Dennis Yiu Tong Ong

This decision concerns the continuation of refusals motions in complex insurance litigation involving environmental claims at 26 mining sites operated by Vale Canada Limited.

The court addresses the proportionality and sufficiency of discovery efforts, the organization and resolution of thousands of discovery refusals, and sets out directions for further production and inquiry.

The ruling emphasizes the need for balance and proportionality in discovery, especially in large-scale litigation, and provides a framework for resolving outstanding discovery disputes ahead of trial.

This decision concerns the interpretation and distribution of proceeds from a Legal Expense Insurance (LEI) policy following the unsuccessful outcome of a personal injury trial.

The court considered whether the applicant (Spencer and Elite Insurance Company) or the respondent (Belton) was entitled to the policy funds, and whether the funds should be shared pro rata between costs and disbursements.

The court held that the policy funds were to be paid to the applicants to offset their costs, as the law firm (MHA) had abandoned its claim for disbursements, and that Belton was not a beneficiary entitled to direct the use of the funds.

The appellant, Ms. Wong, appealed a lower court's finding of civil fraud against her, which arose from her misrepresentation to Aviva Insurance Company of Canada regarding who was driving during a motor vehicle accident.

The original application sought a declaration that Aviva owed her a defence, which was denied due to policy breach and civil fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that Aviva had suffered a real, albeit unquantified, loss due to Ms. Wong's actions, specifically in terms of its ability to defend the main action, thereby satisfying the loss element of civil fraud.

This appeal addresses an insurer's duty to defend and fund defence costs for mixed claims (covered and uncovered).

The Court of Appeal clarified the application of the pleadings rule to determine coverage and whether an insurer can seek equitable contribution from an insured.

The application judge erred in characterizing all claims as covered and in finding equitable contribution inapplicable between insurer and insured.

The Court found that statutory negligence claims were not covered by the Aviva policy, but upheld the initial 100% funding by Aviva, subject to reallocation after trial or settlement, as equitable contribution is only available between concurrent insurers, not from an insured.

The applicant, Victoria Wong, sought a declaration that Aviva Insurance Company of Canada owed her a defence and indemnity under an insurance policy following a motor vehicle accident.

Aviva denied coverage, alleging breach of contract and civil fraud, stemming from Wong's misrepresentation that her mother, Chang Tieu, was driving the vehicle, and their subsequent collusion, including Tieu's false testimony under oath during discovery, assisted by Wong.

Wong also sought relief from forfeiture.

Aviva brought a cross-application to be added as a Statutory Third Party.

The court found that Wong breached her insurance contract and committed civil fraud, and that her conduct barred her from relief from forfeiture.

Consequently, Wong's application was dismissed, and Aviva's cross-application to be added as a Statutory Third Party was granted.

The applicant sought a declaration of insurance coverage and relief from forfeiture after the respondent insurer denied coverage due to the applicant's misrepresentation and civil fraud regarding a motor vehicle accident.

The court found the applicant breached her insurance contract and committed civil fraud by falsely representing herself as the driver and lying under oath.

Consequently, the court dismissed the application, denying relief from forfeiture due to the fraudulent conduct and the gravity of the breach.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his personal injury action, which was found to be statute-barred due to the two-year limitation period.

The motion judge concluded that the appellant's injuries were discoverable well within the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's application of discoverability principles under the Limitations Act and the threshold for serious and permanent impairment under the Insurance Act.

The Court clarified that formal medical opinions required for a threshold motion are not necessary to trigger the limitation period.

The applicants sought an order compelling Martin & Hillyer Associates to produce an unredacted adverse costs insurance policy.

Martin & Hillyer had provided a partially redacted copy, claiming privilege and confidentiality over certain portions.

The court found that the redacted portions were neither privileged nor confidential, as the policy contained generic wording common to such contracts and did not include solicitor-client communications or litigation strategy.

The court emphasized that the entire policy was relevant for proper contractual interpretation.

The application for production was granted.

The appellant, Gamma Construction Ltd., appealed a lower court's decision regarding causation under the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's conclusion that causation was not made out, applying the Amos v. The Insurance Corp. of British Columbia test.

The court found that the use of the automobile, as it related to the injuries, was merely incidental or fortuitous, and therefore, the causation finding was unassailable.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This application concerned a dispute between Live Nation and Aviva regarding which of two insurance policies (Aviva's or Live Nation's Starr policy) should primarily cover Live Nation's defence costs in a related claim.

Live Nation, as an additional insured under Aviva's policy (issued to its security contractor NWP), argued Aviva's policy was primary.

Aviva contended its policy was excess and sought equitable contribution from Live Nation's policy.

The court found Aviva's policy to be primary, rejecting the equitable contribution argument based on policy language and commercial intent, and ordered Aviva to pay 100% of defence costs, subject to a future re-apportionment application.

The applicants brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of David L. Edwards J. dated December 15, 2021.

The Divisional Court allowed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs of the motion were fixed at $5,000, to be determined by the panel hearing the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal concerning a coverage dispute.

The appellants challenged the lower court's finding that Proturf was an essential party to the original application.

The appellate court affirmed that determining the existence of an implied contract between the appellants and Proturf was central to the coverage issue, and procedural fairness necessitated Proturf's inclusion as a party, even without direct relief sought against them.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Speyer J. dated October 29, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding party in the agreed amount of $2,825.

The applicants sought an order declaring that the respondent insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify them in an underlying trip and fall action.

The incident occurred during a gap period between written service contracts with a landscaping contractor insured by the respondent.

The applicants argued an implied contract existed during the gap period.

The court dismissed the application, finding it fatally flawed because the landscaping contractor was not named as a respondent and could not have a ruling made against its interests without an opportunity to be heard.

The court dismissed a motion for leave to appeal the order of Justice Lemon dated June 22, 2021.

As no costs submissions were received from the parties, no costs were awarded.

The defendants, an athlete and a national sports organization, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for damages arising from alleged harassment and assault.

The defendants argued the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff had already pursued a complaint under the organization's internal disciplinary code, making the civil action an abuse of process or collateral attack.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the internal disciplinary process did not have the authority to award compensatory damages for tortious conduct, and therefore did not oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts.

The defendant insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing it was brought outside the one-year limitation period set out in the Insurance Act and the standard automobile insurance policy.

The plaintiff argued the claim was not for breach of contract, but for breach of the insurer's independent duty of good faith, which is subject to the basic two-year limitation period.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that based on the pleadings, the bad faith claim is separate and distinct from a claim under the insurance contract, and therefore falls outside the one-year limitation period.

This is an appeal from a costs ruling in a negligence action.

The plaintiff, Anna Przyk, sued Hamilton Retirement Group Ltd. (Rushdale) after a slip and fall.

A jury found Rushdale not liable, and the action was dismissed.

Rushdale, as the successful party, sought partial indemnity costs, which the trial judge denied.

The trial judge cited three reasons: the need for negligence law to adapt to elder care, a "David and Goliath" situation due to Rushdale's insurer (Aviva), and Aviva's "hardball" settlement approach.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by relying on the insurer's resources and settlement posture as reasons to deny costs to a successful party, absent litigation misconduct.

However, the Court upheld the no-costs award on the independent ground that the case raised important and novel issues concerning elder care, which is a valid consideration for costs discretion.

The appeal was dismissed, with no costs awarded for the appeal.

Aviva sought costs for its motion to be added as a statutory third party.

The plaintiff and one defendant claimed they never opposed the motion, but the case conference endorsement explicitly stated they did, leading Aviva to prepare for an opposed motion.

The court found it was reasonable for Aviva to rely on the endorsement and awarded Aviva $5,000 in costs on a partial indemnity scale, payable equally by the plaintiff and the responding defendant.

The moving party withdrew its motion for leave to appeal the order of Justice Nishikawa.

The Divisional Court awarded costs of the withdrawn motion to the respondent in the fixed amount of $5,000.