action.

The motion to stay was granted.

The applicants sought an order compelling Martin & Hillyer Associates to produce an unredacted adverse costs insurance policy.

Martin & Hillyer had provided a partially redacted copy, claiming privilege and confidentiality over certain portions.

The court found that the redacted portions were neither privileged nor confidential, as the policy contained generic wording common to such contracts and did not include solicitor-client communications or litigation strategy.

The court emphasized that the entire policy was relevant for proper contractual interpretation.

The application for production was granted.

The appellants appealed an approval and vesting order that authorized a receiver to sell a property in receivership.

One of the appellants, a second mortgagee, sought to redeem the first mortgage or be recognized as a successful creditor bidder, arguing an absolute right to redeem under the Mortgages Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motions judge's decision that the right to redeem is qualified once a court-approved sales process has been undertaken in a receivership.

The court emphasized balancing the right to redeem against the integrity of the court-supervised sales process, finding no error in the motions judge's conclusion that the sales process was fair and the balance favoured its integrity.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's affidavits, arguing they contained inadmissible hearsay, opinion, argument, and constituted "fresh evidence" without leave.

The court emphasized the strict rules of evidence for affidavits, noting a troubling trend of non-compliance.

The court struck several paragraphs for inadmissible hearsay due to failure to specify sources and belief, and for inadmissible opinion and argument from lay witnesses.

The court rejected the "fresh evidence" argument, clarifying that the tests for fresh evidence do not apply to evidence filed before the main application hearing.

Leave to amend was granted for some struck paragraphs where deficiencies could be cured, but denied for others, particularly those containing opinion evidence from unqualified affiants.

No costs were awarded due to divided success and unreasonable positions taken by both parties.

This appeal concerned the enforcement of letters rogatory issued by a California court in a divorce action, seeking financial disclosure from Canadian corporations and an individual.

The Ontario application judge granted the request, subject to minor refinements.

The appellants, corporate entities associated with the husband, argued procedural errors (lack of service) and substantive errors (wrong test applied, fishing expedition, burden of proof).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the disclosure was relevant to family law obligations and not a fishing expedition, and that the application judge correctly applied the criteria for enforcing letters rogatory, including principles of comity and public policy.

The court also found that the documents were not otherwise obtainable given the husband's history of non-compliance.

This appeal addressed a dispute arising from an asset purchase agreement concerning a director's resignation under a majority voting policy and a claim for contractual set-off.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in concluding that Baylin's majority voting policy did not comply with TSX requirements and in finding oppression against the respondent director.

The court also found error in the denial of contractual set-off for indemnity claims against unreleased shares.

The appeal was allowed, upholding the majority voting policy, requiring the director's resignation, and permitting the set-off of shares.

The applicants, Spacebridge Inc. and David Gelerman, sought an order allowing Gelerman to complete his term as a director of Baylin Technologies Inc. and for the release of share certificates held in trust.

Baylin and 2385796 Ontario Inc. brought a cross-application seeking a declaration that Gelerman breached Baylin’s Majority Voting Policy and an order for his resignation.

The court found Baylin’s Majority Voting Policy to be oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, and in unfair disregard of the applicants' reasonable expectations, as it deviated materially from TSX requirements and was designed to remove Gelerman.

The court also found that Baylin was not entitled to set-off the share certificates against indemnity claims, as the shares had already been "paid" by delivery to the trustee.

The application was allowed, setting aside Baylin's policy and ordering the release of shares, and the cross-application was dismissed.

One hundred and fifteen former Nortel employees brought a motion seeking to impose personal liability on the former directors of Nortel Networks Limited (NNL) and Nortel Networks Corporation (NNC) for unpaid severance payments under section 119 of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA).

The employees argued that the severance payments were akin to retention payments for services performed.

The directors raised defenses including that severance payments are not covered by section 119, they exercised due diligence, and some claimants were employed by a different subsidiary (NNTC).

The court dismissed the motion, finding that severance payments are not for 'services performed' under CBCA s. 119, but rather compensation for loss of employment.

The court also found that the directors had a valid due diligence defense and that the 'true employer' test would have identified NNL as the employer for all employees, despite payroll being handled by NNTC.

The court also noted that releases signed by some employees would have covered the claim.

Zayo Inc. brought a motion seeking an order for FTI Consulting Canada Inc., as Monitor for the Primus Entities, to pay Zayo $1,228,799.81 from asset sale proceeds.

This amount represented pre-CCAA filing arrears owed to Zayo under contracts assigned to Birch Communications Inc. Zayo argued the consent process for assignment was not transparent or fair, alleging it was misled into consenting without realizing it could have leveraged Section 11.3(4) of the CCAA to demand full payment of arrears.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the consent process fair and transparent, noting Zayo's sophistication and lack of due diligence.

The court also found that granting the order would cause prejudice to secured lenders and Birch, as it would require varying existing orders and disrupt a closed transaction.