Peter Brian Cozzi

The respondent brought a motion for summary judgment based on the terms of a Separation Agreement dated November 24, 2023, which provided for spousal support of $800 monthly for three years, terminating on August 30, 2024.

The applicant opposed the motion, claiming the parties had orally agreed to extend the support obligation for a full year and that four months of additional payments constituted a variation of the agreement.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and granted the respondent's motion for summary judgment, finding the applicant bound by the terms of the Agreement and that the additional payments were gratuitous.

The court awarded costs to the respondent.

The applicant, Jerzy Szot, sought an order under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring the respondents, Peter B. Cozzi and his professional corporation, to be vexatious litigants.

The application arose from a lengthy and complex litigation history involving Mr. Cozzi’s repeated attempts to access insurance proceeds and fees in relation to a former client, Mr. Nguyen, a party under disability.

The court found that Mr. Cozzi’s conduct, including relitigating settled issues, failing to pay costs orders, and acting against a vulnerable party, was vexatious and an abuse of process.

The court granted the order, prohibiting the respondents from instituting or continuing proceedings without leave.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment for a mortgage deficiency, arguing that the respondent (mortgagee) failed to take reasonable precautions to obtain the property’s true market value during power of sale proceedings, leading to an improvident realization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly applied the summary judgment test and that there was no evidence of the respondent failing to take reasonable precautions or of an improvident sale.

The court also rejected the appellants' arguments regarding inadequate evidence and the legal test for a mortgagee's duty, affirming that a mortgagor must show a higher price would have been obtained but for any alleged breach.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court of Justice order concerning an estate trustee's conflict of interest and a claim for compensation.

The appellant argued that the application judge made palpable or overriding errors in her findings of fact and application of law.

The Court of Appeal found no such errors, affirming the lower court's determination that a conflict of interest prevented the appellant from continuing as estate trustee and upholding the decision on the appellant's compensation claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a 2002 court order, seeking retroactive child support and special expenses for the child, K, from the respondent father.

The father had failed to provide annual financial disclosure as required by the original order and had largely been out of contact.

The court found the father's conduct blameworthy, rejecting his arguments of delay by the mother or the child's withdrawal from parental control.

The court ordered retroactive child support based on the father's income from July 1, 2010, until January 31, 2019, and an equal sharing of post-secondary tuition and health-related expenses.

The existing order for daycare contribution was terminated as of September 1, 2008.

The applicant solicitor brought a motion to set aside an Assessment Officer's decision that reduced his contingency fees and imposed tax liability on him.

The Assessment Officer had reduced fees for accident benefit claims due to the clients' misunderstanding of net settlement proceeds.

The court confirmed the fee reduction, finding the solicitor responsible for ensuring client understanding of settlement terms.

However, the court set aside the Assessment Officer's decision to impose the increased HST amount on the solicitor, deeming it inappropriate as the tax was collected for remittance to the government and the increase was not the solicitor's responsibility.

The defendant Toronto Transit Commission brought a motion to compel the plaintiff Aldea to produce 18 documents listed in Schedule "A" of her affidavit of documents.

The plaintiff refused to obtain these documents without upfront payment from the TTC, arguing they were available at third-party offices.

The court found that by listing documents in Schedule "A", the plaintiff admitted their relevance and could not object to their production or impose terms.

The court reiterated that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to secure and produce documents relied upon in their claim at their own expense.

The motion was granted, and the plaintiff was ordered to obtain and produce the documents and pay costs to the TTC.

This motion concerned the plaintiff's request for leave to further amend its Statement of Claim to add new causes of action and a new defendant.

The court assessed the tenability of proposed claims for civil conspiracy, inducing breach of fiduciary duty, and trespass to property against a newly added defendant, Allen Wilford.

The court permitted amendments for inducing breach of fiduciary duty and trespass to chattels, including a devaluation claim, but struck the civil conspiracy claim due to insufficient pleading of an agreement and predominant purpose to injure.

The court also allowed the addition of 7887035 Canada Inc. as a defendant.

The plaintiff brought a tort action for a motor vehicle collision.

After a jury awarded nominal general damages (less than the statutory deductible) and past loss of income (reduced to zero by collateral benefits), the defendant brought a threshold motion to declare the plaintiff not entitled to non-pecuniary damages.

The court determined the threshold issue was not moot, despite the net zero award, for costs purposes.

The court found the plaintiff failed to establish a permanent serious impairment of an an important physical, mental, or psychological function, largely due to the plaintiff's exaggeration of symptoms and the expert witness's lack of impartiality.

Consequently, the defendant's threshold motion was granted, and the plaintiff's total damages were reduced to zero.

The defendant was deemed the successful party and awarded costs and disbursements.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking to change the children’s primary residence, alter the parenting schedule, determine schooling, and terminate his child support obligations.

The court considered extensive evidence regarding one child’s serious behavioural disorders, professional assessments, and testimony from a family services worker indicating the need for stability, structure, and consistent parental supervision.

The court found that the mother had demonstrated ongoing inconsistency in attending appointments, follow-through with services, and providing stability, while the father presented a structured care plan including specialized educational programming.

Determining that the children’s best interests required urgent intervention, the court ordered that primary residence change to the father commencing September 1, 2013 and directed that the children attend a school capable of addressing the behavioural needs of one child.

The father’s child support obligation was terminated effective July 1, 2013, while the issue of potential support from the mother was adjourned and disclosure ordered.

Following a family law trial concerning constructive trust, spousal support, and child support, the respondent sought costs of the proceeding alleging unreasonable conduct by the opposing party.

The court reviewed the costs framework under Rules 24 and 18 of the Family Law Rules, including the presumptive entitlement of a successful party to costs and the relevance of litigation conduct.

Although the responding party had some procedural shortcomings, the court found the moving party had also engaged in conduct contributing to the dispute and that the opposing party had achieved greater success at trial.

In the circumstances, the court declined to award costs to either side.

No order as to costs was made.

In a matrimonial proceeding involving a lodge business subject to a court‑appointed receivership, the respondent husband moved to remove the receiver, stay payments, and seek contempt findings against the applicant wife.

The wife cross‑applied for transfer of the property into her name and other interim relief including support.

The court held that removal of a receiver requires strong evidence of bad faith or misconduct and found no basis to discharge the receiver despite disputes over expenditures and alleged bias.

The court declined to transfer ownership of the property or make certain enforcement orders but granted modest interim spousal support and ordered financial disclosure.

Several ancillary requests, including contempt findings and other relief, were denied pending trial.