Peter Brian Cozzi

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to examine a second representative of the corporate defendant in a slip-and-fall action.

The plaintiffs sought to examine the employee who prepares planograms after discovering the initial representative had limited knowledge of them.

The motion was dismissed, as the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the initial representative was unwilling or unable to inform himself, or that a second examination was necessary to obtain satisfactory answers.

The respondent brought a motion for summary judgment based on the terms of a Separation Agreement dated November 24, 2023, which provided for spousal support of $800 monthly for three years, terminating on August 30, 2024.

The applicant opposed the motion, claiming the parties had orally agreed to extend the support obligation for a full year and that four months of additional payments constituted a variation of the agreement.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and granted the respondent's motion for summary judgment, finding the applicant bound by the terms of the Agreement and that the additional payments were gratuitous.

The court awarded costs to the respondent.

The applicant, Jerzy Szot, sought an order under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring the respondents, Peter B. Cozzi and his professional corporation, to be vexatious litigants.

The application arose from a lengthy and complex litigation history involving Mr. Cozzi’s repeated attempts to access insurance proceeds and fees in relation to a former client, Mr. Nguyen, a party under disability.

The court found that Mr. Cozzi’s conduct, including relitigating settled issues, failing to pay costs orders, and acting against a vulnerable party, was vexatious and an abuse of process.

The court granted the order, prohibiting the respondents from instituting or continuing proceedings without leave.

The appellants sought to appeal a decision declining to award costs against a law firm under s. 86(1)(b)(i) of the Construction Act.

The Divisional Court held that leave to appeal was required under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act because the appeal was solely regarding discretionary costs, and the costs order did not constitute a 'judgment' under s. 71 of the Construction Act.

Finding that the test for leave was not met, the court denied leave and dismissed the appeal.

The defendants brought motions under section 86(1)(b)(i) of the old Construction Act seeking costs against the plaintiff's former law firm, arguing the firm participated in preserving and perfecting a baseless construction lien.

The court held that liability under this section requires subjective actual knowledge, recklessness, or willful blindness regarding the baselessness of the lien, rather than mere negligence.

Finding no evidence that the law firm possessed such knowledge or acted with willful blindness at the time of preservation and perfection, the court dismissed the motions.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment for a mortgage deficiency, arguing that the respondent (mortgagee) failed to take reasonable precautions to obtain the property’s true market value during power of sale proceedings, leading to an improvident realization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly applied the summary judgment test and that there was no evidence of the respondent failing to take reasonable precautions or of an improvident sale.

The court also rejected the appellants' arguments regarding inadequate evidence and the legal test for a mortgagee's duty, affirming that a mortgagor must show a higher price would have been obtained but for any alleged breach.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident but failed to attend multiple case conferences and the scheduled videoconference hearing.

Despite efforts by her counsel and the Tribunal to contact her, she remained unreachable.

The Tribunal proceeded in her absence under section 7(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

As the applicant adduced no evidence to meet her burden of proof, the application was dismissed in its entirety.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court of Justice order concerning an estate trustee's conflict of interest and a claim for compensation.

The appellant argued that the application judge made palpable or overriding errors in her findings of fact and application of law.

The Court of Appeal found no such errors, affirming the lower court's determination that a conflict of interest prevented the appellant from continuing as estate trustee and upholding the decision on the appellant's compensation claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought to remove his brother as co-Estate Trustee of their late father's estate and sought directions on the apportionment of the estate.

The respondent brought a cross-application seeking compensation for personal care services, interest, and other payments.

The court found the respondent to be in an irreconcilable conflict of interest due to his unauthorized use of estate funds, failure to comply with a prior settlement agreement, and procedurally flawed claims against the estate.

The court removed the respondent as an Estate Trustee, dismissed his cross-application, and directed that specific amounts be deducted from his share of the estate to reimburse the applicant.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a 2002 court order, seeking retroactive child support and special expenses for the child, K, from the respondent father.

The father had failed to provide annual financial disclosure as required by the original order and had largely been out of contact.

The court found the father's conduct blameworthy, rejecting his arguments of delay by the mother or the child's withdrawal from parental control.

The court ordered retroactive child support based on the father's income from July 1, 2010, until January 31, 2019, and an equal sharing of post-secondary tuition and health-related expenses.

The existing order for daycare contribution was terminated as of September 1, 2008.

The plaintiff contractor brought a construction lien action against the defendant owner for unpaid renovation work on a commercial condominium unit.

The parties disputed seven claims for extra work and a 10% discount clause for delay inserted by the owner.

The court found that the extra work was outside the scope of the contract and implicitly authorized, awarding the plaintiff $5,755.09 for the extras.

The court also held that the 10% discount clause was an unenforceable penalty, as it was not a genuine pre-estimate of damages, and dismissed the owner's claim for delay damages.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for $12,535.09.

The insurer requested a reconsideration of a preliminary issue decision which found that section 56 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule did not bar the applicant's claim for a non-earner benefit.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that under Rule 18 of the Common Rules of Practice and Procedure, it can only reconsider decisions that finally dispose of an appeal.

Because the preliminary issue decision was interlocutory and did not deprive the insurer of a substantive right determinative of the entire application, it was not subject to reconsideration.

The applicant's request for costs was also dismissed.

The moving party withdrew its motion for leave to appeal the order of Justice Nishikawa.

The Divisional Court awarded costs of the withdrawn motion to the respondent in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought non-earner benefits.

The respondent raised a preliminary issue, arguing that the applicant was barred from proceeding with her claim under section 56 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule because she failed to establish eligibility within the prescribed time limit.

The Tribunal found that the respondent had never issued a clear and unequivocal denial of a specific claim for the benefit, as no claim existed at the time of the purported denials.

Therefore, the limitation period under section 56 was not triggered, and the applicant was not barred from proceeding with her application.

The respondent mother brought an urgent motion to suspend the applicant father's mid-week parenting time or, alternatively, to order him to take their three-year-old child to daycare during his parenting time.

The mother required the child to attend daycare full-time to maintain his spot and subsidy, which she needed in order to work.

The father objected to daycare attendance during his time, preferring the child stay home with his stepmother and siblings.

The court found it was in the child's best interests to attend daycare full-time, noting the benefits of the program and the disruption of part-time attendance, but allowed either parent to pick up the child before or after nap time.

The applicant filed a request for reconsideration of a preliminary motion decision that found they were precluded from proceeding with a claim for income replacement benefits due to a limitation period.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the request, noting that under the amended Rule 18.1 of the Common Rules of Practice and Procedure, requests for reconsideration are only accepted for decisions that finally dispose of an appeal.

The applicant applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal for income replacement benefits (IRBs) more than two years after the insurer issued an Explanation of Benefits denying the claim.

The insurer raised a preliminary issue that the claim was statute-barred.

The Tribunal found that the insurer's denial was clear and unequivocal, triggering the two-year limitation period.

The Tribunal declined to extend the limitation period under section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, finding no bona fide intention to appeal within the time limit and significant prejudice to the insurer.

The application for IRBs was dismissed as statute-barred.

The applicant solicitor brought a motion to set aside an Assessment Officer's decision that reduced his contingency fees and imposed tax liability on him.

The Assessment Officer had reduced fees for accident benefit claims due to the clients' misunderstanding of net settlement proceeds.

The court confirmed the fee reduction, finding the solicitor responsible for ensuring client understanding of settlement terms.

However, the court set aside the Assessment Officer's decision to impose the increased HST amount on the solicitor, deeming it inappropriate as the tax was collected for remittance to the government and the increase was not the solicitor's responsibility.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Director's Delegate decision confirming an Arbitrator's finding that he was not catastrophically impaired following a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant argued the Arbitrator erred in law by relying on surveillance evidence, the applicant's presentation at the hearing, and a psychiatrist's report.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the issues raised were questions of fact and the weighing of evidence, not errors of law, and that the Director's Delegate's decision was reasonable.

The defendant Wilford brought a motion for security for costs against the corporate plaintiff under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The corporate plaintiff argued it was impecunious and that the action was primarily driven by its principal, who was also a plaintiff.

The Master found that the corporate plaintiff had insufficient assets in Ontario and that its claims were weak.

Applying a holistic analysis, the Master concluded it was just to order security for costs to protect the defendant, fixing the amount at $12,500 up to the end of discoveries.