Angela Mae Casey

The applicant, Stoja Sekulovski, sought dependant's support from the estate of her late husband, Jim Sekulovski, under the Succession Law Reform Act.

She also sought an order for her step-son, Michael Sekulovski, to return funds he received from Jim's mother's estate, asserting it was an invalid gift, and to discharge Personal Property Security Act (PPSA) registrations he made against the estate and Stoja, along with statutory and punitive damages.

The court found the purported gift to Michael invalid, granted Stoja dependant's support including vesting the matrimonial home in her, and ordered Michael to discharge the PPSA registrations, pay the statutory amount, and punitive damages for his vexatious conduct.

This application concerned the validity of powers of attorney (POAs) for property and personal care signed by Agnes Adler, a 90-year-old woman, in September 2017.

The applicant, Judy Adler, sought to uphold these POAs, which appointed her and her sister, Andrea Gregor, jointly.

Andrea Gregor, a respondent, challenged their validity, arguing Agnes lacked capacity and was subject to undue influence.

The court also considered the validity of 2015 POAs appointing Andrea solely, the status of Agnes's joint bank accounts with Andrea, and a $25,000 gift from Agnes to Andrea.

The court found the 2017 POAs invalid due to Agnes's lack of capacity to appreciate the consequences of appointing joint attorneys given the sisters' acrimonious relationship, and alternatively, due to undue influence by Judy.

The 2015 POAs, appointing Andrea solely, were upheld.

Andrea was ordered to transfer Agnes's joint bank accounts to Agnes's sole ownership and to repay the $25,000 gift.

The court criticized both daughters for misusing capacity assessments in their litigation.

The respondents brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement against the applicant, who had initially sought an interest in a property held by a family trust.

The applicant argued that no binding agreement was reached due to a lack of agreement on the specific terms of a mutual release, which he considered an essential term, and that he entered the agreement under duress.

The court applied contract law principles and Rule 49.09, finding that a mutual intention to settle existed and all essential terms were agreed upon.

It held that the specific wording of a release is not a material term unless explicitly made conditional, and rejected the duress claim due to a lack of credible evidence.

The settlement was enforced, and the applicant's original application was dismissed.