Maneesha Mehra

The respondent mother sought to stay the Court of Appeal's order requiring the return of a five-year-old child to the United Kingdom pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, pending her application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The father had successfully appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed his application for the child's return, on the basis that the father had consented to or acquiesced in the child's retention in Canada.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in conflating consent to relocation with consent to retention.

The motion judge dismissed the mother's stay motion, finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the child's return to the jurisdiction of habitual residence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether the application judge erred in refusing to order the return of a child to the United Kingdom under the Hague Convention, on the basis that the left-behind parent had consented to or acquiesced in the child’s retention in Canada.

The Court found that the application judge conflated consent to future relocation with consent to the present retention, and that the evidence did not support a finding of consent or acquiescence to the wrongful retention.

The appeal was allowed and the return of the child to the U.K. was ordered, with undertakings imposed to protect the child’s best interests.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of A.A. regarding the return of her child to Bangladesh under the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA) while refugee applications were pending.

The court found that the motion judge erred by failing to consider the impact of the outstanding refugee claims, the allegations of domestic violence, and the potential for serious harm to the child if returned.

The decision clarifies that the existence of a refugee claim does not automatically stay CLRA proceedings but is a significant factor in the analysis.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

This is a panel review of a single judge's order dismissing a motion to stay a return order for an infant child to Bangladesh, pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal majority granted the review, set aside the stay dismissal, and granted a stay of the return order.

The majority found that the single judge erred in principle by giving insufficient weight to the serious issue of the relationship between the Children's Law Reform Act and pending refugee claims, and by misapplying the irreparable harm and balance of convenience tests, particularly regarding the child's best interests and the potential loss of refugee status.

The dissenting judge argued that the majority conducted a de novo review rather than applying deference to the single judge's discretionary order.

The Court of Appeal heard cross-motions within an appeal concerning a child's return to Bangladesh.

The mother (appellant) sought to stay a lower court order for the child's return, arguing a pending refugee claim should preclude the order, and also requested initials and a publication ban.

The father (respondent) sought security for costs for the appeal.

The court dismissed the mother's stay motion, finding no evidence of merit to the refugee claim or irreparable harm, and that the child's best interests favored return to Bangladesh.

The court granted the mother's request for initials and a limited publication ban.

The father's motion for security for costs was dismissed, as it would impede access to justice.

The appellant, Mr. Thomas, appealed the dismissal of his Hague Convention application for the return of his son, Isaiah, from Toronto to his habitual residence in Balch Springs, Texas.

The application judge had found that the appellant unequivocally acquiesced to the child's relocation.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by reversing the burden of proof, misapplying the standard of "clear and cogent evidence" for acquiescence, and failing to properly consider the appellant's subjective intention.

The Court reiterated that the standard for finding acquiescence is high and that the Hague Convention's objective is the prompt return of abducted children.

The appeal was allowed, and the child was ordered to be returned to Texas.

The Applicant Father sought the return of his son to Balch Springs, Texas, U.S.A., under Article 12 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, alleging wrongful removal and retention by the Respondent Mother in Toronto.

The Mother relied on Article 13 exceptions, asserting the Father's subsequent acquiescence to the child's retention or, alternatively, a grave risk of harm upon return.

The court found that while Texas was the child's habitual residence and the Father did not initially consent to the removal, he subsequently unequivocally acquiesced to the child's retention in Ontario through his conduct and communications over several months.

The Mother's alternative argument regarding grave risk of harm was not proven to meet the high threshold required by the Convention.

Consequently, the Father's application for the child's return was dismissed based on the finding of acquiescence.

The applicant appealed an arbitration award that granted summary judgment to the respondent, dismissing her claims to set aside two domestic contracts.

The applicant argued the contracts should be set aside due to financial non-disclosure, lack of understanding, and duress.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the arbitrator made palpable and overriding errors of mixed fact and law by conflating the steps of the summary judgment test, assessing credibility on a conflicting written record without oral evidence, and failing to properly weigh the respondent's non-disclosure of a significant family trust.

The summary judgment was set aside and the matter was remitted to a new arbitrator for a full hearing.

The applicant ex-spouse sought a declaration for the proceeds of the deceased's Locked-in Retirement Account (LIRA) based on a 1997 beneficiary designation.

The respondent estate and parents opposed, relying on a 2001 designation changing the beneficiary to the parents, of which only a photocopy could be found, and a 2005 final matrimonial release.

The court dismissed the application, finding the 2001 photocopy was a valid instrument under the Succession Law Reform Act that revoked the 1997 designation.

Furthermore, the 2005 matrimonial settlement and release precluded the applicant's claim, and awarding her the LIRA would result in unjust enrichment.

The applicant wife brought a motion seeking production and answers to refusals related to the respondent husband's financial disclosure during marriage contract negotiations.

The wife argued that the husband's reliance on his professional advisors, including his lawyer, to prepare his financial disclosure constituted an implied waiver of solicitor-client privilege over his lawyer's file.

The court dismissed the wife's motion, holding that merely stating reliance on a lawyer to perform their job in preparing disclosure does not put the legal advice itself in issue, and therefore does not amount to an implied waiver of solicitor-client privilege, which is considered to be as close to absolute as possible.

The court determined the costs of two motions in a family law proceeding.

The respondent father was successful on a motion for the advancement of funds and was awarded costs of $22,967.05.

The respondent was unsuccessful on a motion to adjourn the trial, and the applicant mother was awarded costs of $7,631.38 for that motion.

The court ordered a set-off, resulting in a net payment of $15,335.67 by the applicant to the respondent.

The respondent father sought $11,714.26 in full indemnity costs of a case conference and motion that settled before argument.

The terms of settlement were similar to the father's offer to settle.

The applicant mother opposed the request and sought no costs award.

The court found that success was divided, as the parties were virtually ad idem on the date the mother was required to respond to the father's offer.

The court determined that the father's response to the mother's counteroffer was disproportionate to the minor remaining issues in dispute.

The court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

This endorsement addresses procedural matters in an appeal concerning child support and s.7 expenses.

The court scheduled a settlement conference prior to the appeal hearing, emphasizing the exchange of offers to settle.

It also issued an order allowing for a paperless/electronic appeal, with counsel responsible for ensuring technology is in place, and requiring a paper copy of the respondent's factum.

The parties separated and initially shared a nesting arrangement in the matrimonial home.

Following the sale of the home, both parties brought motions regarding the parenting schedule, schooling, and child support.

The mother sought primary residence and interim sole custody, while the father sought to continue an alternating week schedule.

The court excluded surreptitious surveillance evidence obtained by the mother against the father.

Finding that the father's demanding schedule as a medical resident made him largely unavailable to parent the children without delegating to his extended family, the court ordered primary residence to the mother with the father having alternate weekends and Wednesday overnights.

The court also ordered the children to attend the school proposed by the mother and ordered the father to pay table child support.