Overview

[1] I was designated the case management judge for this matter on June 16, 2015.

[2] The parties obtained a special appointment motion, heard before me on Monday, August 10, 2015. The motion brought by the applicant mother, dated July 23, 2015 (tab 48 of the continuing record (“CR”)), sought to vary the order of Rogin J. dated January 26, 2015, in respect of, primarily, the parenting schedule for the two children of the marriage. There was other relief sought relating to the schooling of the children come September 2015, the sale of the matrimonial home, and child support.

[3] The respondent father brought two cross motions, the primary one, dated July 28, 2015 (tab 54 of the CR), and a second and much briefer one, dated July 29, 2015. The applicant objected to various aspects of the cross motion being heard on August 10th. Those objections were addressed in my endorsement released August 2, 2015.

[4] To summarize the endorsement of Rogin J. released February 10, 2015, the court, inter alia:

a. dismissed the respective claims of both parties for interim sole custody of the two children;

b. found that the “children have been parented by both parents (with the assistance of others) since the date of separation”;

c. found that since both parties were still residing in the matrimonial home at the time, “there is already a de facto nesting arrangement”;

d. found that the continued nesting arrangement, which had been proposed by the respondent, was in the best interests of the children and should be maintained;

e. ordered that, in furtherance of the de facto nesting arrangement, the arrangement should continue until trial, with each party having exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and interim custody of the children in alternating weeks, commencing each Saturday at noon, with the non-custodial parent having telephone access to the children on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday evenings; and

f. ordered that the matrimonial home should be listed for sale immediately but that the closing date was not to occur before June 28, 2015, in order that the older child, Hallie, would not have to switch schools mid-term.

[5] The matrimonial home was since sold. The transaction closed on Thursday, August 20, 2015, only ten days after the special motion was argued before me.

[6] It goes without saying that the sale of the matrimonial home rendered moot the continued nesting arrangements and thus required that the court determine anew the issue of the parenting schedule on an interim – and immediate – basis. That was the urgency underlying the August 10th special appointment.

[7] In her motion to vary the order of Rogin J., the applicant mother sought to have primary residence of the children in her new home in LaSalle, where the children would attend a new, private school. The father would see the children on alternate weekends with a mid-week overnight.

[8] The respondent father wishes to remain in their current neighbourhood, where the two children would attend the same school where the eldest attended for the last two years. The father proposed that the parties continue the same parenting schedule of alternating weeks with the children.

[9] Given the imperative of providing the parties with an answer to the most pressing questions (i.e., the parenting schedule and schooling) as quickly as possible and before the closing of the matrimonial home on August 20th, I released an endorsement to the parties dated August 19, 2015, providing them with a ruling on those questions; my endorsement indicated that the court’s full reasons for its decision would follow at a later date. These are the reasons.

Background

[10] The applicant, Valentina Veljanovski, née Bello (“Val”), and the respondent, Dr. Jovica Veljanovski (“John”), were married on July 29, 2007, and separated on June 24, 2014, after some seven years of marriage and the birth of two children.

[11] The two children of the marriage are Hallie Marilena Veljanovski (born May 11, 2009) and Noah Ted Veljanovski (born February 25, 2011).

[12] Many of the relevant background facts remain essentially the same as those findings made by Rogin J. in his endorsement released February 10, 2015, 2015 ONSC 921, at para. 6:

a. Val had been previously employed as a pharmaceutical representative, where she earned approximately $180,000 per annum from her employment;

b. Val has cystic fibrosis;

c. Val resigned from her employment in September 2013 and has been a stay-at-home mother since that time;

d. Val comes from a very wealthy family; she receives significant dividend income;

e. John is a medical doctor. John was attending medical school (or was studying to gain admission thereto) during the parties’ entire marriage, and is currently a Resident at Henry Ford Hospital. He has three years of Residency and then wants to pursue a Fellowship in Pulmonology with the designation in CCU/ICU, which requires an additional three years of on-call shiftwork;

f. John earns approximately US$55,000 as a Resident physician;

g. John has financial support from his sister, and child care support from his mother and sister. His mother often cared for the children when the parties were at work; and

h. the parties had employed a nanny until approximately September 2013.

[13] Following their separation, Val and John resided together with the children in the former matrimonial home, municipally known as 275 West Puce River Road, Belle River, until February 2015, at which time they commenced a week-on/week-off nesting arrangement as ordered by Rogin J.

[14] The matrimonial home was listed for sale on May 28, 2015. The parties accepted an offer to purchase the matrimonial home on July 14, 2015, for the amount of $950,000. The transaction closed on August 20, 2015.

[15] The matrimonial home was jointly owned by the parties, with a mortgage of approximately $274,000 secured against the property; it was expected that the net equity in the matrimonial home, after deduction for expenses, would be approximately $625,000. No decision has been made about either any equalization payment in this matter or the distribution of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home upon closing.

[16] Following the release of the endorsement of Rogin J., Val proceeded to build a new home in LaSalle, municipally known as 6189 Silver Maple Street, LaSalle, which is close to Val’s extended family, but on the other side of Windsor from the former matrimonial home. Val’s new home is, according to Google Maps, approximately 26-28 km. or 22-26 minutes away from the matrimonial home.

[17] Other than to say that he would be remaining in Puce close to the former matrimonial home, John had not provided any detailed information regarding his intended residential arrangements following the sale of the matrimonial home until the week before the hearing of the special appointment motion. At that time, his counsel advised that John had purchased a home very near the matrimonial home, at 416 West Puce River Road, closing on August 19, 2015.

Characterization of the order of Rogin J.

[18] The parties disagree over the proper characterization of the order of Rogin J. dated January 26, 2015. The question has implications for the applicable threshold test that the applicant must satisfy on this motion.

[19] The respondent argues that the order of Rogin J. was an interim order and that, consequently, the applicant must demonstrate a material change in circumstances as a result of which there are compelling reasons to vary the interim order to meet the children’s best interests (Greve v. Brighton, 2011 ONSC 4996, 2011 CarswellOnt 8814 (S.C.J.), at para. 24). Further, the respondent submits that the applicant must produce cogent and compelling evidence to show that the physical, mental, and moral welfare of a child would be in danger in maintaining the status quo (McCarthy v. Scheibler, [1999] O.J. No. 3999, 1999 CarswellOnt 3419 (S.C.J.), at para. 14).

[20] In my view, the instant case does not fit easily within the rubric of “maintaining the status quo” that was considered by the court in McCarthy. There, the mother had de facto custody of the child of the marriage from the date of separation until the date of the order that awarded her interim custody; the status quo continued in place as of the date of the father’s own motion for custody of the child. In those circumstances, the court held that “stronger evidence is required to disturb the status quo than is required to support an order for custody after a trial on the merits.”

[21] In the instant case, however, I don’t think one can fairly say that it is the applicant’s motion that seeks to disturb the status quo. The status quo – of the children residing in the matrimonial home under a nesting arrangement, with each parent alternating residency in, and exclusive possession of, the matrimonial home and interim custody of the children on a week-on, week-off basis – is clearly being disturbed; but that is a function of the sale of the matrimonial home, and not the motion of the applicant, or of the respondent for that matter. Rather, as I view the matter, the status quo, of necessity, has been changed by reason of the sale of the matrimonial home, the nesting arrangement has been rendered moot, and now each party is presenting their own parenting plan to the court.

[22] For her part, the applicant argues that the order of Rogin J. is in the nature of an interim interim order and, as such, the applicant is not required to establish a material change in circumstances in order to seek a change of the parenting schedule and other incidents of custody.

[23] The respondent concedes, in para. 85 of his factum, that it is not necessary for a party seeking a variance to demonstrate a material change in circumstances where the order in question specifically contemplates a variation pending trial. See Jajal v. Agrawal, 2013 ONSC 2505, 2013 CarswellOnt 4898 (S.C.J.), at paras. 6-7.

[24] In my view, the order of Rogin J. is best regarded as being in the nature of an interim interim order and must be taken as having contemplated a variation pending trial. Indeed, Rogin J. himself twice describes his order as being an interim interim one. In para. 6 of his endorsement, His Honour states that: “I make my interim interim order for the part on evidence which I feel is not contested.” Later, at para. 30 of his endorsement, Rogin J. states that “any finding that [Val] is deliberately underemployed should not be made on an interim interim basis.”

[25] That said, I appreciate that in other instances in his endorsement, Rogin J. makes reference to the “interim” nature of the relief sought or order made (see, e.g., para. 10). In those instances, I read the court as merely saying that the relief or order is “interim” in the sense of being temporary. One may posit that all “interim interim” orders are interim orders (i.e., in the sense of temporary), but the reverse is not true.

[26] The history or state of the proceedings at the time of the motion before Rogin J. also supports the characterization of the interim interim nature of the order. Val commenced this proceeding in September 2014. The hearing before Rogin J. was the first motion in the proceeding (there being an initial attendance before Campbell J. on December 5, 2014, at which time the motion was adjourned to a two-hour special appointment on January 26, 2015). Rogin J. heard argument on the motion on January 26, 2015, shortly following an urgent case conference that was held before Campbell J. on December 16, 2014. The affidavit evidence before the court at the time of the motion concerning the conduct of each party was noted by Rogin J. to be “contested” (para. 6) and “contradictory” (para. 38). He also noted that no cross-examination had been conducted on any of the competing affidavits. In short, the order was made very early on in the proceeding.

[27] Moreover, viewed objectively, the order must be taken to have contemplated a further variation prior to trial. Having ordered that the de facto nesting arrangement should be maintained (para. 16), with the children remaining in the matrimonial home, and each parent alternating residency in, and exclusive possession of, the matrimonial home on a week-on, week-off basis (paras. 19-20), Rogin J. went on, in para. 34 of his endorsement, to order the immediate sale of the matrimonial home, as follows:

The home should be sold. Although there is some minimal discretion under the Partition Act not to order sale, I decline to exercise my discretion in that regard. It shall be listed immediately and an order will go to that effect. Both parties will cooperate in signing a listing agreement and showing the home. If the parties cannot agree on an agent or a listing price, it will come back before me as if on a reference to the Master, there no longer being a Case Management Master in Windsor.

[28] Having ordered the immediate sale of the matrimonial home (which transaction, pursuant to para. 35, was not to close before June 28, 2015, in order to allow Hallie to complete her school year without having to switch schools), the order must be taken to have contemplated that a further order for parenting arrangements would be necessary once the transaction closed and the nesting arrangement in the matrimonial home was rendered moot. It cannot seriously be contended that, the order having been released mid-February 2015, anyone reasonably contemplated that the trial in this matter would occur within six months before the transaction closed. In my view, once the matrimonial home was ordered for immediate sale, it was a virtual certainty that a further motion would be necessary to deal with the further temporary parenting arrangements post-sale but prior to trial, unless of course the parties were able to agree on those arrangements.

[29] I would also note that the respondent himself would also seem to have contemplated the interim interim nature of the nesting arrangement. It was the respondent who, on the motion before Rogin J., argued for the nesting arrangement. In support of his proposal, the respondent swore a reply affidavit sworn January 21, 2015 (tab 20 of the CR), in para. 18 of which he suggests that, the applicant having then just purchased a lot for her new home in LaSalle, the construction of which was not expected to be completed and the home not available for occupancy prior to August 2013, “[w]e could use the ‘nesting’ arrangement in the interim for a six or seven month period. That period would include March Break and summer vacations in July and August” [emphasis added]. To the same effect is his statement in para. 21 of that same affidavit that, “[i]t is possible, with a little cooperation from Val and support from my mother, to be able to follow a ‘nesting’ arrangement over the next six months” [emphasis added]. Clearly, when the respondent himself first suggested the nesting arrangement, he was not contemplating that it would continue in place until trial but, rather, it would be merely an interim interim arrangement that would last six or seven months only.

[30] In the circumstances, neither party is required to establish a material change in circumstances in order to seek a change of the parenting schedule and other incidents of custody arising from the interim interim order of Rogin J.

Custody of the Children

[31] The applicant sought an interim order for sole custody of the children.

[32] The respondent did not seek any corresponding order for interim sole custody of the children. The respondent sought, essentially, a variation but continuation of the alternating-week parenting schedule under the order of Rogin J. dated January 26, 2015.

[33] In my August 19th endorsement, I declined to make any interim order regarding custody of the children at this juncture in the proceeding. I would note, again, that Rogin J. in his February 10th endorsement, released just six months before the special appointment before me, also dismissed the claims of both parties for interim sole custody.

[34] From the perspective of the children, what most pressingly needed to be determined are their residency and the parenting schedule, and where they would be attending school as of September 2015. Determination of those issues did not require, at this juncture, an interim order regarding custody, irrespective of how fervently that may be sought by either one of their parents. Moreover, in my view, a decision on custody at this interim stage would undoubtedly serve only to entrench the parties in their positions and undermine the spirit of compromise that both parties need to fully embrace in order for them to resolve their outstanding differences.

[35] As well, a decision on custody is not functionally necessary. As Rogin J. noted in para. 10 of his endorsement, “[n]either party denigrates the other’s parenting skills.” Indeed, during argument before me, both counsel conceded, quite fairly, that there was no issue regarding the parenting abilities of the other party. Both parties are sophisticated and intelligent, and they are able to cooperate and communicate respectfully, when they want to, in furtherance of the best interests of their children. They need to be encouraged in that regard.

[36] Accordingly, I dismissed the applicant’s claim for interim sole custody of the children, without prejudice to her right to renew the claim at trial or upon further order of the court.

Admissibility of Surveillance Evidence

[37] In para. 6 of his cross motion dated July 28th (and the second cross motion dated July 29th), the respondent sought to strike certain paragraphs of the applicant’s affidavits and related exhibits on the grounds that the evidence is inadmissible.

[38] The proffered evidence in question is derived from surveillance that the applicant had conducted on the respondent. There have been on-going concerns in this proceeding with the respondent’s work schedule at his place of employment, Henry Ford Hospital in Detroit, Michigan. Those concerns, from the applicant’s perspective, gave rise to the perceived need of the applicant to conduct surveillance of the respondent in an attempt to verify his workplace shift schedule and, in turn, his availability to parent the children.

[39] The objection of respondent’s counsel to the admissibility of the surveillance evidence was based, in short, on public policy considerations.

[40] In para. 15 of his endorsement, Rogin J. said:

Whatever is the date of separation, which is more germane to equalization than custody, the parties are both still in the matrimonial home. Although they are capable of cooperating with each other, the tension is escalating. The potential for conflict is increasing with the pressure of these court proceedings. The parties have started to surreptitiously record each other. This must stop. They are too mature to act in this way. It is not in the best interests of the children for the parents to be at war with each other. Even if Val and John think that the children do not notice this tension they are incorrect. Children always notice. [Emphasis added.]

[41] The clear distaste that the court expressed for the parties’ practice of surreptitiously recording each other is patently obvious. It could not have been lost on the applicant.

[42] It ought to have given Val pause to reconsider her decision to intensify her surveillance of John. That is, at some time in January 2015, i.e., in the weeks prior to the release of the endorsement of Rogin J., Val retained a private investigation firm to conduct “sightline surveillance” of John’s comings and goings. The surveillance, conducted by a team of six different investigators, included the taking of photographs and the making of video recordings of, primarily, John but also, incidentally, the children, the children’s grandmother, and their aunt, during drop-offs and pick-ups at school and other children’s activities.

[43] In addition, Val instructed the investigators to install a GPS tracking device on John’s car, the electronic data from which (though never made available to Val at the material times) was used to prepare a “tracker report,” showing the location of John’s car at any given time, i.e., whether it was at the matrimonial home, Henry Ford Hospital in Detroit, etc.

[44] This surveillance continued for at least seven months until it was terminated in or about August 2015.

[45] Not surprisingly, John feels the surveillance was a gross violation of his privacy, as well as that of his children’s and his extended family’s. One can certainly appreciate the sentiment he expressed in para. 37 of his affidavit sworn July 28, 2015 (tab 55 of the CR): “I was very upset to see the pictures had been taken of our children. While I have nothing to hide, the feeling of needing to ‘look over my shoulder’ all the time still sticks with me.”

[46] The surveillance was not disclosed by the applicant during the argument of the motion before Rogin J. on January 26, 2015. (I hasten to add that Ms. Goldhart did not represent the applicant at the time of the motion before Rogin J.; Ms. Goldhart advises her firm was retained on or about March 16, 2015. Nor is there any evidence that the applicant’s former counsel was aware of the surveillance.)

[47] I appreciate that at the time Val apparently retained the private investigators in January 2015, she did not have in hand the endorsement of Rogin J., which was released on February 10, 2015, and was thus unaware of the distaste pronounced by the court in its ruling. But that said, clearly she also did not instruct her investigators to terminate the surveillance once she did receive the endorsement. On the contrary, the surveillance continued for several months. That is most troubling. It is no answer to say that the court’s pronouncement was obiter.

[48] As I have said, it cannot have been lost on the applicant that the court had expressed its strong distaste for any surreptitious surveillance and recordings by the parties of each other. Nor do I accept any suggestion that, upon reading the court’s endorsement, Val, in effect, may have said to herself, “okay, so I understand the court has ordered both of us to stop secretly recording each other in the matrimonial home, but I’m sure putting a GPS bug on his car and hiring a private investigator to follow him around all day would be okay.” Even if she did, any supposed distinction is utterly without merit.

[49] It follows that I reject the argument, made in para. 85 of the applicant’s factum, that the surveillance conducted by the private investigators is “distinct and distinguishable” from the surreptitious recordings that Rogin J. condemned in his endorsement. With respect, I find that argument specious. Both practices offend the privacy interests of the individual and the family, and both are the type of “odious practice” that the courts typically seek to discourage in family law proceedings because they are destructive of the maintenance, restructuring, and encouragement of constructive family relationships. See generally Brian J. Burke and Margaretta H. Hanna, “Surreptitious Recordings in Family Law: Of ‘Odious and Repugnant Practices,’ ‘Calculated Subterfuges,’ ‘Tricks and Deceit’ – and The Truth” (Law Society of Upper Canada, 8th Annual Family Law Summit, April 1, 2014) at p. 3-3 et seq.

[50] Nor do I accept the implicit suggestion in the applicant’s materials that because the car driven by John is evidently jointly owned by the parties, Val is somehow justified or has some “colour of right” argument in planting a GPS bug on the car to track its location and movements. Val may well have some property interest in the vehicle, but there is no suggestion that John’s use of the car somehow jeopardizes her proprietary or financial interest in the car – and the protection of any such interest was clearly not the reason why she authorized the installation of the tracker in the first place.

[51] I accept the observation of the applicant as set out in para. 84 of her factum that surreptitious recordings by parents of the children and/or the other parent are often referred to as “repugnant” by the courts and yet are still admitted into evidence in family law cases if there is a “compelling” reason to do so. As Sherr J. held in Hameed v. Hameed, 2006 ONCJ 274, at paras. 11 and 13:

Surreptitious recording of telephone calls by litigants in family law matter should be strongly discouraged. There is already enough conflict and mistrust in family law cases, without the parties worrying about whether the other is secretly taping them. In a constructive family law case, the professionals and the court work with the family to rebuild trust so that the parties can learn to act together in the best interests of the child. Condoning the secret taping of the other would be destructive to this process. …

The court in deciding whether to admit such evidence will need to weigh these policy considerations against its probative value. The party seeking its admission should establish a compelling reason for doing so. [Emphasis added.]

[52] In this case, I am not convinced that the applicant has established a sufficiently compelling reason. Indeed, in view of the strong public policy reasons disapproving of surveillance practices in family law matters, one may question whether the surveillance evidence in the instant case was truly necessary. In this regard, there is merit in the point made in para. 8 of the respondent’s factum, that: “[t]he private investigators established one fact conclusively, which is that John’s mother and sister help with dropping off and picking up the children at school and their various activities; however, this has always been acknowledged by John, who had explicitly built it into his parenting plan.” As John said in para. 26 of his July 28th affidavit: “this fact has not been a secret. I have asked them to do it. As has been explained to Val and her counsel on numerous occasions, I have relied on my mother and sister to assist me during my residential weeks.”

[53] In the same vein, I note para. 48 of Val’s affidavit sworn July 23, 2015 (tab 50 of the CR), which indicates that Val kept a detailed log of the dates and times that John was working from July 2014 to December 2014, cross-referenced to his residency rotation requirements, all of which was attached as exhibit “H” to her affidavit. A perusal of Val’s detailed log indicates, for example, that John had usually left the house before the children start their morning routine.

[54] Further, it should not be forgotten that both parties had the opportunity to conduct questioning of each other, and both availed themselves of that right. Many of the incidents in respect of which the applicant sought to rely upon the surveillance evidence to support her position were also areas that her counsel pursued, to her advantage, in cross-examination of the respondent at his questioning. To take a few examples, I note the following:

a. with respect to the incident involving Lauren’s baptism on April 12, 2015, paras. 64-65 of Val’s reply affidavit sworn August 4, 2015 (tab 51 of the CR) make the point that “John demanded that I return the children to his mother by 6:15 p.m. that day” and that Val had to leave the baptism dinner early in order to bring the children to John’s mother for 6:15 p.m. despite the fact that John did not arrive home until some hours later. Paragraph 64 of Val’s affidavit states that: “[a]t his questioning on July 30, 2015, John confirmed that he did not get home until between 8 and 9 p.m.; yet, he still demanded that the children be returned to his mother’s care at 6:15 p.m.”

b. para. 73(a) of Val’s August 4th reply affidavit makes the point that: “John’s mother has been with the children virtually every day during his parenting weeks since the nesting arrangement was instituted. John confirmed, at his questioning, that he has only ever cared for the children alone twice in the last [five-and-a-half] months. If his mother is not there, his sister is there with him.”

c. para. 73(b) of Val’s August 4th reply affidavit makes the point that: “John’s mother conducts virtually every drop off and pick up. John confirmed (at his questioning) and that he has only ever picked up and/or dropped off the children at school a handful of times since the nesting arrangement has been in place.”

[55] In sum, this is not a case where the impugned surveillance evidence was necessary to reveal information to the court that was not otherwise available through the applicant’s logs and records, the admissions in the respondent’s affidavits, or the questioning of the respondent himself. Put differently, at the end of the day, the probative value of the surveillance evidence sought to be admitted here does not outweigh the competing public policy interests.

[56] I therefore allow the respondent’s motion to exclude the surveillance evidence and strike paras. 55, 56, and 57 of the affidavit of the applicant sworn July 23, 2015, and related exhibits, as detailed in paras. 3(b) and (c) of the respondent’s factum.

[57] I agree wholeheartedly with the observation made by the respondent in para. 37 of his July 28th affidavit that “[t]his type of behaviour involving surveillance of our family embarrasses us all.” Perhaps the same might be said in many of the cases in which the courts have expressed their disapproval of the “odious” and “repugnant” practice of conducting surreptitious surveillance in family law matters. What would appear to be a distinguishing feature of this case is that here the court had already expressed its distaste for the practice, but the applicant chose to ignore that admonition and maintained the intensified surveillance of the respondent. That is a decision the responsibility for which lies squarely at the feet of the applicant. I should expect the parties will wish to address the issue in their cost submissions to the court.

[58] The respondent also sought an order restraining the applicant from continuing the surveillance of the respondent, their children, his mother, and his sister. Such an order is not necessary at the present time because the surveillance has been terminated. Val stated in para. 76 of her August 4th reply affidavit that the surveillance has ceased and that the GPS tracker has been removed from John’s car. In argument before me, Ms. Goldhart confirmed that the surveillance had been terminated and that the tracker would be removed in a matter of days. Despite the apparent discrepancy between the applicant’s evidence and counsel’s submission regarding the GPS tracker, I accept Ms. Goldhart’s submission (subsequently repeated in these proceedings) that all surveillance has now ceased.

Parenting Schedule

Positions of the parties

[59] As indicated above, with the nesting arrangement in the matrimonial home as ordered by Rogin J. now rendered moot, the applicant mother seeks to have primary residence of the children, with the father having the children on alternate weekends with a mid-week overnight. In the alternative, the applicant proposes “that the children reside with both parties in accordance with a 3-2-2-3 parenting schedule with the right of 1st refusal to be applied if either party is not available to be with the children during his or her parenting time.” In oral argument, however, counsel for the applicant withdrew the alternative 3-2-2-3 proposal.

[60] The father proposes that the parties continue the same parenting schedule of alternating weeks with the children, with each party exercising his or her parenting time in their respective residences.

Guiding principles

[61] As indicated in my endorsement of August 19th, to assist the parties’ understanding of the rationale for the court’s ruling, I set out briefly some of the guiding principles that informed the court’s determination of the issues before it, being, inter alia, the following:

a. s. 16(10) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), directs that, in making orders for custody of and access to the children of the marriage, “the court shall give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child, and, for that purpose, shall take into consideration the willingness of the person for whom custody is sought to facilitate such contact”;

b. in short, parenting arrangements should seek to maximize contact for the children with their parents;

c. pursuant to s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, in assessing the relative merits of any custody and access case, the sole issue before the trier-of-fact is the best interests of the children, which includes but is not limited to an assessment of the ability to act as parent, and the permanence and stability of the proposed living arrangements; and

d. as Olah J. commented in Celotti v. Celotti (2007), 40 RFL (6th) 411, 2007 CanLII 23909 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 30, parenting time is “the opportunity and obligation” of the parent.

Analysis

[62] Central to the court’s task of finding an appropriate parenting arrangement that is in the best interests of the children is the question of to what extent is each party able to bear primary responsibility for the parenting of the children. To paraphrase Ms. Goldhart in argument before me, if both parents were available, they likely wouldn’t be before the court.

[63] But the reality is that given the rigours of the husband’s schedule as a busy resident in a large hospital in Detroit, John is largely not available himself to parent the children at this stage in his career. Perhaps that will change as his career progresses, in which event perhaps the parties will be able to fashion a solution for themselves and their children, but right now the court must provide a parenting schedule that is in the best interests of the children at this time.

[64] I start with considering the parties’ respective availabilities to parent the children.

[65] Generally speaking, the children wake-up between 7:00–7:30 a.m. and commence their bath/bedtime routine at approximately 7:00 p.m.

[66] There is essentially no factual dispute that, given that Val is currently not employed, she is generally available to parent the children.

[67] In terms of John’s schedule, during his questioning, he confirmed the following:

a. his schedule changes and the hours may be longer and/or shorter;

b. he routinely swaps shifts with his fellow residents;

c. he arrives earlier than the set time noted for a particular shift;

d. historically, he’s almost always the first one there in the morning;

e. even during “non-call” months, he must arrive at the hospital by 8:00 a.m.;

f. generally, his mother arrives at the home between 5:30–6:00 a.m.;

g. generally, his mother is at the home for 12 hours a day;

h. generally, he leaves home for work between 6:30–7:00 a.m.;

i. he often leaves for work before the children even wake up and often returns home after they have gone to bed;

j. he has never put the children on the bus in the morning since the nesting arrangement was instituted;

k. John has driven the children to school only three to four times since the nesting arrangement was instituted;

l. driving home from the hospital, his commuting time varies between 35–50 minutes;

m. generally, the children have their dinner around 6:30 p.m.;

n. John has had dinner alone with the children, i.e., without his mother, only five to ten times since the nesting arrangement was instituted;

o. the children are often left in the care of his mother and/or sister during his parenting weeks in the mornings, after school, and until after the children have gone to bed when John is not available;

p. without the assistance of his family, John would not be able to parent the children on his own; and

q. John has cared for the children alone by himself only twice since the nesting arrangement was instituted.

r. (See generally Transcript of the cross-examination of John Veljanovski held on July 30, 2015 (“Transcript of John”), pp. 5-9, pp. 31-32, pp. 41-50, p. 85, pp. 91-94, p. 119, and p. 135.)

[68] Consequently, it is not even necessary to have regard for the surveillance evidence, which I have excluded, to come to the inescapable conclusion, looking at all of the evidence as a whole, that the respondent father is largely not available himself to parent the children at this point in his career.

[69] And that leads to the second fundamental issue that drives the result here: John’s conception of the “team approach.” Because when John is questioned or pressed on his availability to parent the children on a day-to-day basis, his response is – quite candidly and correctly – that he uses the “team approach.” To be sure, John has never denied that he relies on his mother and sister – the children’s Baba and Teta – to help raise and parent the children. Indeed, again, John admitted on cross-examination that without the assistance of his mother and sister, he would not be able to parent the children on his own. (See Transcript of John, p. 119, Q. 698.)

[70] On its face, there is nothing wrong with employing a familial “team approach” to child-rearing. Indeed, it is reminiscent of that wonderful African proverb, “it takes a village to raise a child.” But that said, it is also important to consider who makes up the team and what roles do the various team-members play.

[71] In this regard, the use of the extended-family “team approach” to parenting must align with the directive under s. 16(10) of the Divorce Act and the maximum contact principle. Again, s. 16(10) requires the court to “give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.” Consistent with the Divorce Act’s directive is the “opportunity and obligation” dictum of Olah J. in Celotti v. Celotti, at para. 30, expressed in the context of access by a non-principal residence parent, that access or parenting time is the “period of time wherein the non-principal residence parent has the opportunity and obligation to parent the children.” In the same vein that no one was ever bestowed with a right without at the same time being saddled with a responsibility, the parent must appreciate that the opportunity to have access with the children must also carry with it the responsibility or obligation to parent the child.

[72] In this case, while I would not express the notion, as applicant’s counsel suggests, in terms of John “abdicating” the responsibility for parenting to his mother and sister, it is fair to say that he has de facto delegated his day-to-day parenting obligation to them during the majority of his parenting time. Again, that is not intended to be a criticism of the father’s parenting skills (of which there is none, to be sure), but it is simply a function and the reality of the work schedule required by the professional career that he has chosen to pursue.

[73] Further, in terms of the opportunity to have parenting time with the children, not all “team members” are equal under the Divorce Act. The maximum contact principle seeks to maintain maximum contact with parents. As important as grandparents and extended family are to the upbringing, nurturing, and development of children, in the normal course the courts do not recognize grandparents and extended family members on the same footing as parents for the purposes of s. 16(10). The courts expect that the grandparents will have time with the grandchildren during the parent’s time – but not in de facto substitution of the parent’s time. The evidence would indicate that that is what has in fact occurred for a good portion of the husband’s parenting time.

[74] In this regard, I accept the submissions of the applicant in paras. 68-69 of her factum, as follows:

Given John’s schedule and the objective evidence as to his lack of availability to be with the children, not only do Hallie and Noah potentially experience 7 days without seeing the non-residential parent, but during John’s parenting weeks, they may actually experience several days without any contact with either parent. Hallie and Noah are routinely left in the care of their grandmother and/or aunt.

It should be noted that the applicable legislation, prevailing caselaw and [widely]-accepted scholarly articles on this subject all focus on appropriate parenting arrangements to maximize contact for the children with their parents. That is not, in fact, what has occurred in this case and could not be what was contemplated by Justice Rogin in making an order for shared parenting. The parenting schedule that was ordered has resulted in the children experiencing a parenting arrangement that is effectively shared between their mother and grandmother, with infrequent and irregular visitation with their father and without maximizing contact with the available parent (their mother). [Emphasis in original.]

[75] Subsection 16(10) of the Divorce Act also directs the court to “take into consideration the willingness of the person for whom custody is sought to facilitate such contact.” This goes to the issue of each parent’s willingness to facilitate maximum contact of the children with the other parent. In other words, for present purposes, this engages the question of “who is on the team?” John has testified that, as he understood the order of Rogin J. and how the nesting arrangement was to be implemented in practice, the “team” for the purposes of his “team approach” consisted of himself, his mother (Baba), and his sister (Teta). (See Transcript of John, p. 99, QQ. 578-579, and para. 30 of his July 28th affidavit (tab 55 of the CR).) It is clear that, in the father’s conception of the team required by the nesting arrangement ordered by Rogin J., the mother is not on the team.

[76] That conception is problematic.

[77] In my view, the argument of Ms. Goldhart on this point has considerable resonance: there needs to be a shift – I would say a fundamental shift – in the thinking of the respondent father that the mother, as one of the only two parents, has the primary responsibility and obligation with him to parent the children. It is not clear to me that John appreciates that reality. Indeed, the evidence suggests to me that he does not; the evidence suggests to me that John perceives that there are, in effect, two teams in play, and that mom’s team has the ice (field, court, etc.) during her parenting week, and that a separate team (John, Baba, and Teta) takes to the ice during his team’s week. That is not the case. That conception of a parenting regime is, in my view, inconsistent with the directive under s. 16(10) of the Divorce Act and its corollaries. In fairness to John, I believe that he honestly believes that the nesting arrangement ordered by Rogin J. required that division; but that does not reflect a proper understanding of either the court’s order or the requirements of the Divorce Act.

[78] I should think that it would be instructive for both parties to consider the perspective of their children on the issue of “who is on the team.” Putting oneself in the shoes of the children, surely the children would think that both parents must be part of their parenting team.

The alternative 3-2-2-3 proposal

[79] It was on this basis of the father’s general unavailability to parent the children, and following the disclosure of John’s work schedule the week before the argument of the special motion before me, that counsel for the applicant withdrew her alternative suggestion of the 3-2-2-3 parenting schedule. As Ms. Goldhart said, “I would never have put forward in a notice of motion 3-2-2-3 if I had known quite how obvious it is that he isn’t available.” Given the applicant’s withdrawal of her alternative position, I do not propose to deal with it at length, except to say that, in my view, Ms. Goldhart’s point is well taken, and given the evidence of the extent of the husband’s unavailability to parent the children himself, I would not have ordered a 3-2-2-3 parenting schedule in this case at this juncture.

[80] The other concern that I have at this point with a 3-2-2-3 is that it would have the children moving back and forth between houses more frequently than they did previously, and I think the children have had enough to contend with in the last year. Moreover, the 3-2-2-3 would mean more drop-offs and pick-ups, and that has to date been a source of friction and conflict for the parties. I would not seek to increase the opportunities for conflict between these parties.

Drop-offs and pick-ups by third parties

[81] On the issue of drop-offs and pick-ups, I note the evidence that the applicant has been critical of John for not attending to or conducting the exchanges personally (see, for example, para. 58 of John’s July 28th affidavit (tab 55 of the CR), and para. 79 Val’s August 4th reply affidavit (tab 51 of the CR)). In the circumstances, I see no reason why John should not be permitted to have third parties conduct the exchanges, particularly in view of the order I have now made on the parenting schedule. Given the pattern of conflict that has occurred at the exchanges historically, one can understand John’s concern that he seek to limit the amount of direct contact he has with Val; he has offered a very compelling explanation for his motivation, namely, that “given the very serious (and false) sexual assault allegations made by Val against me in some of the Affidavits filed with the court [and] [g]iven my work, the need to cross the border each day, and Val’s previous threats to ruin my career, I needed to reduce any risk of more allegations” (see para. 31 of his July 28th affidavit).

[82] This is but one of many instances that illustrates how increased cooperation and mutual trust between the parents would serve only to benefit their children. One hopes both parties come to that realization sooner rather than later.

Non-parent team members

[83] I would add a further observation. As I have said, there is nothing wrong with a team approach provided that everyone appreciates it must be consistent with the directive of s. 16(10) of the Divorce Act and the maximum contact principle, recognizing that the parents are primary members of the team. But, to be sure, all non-parent team members are also to be respected and valued for their role in the children’s lives. Reviewing the evidence in this matter, there are, in my view, too many instances where it would appear one parent is not showing the full respect for the role that other extended family members play in their children’s lives, whether that be Baba, Teta, or Nonna Marisa, or others. I do not direct this comment solely to one parent but to both of them.

High conflict and its impact on the children

[84] Three judges of the Superior Court have now commented on the high conflict nature of this case. It is of both parties’ making. Rogin J. said it best when he observed in his costs endorsement, released April 29, 2015, that “the parties have chosen to make this a high conflict case when it should not be.”

[85] As I have said, both parties are intelligent and sophisticated. The evidence is clear that they are capable of cooperation. The evidence is clear that there are in fact many instructive examples of the parties working cooperatively together, which only furthers the children’s best interests, as Mr. Cochrane eloquently highlighted in argument before me.

[86] But it is also true that they can behave very badly on occasion as well. Examples that immediately come to mind include the incidents involving Christmas vacation in 2014, Mother’s Day in 2015, Noah’s birthday, Lauren’s baptism. Unfortunately, there are many other examples in the record that the court could have cited to illustrate the same point. No purpose useful to the furtherance of the children’s best interests would be served by making findings of fact in respect of these incidents. Collectively, both parties are implicated.

[87] The vexing question is how two such apparently intelligent and sophisticated people could fail to appreciate the detrimental effects that their behaviour towards each other causes their children.

[88] The explanation that is the kindest to the parents is that they simply don’t realize or perhaps accept that their behaviour towards each other does in fact impact their children. If that is the explanation, then I would take the parties back to the endorsement of Rogin J., where, in para. 15, the court held that:

Although they are capable of cooperating with each other, the tension is escalating. The potential for conflict is increasing with the pressure of these court proceedings. … It is not in the best interests of the children for the parents to be at war with each other. Even if Val and John think that the children do not notice this tension they are incorrect. Children always notice.

[89] To the same effect was Ms. Goldhart’s perceptive observations offered in argument before me: “No child is unscathed. … These kids are trying to make sense of such a difficult situation and the conflict. … Even if they don’t say the words, children feel it, they know when something’s going on.”

[90] It is beyond doubt that both Val and John love their two children. They need to actualize that love for their children in the manner in which they treat, communicate with, and respect each other.

Conclusion

[91] For these reasons, my endorsement of August 19th ordered that the parenting schedule set out in paras. 1 through 4 of the order of Rogin J. dated January 26, 2015, be changed as follows:

a. Commencing Friday, September 4, 2015, the children shall reside with the respondent on alternate weekends from Friday after-school/camp (or 4:00 p.m. if there is no school/camp that day) until Monday upon return to school/camp (or 9:00 a.m. if there is no school/camp that day).

b. Commencing Wednesday, September 2, 2015, the children shall reside with the respondent each Wednesday from after-school/camp (or 4:00 p.m. if there is no school/camp that day) until Thursday upon return to school/camp (or 9:00 a.m. if there is no school/camp that day).

c. The children shall reside with the applicant at all other times, unless otherwise agreed.

d. The parties shall have reasonable access to the children by telephone or FaceTime or similar social media from 6:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. during those periods when the children are not residing with him or her, and the other party shall make all reasonable effort to facilitate such contact.

e. The parties shall negotiate in good faith in order to agree upon a holiday/vacation schedule, which will then be filed with the court and be made the subject of further order. The parties shall adhere to the agreed-upon holiday/vacation schedule, and the residency schedule set out above shall be suspended during those periods prescribed by the holiday/vacation schedule. The parties shall advise the court no later than Friday, September 18, 2015, whether they have agreed upon a holiday/vacation schedule, failing which I may be spoken to.

f. In all matters related to the parenting schedule, the applicant and the respondent shall give the needs and convenience of the children primary importance and shall give their own needs and convenience only secondary importance.

g. The applicant and respondent shall confer with each other on all important matters relating to the children’s health, welfare, education, and upbringing, and shall keep each other fully informed of all matters touching the interests of the children.

h. The applicant and respondent shall each be entitled to obtain information and documentation from third parties as to the health, education, and welfare of the children and each party shall provide any written consent necessary to facilitate same.

i. All other terms of the order of Rogin J. dated January 26, 2015, remain in full force and effect.

Schooling

[92] As I indicated in my endorsement of August 19th, somewhat remarkably, the parties were unable to agree even upon what school the children should attend come September 2015. Rather than make that decision themselves, in the spirit of compromise for the sake of the best interests of the children, as that would thus ensure that the centrally important decision of the schooling of the children would be made by their parents – the two persons on the face of the globe with the greatest knowledge of Hallie and Noah – the parties evidently decided that it would be preferable to have that decision made by the court.

[93] As Price J. observed in Wilson v. Wilson, 2015 ONSC 479, 2015 CarswellOnt 839, at para. 123:

Choices of a child’s school, religion, or primary physician are long term decisions affecting the child and his parents in significant ways. They should be made by the custodial parent(s), if at all possible. It is they who have the most intimate knowledge of their child’s needs and their own ability to meet those needs and it is they, as well as the child, who will be most affected by the choices.

[94] Pursuant to my August 19th endorsement, the court ordered that the children shall attend Académie Ste. Cécile International School (“Ste. Cécile”) commencing September 2015, and that all costs of the children’s attendance at Ste. Cécile shall, in accordance with the applicant’s consent and representation to the court, be borne by the applicant.

[95] At the time of the special appointment motion, Hallie was 6-years-old and had attended École Sainte-Marguerite D’Youville (“Ste-Margurerite”) for senior kindergarten during the 2014-2015 school year. Ste-Margurerite is a French-language Catholic elementary school, located in Tecumseh, operated by the Conseil scolaire catholique Providence. That is to say, Ste-Marguerite is not a French immersion program; it is a French-language school offering a full-French program. Hallie would be entering grade 1 as of September 2015.

[96] Given that Ste-Margurerite is a full-French program, i.e., all subjects are taught in French only, it is significant to note that, as between the parents, only Val and her extended family members are fluent in French. Neither John nor any of his extended family members speak and/or read French. Historically, Val would work with Hallie on her French language skills, both written and verbal, by assisting her with written assignments and reading aloud to develop proper pronunciation and annunciation. The evidence is that notwithstanding assistance and prior exposure to the French language from Val, Hallie has had some difficulty adapting to the full-French program at Ste-Margurerite.

[97] At the time of the motion, Noah was 4-years-old and had attended The Children’s House Montessori (Lakeshore) as a daycare program for three days each week. Both parties contemplated that Noah would enter junior kindergarten as of September 2015. In argument before me, counsel for the respondent argued that one of the advantages to Ste-Margurerite is that both Hallie and Noah would be able to go to the same school – implicitly allowing that Noah would be attending JK as of September 2015, rather than returning to the Montessori daycare program.

[98] On the motion before me, Val took the position that the children should attend Ste. Cécile for their schooling as of September 2015. John argued that the children should attend Ste-Margurerite.

[99] In determining issues of schooling, the question for the court is not which school is “the best” in terms of its academic programs or related merits; rather, the issue for the court is to determine which school is best for the children in question. See Wilson v. Wilson, at paras. 119-120, quoting Schloegel v. McCroary, 2012 BCSC 1606, at paras. 36-37.

[100] In argument, counsel for both parties essentially conceded that the court’s determination on the parenting schedule and the residency of the children would effectively decide the schooling issue. Indeed, as John conceded in cross-examination, “if Val gets primary residence of the children, the children’s school will be determined by her home” (Transcript of John, p. 195, Q. 1181). As Mr. Cochrane said, “what both parents are asking you to do is to set a residential schedule for the family going forward and out of that make a determination about the schooling.”

[101] That said, while I have determined that the children shall have their primary residence with the applicant, I would not let the schooling issue pass without further comment.

[102] Everything else being equal, I think there is much merit in the interest underlying Mr. Cochrane’s argument that a placement at Ste-Margurerite would have preserved the status quo and, in particular, that from the perspective of Hallie, such a placement would have provided some continuity to the child at least in the schooling context, especially when she has had so much else to contend with in the last 12 months. Were it possible, I would have sought to preserve and maximize the stability factor for the children and, in particular, for Hallie.

[103] However, that was not possible in the circumstances. The applicant sought to lay the responsibility for that reality at the feet of the respondent, arguing that the respondent chose a home in the West Puce area in order to be closer to his mother, rather than a home closer to the children’s mother. With respect, I don’t believe that’s a fair characterization. I prefer to view the matter from the perspective of the children, rather than that of either parent. The children were raised in the West Puce area. The children went to school in the West Puce area. When it came time to choose a new home following the sale of the matrimonial home, the respondent chose a home in West Puce that would see the children remain within the very same area that they grew up in (as did their father before them), on the very same street as the former matrimonial home, about one kilometre away from their former home, within a 12 minute walk. The children would have resided within the same school catchment area.

[104] On the contrary, in my view, it was the applicant mother’s decision to purchase and build a new home in LaSalle, on the other side of Windsor, approximately 22-26 minutes away from the children’s former home, that precipitated the schooling issue. In the circumstances, it does not lie in the applicant’s mouth to attempt to cast blame on the respondent for this issue.

[105] That said, the parties must deal with the realities of the situation. And I do not wish to be taken as suggesting that Ste. Cécile is the inferior school or that the children’s placement at Ste. Cécile is not in their best interests. On the contrary, placement at Ste. Cécile has many advantages, as Mr. Cochrane very fairly reviewed in his comparison of the respective pros and cons of placement in both schools in argument before me, which review Ms. Goldhart quite fairly and properly commended as a very balanced comparison.

[106] To highlight a few advantages of the children’s placement at Ste. Cécile, I would note the following:

a. the excellent academic reputation of the school;

b. the very close proximity of the school to the children’s primary residence with their mother (a 5-minute, 2.3 km. drive, according to Google Maps);

c. conversely, the extended period of time the children would have to spend in a car commuting to Ste-Margurerite on (most) days from their primary residence (a 24-minute, 25 km. drive, according to Google Maps – that is, almost one hour of commuting time per day);

d. the fact that both children would attend the same school together, thus providing for some enhanced stability in their lives;

e. the class sizes are limited to 15 students per class;

f. the attractive pre-school and after-school program available at Ste. Cécile at no additional cost, which includes assistance with homework, including French;

g. it is an English-language school with extended French instruction, without being a full-French program; and

h. in view of my lingering questions regarding the ability of the children, especially Noah, to cope with the full-French program at Ste-Margurerite, the program at Ste. Cécile is likely able to provide the children with, as counsel said, “the right amount of French.”

[107] Moreover, inasmuch as the court would have preferred to see a feasible schooling option that maximizes the stability factor for the children, one should also note that the 2015-2016 school year represents an “entry year” for both children, grade 1 for Hallie and JK for Noah. As such, the children will necessarily experience a fairly significant change in their schooling circumstances and environment by reason of the entry year itself. In some respects, if there are changes to be made to the children’s schooling, the entry years present a more opportune time for such transitions to occur.

Child Support

[108] Paragraph 11 of the applicant’s notice of motion sought an order terminating the provisions in para. 11 of the order of Rogin J. dated January 26, 2015, regarding payment of interim child support by the applicant to the respondent. The applicant also sought an order that the respondent pay monthly table child support to her.

[109] Given my decision that the primary residence of the children shall be with the applicant, it is appropriate to terminate the interim child support ordered in para. 11 of the order of Rogin J. dated January 26, 2015, effective August 20, 2015.

[110] Further, there is no reason why the respondent should not provide table support. In his financial statement sworn June 11, 2015 (tab 47 of the CR), the respondent stated that his salary at Henry Ford Hospital is US$50,500, and the updating affidavit of Lisa Henry sworn July 29, 2015 (tab 56 of the CR) indicates that there have been no changes to the respondent’s income. In the current circumstances, an exchange rate of 20% is not unfair, which obtains a notional income in Canadian dollars of $60,600.

[111] Accordingly, there shall be an order that the respondent shall pay child support to the applicant for the children of the marriage, Hallie Marilena Veljanovski, born on May 11, 2009, and Noah Ted Veljanovski, born on February 25, 2011, in the amount of $900 per month, in accordance with the Tables under the child support guidelines based on the respondent’s annual income of CDN$60,600, commencing as of August 20, 2015, and continuing on each month that follows.

Other Matters

[112] In accordance with my endorsement released August 2, 2015, and for greater certainty, the respondent’s motion for the relief sought in para. 4 of his notice of motion dated July 28th (tab 54 of the CR) in relation to division of proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home, and for the relief sought in para. 5 in relation to interim spousal support, is adjourned sine die returnable on ten days’ notice.

Costs

[113] Pursuant to my August 19th endorsement, the court ordered that if counsel were unable to agree on the issue of costs of the special motion, they may file brief written submissions with the court, of no more than five double-spaced pages (exclusive of any costs outline, bill of costs, dockets, offers to settle, or authorities), in accordance with the following schedule:

a. the moving party applicant shall deliver her submissions within 30 days following the release of these reasons;

b. the respondent shall deliver his submissions within 14 days following service of the applicant’s submissions;

c. the applicant shall deliver her reply submissions, if any, within 5 days following service of the respondent’s submissions;

d. if either party fails to deliver her or his submissions in accordance with the schedule, he or she will be deemed to have waived their rights with respect to the issue of costs; and

e. in addition to their filing a hard copy of their submissions with the court office, I would ask that counsel provide me with an electronic version of their submissions in MS Word format, by way of email correspondence sent to my judicial secretary, Ms. Susan LaFontaine, at susan.lafontaine@ontario.ca.

Original signed by Justice J. Paul R. Howard

J. Paul R. Howard

Justice

Date: March 23, 2016

Veljanovski v. Veljanovski, 2016 ONSC 2047

Case Summary

Overview

Background

Characterization of the order of Rogin J.

Custody of the Children

Admissibility of Surveillance Evidence

Parenting Schedule

Positions of the parties

Guiding principles

Analysis

The alternative 3-2-2-3 proposal

Drop-offs and pick-ups by third parties

Non-parent team members

High conflict and its impact on the children

Conclusion

Schooling

Child Support

Other Matters

Costs

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Issues

Statutory Provisions 2

Legal Tests 1

Legislation 2