Anne E. Posno

The court considered motions for costs personally against George Windsor, who commenced proceedings on behalf of Gilles Jozias Overtveld and Gi-Las Management and Maintenance Ltd. without proper authority.

The action was found to be duplicative, meritless, and a waste of resources.

The court fixed costs on a substantial indemnity basis against Mr. Windsor personally, disallowed him from charging legal fees to the plaintiffs, and set out the principles for awarding costs in such circumstances.

The court considered Jack Shapiro’s application for dependant support and a declaration of trust over a condominium following the death of his wife, Carol-Sue Shapiro.

The court found that Jack was a dependant under the Succession Law Reform Act and that Carol-Sue had not made adequate provision for his support in her will.

The court ordered that title to the matrimonial condominium be transferred to Jack, in addition to the $250,000 bequest, balancing Jack’s needs and Carol-Sue’s testamentary intentions to leave the majority of her estate to her son, Michael Shapiro.

This decision concerns an application by Dr. Kelly Diane Riedel regarding the validity and administration of the Dmyant Sangha Family Trust and the Sangha Property Trust.

Dr. Riedel alleges that the trusts are shams, created to defeat her family law entitlements, and seeks various forms of relief including the production of legal records and the conversion of the application to an action.

The court addresses the legal standards for sham trusts, the relevance of disputed facts, and the entitlement to privileged documents.

The application to convert to an action is dismissed, and the court sets out a process for determining threshold questions regarding the validity of the trusts.

This case concerns an application for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee, which was challenged by the deceased's husband and daughter on grounds of undue influence and testamentary fraud.

The objectors alleged that the deceased's son and his wife fraudulently influenced the deceased to disinherit her daughter and significantly reduce her husband's inheritance by instilling false beliefs about the daughter's husband and the husband's financial well-being.

The court found no evidence that the son and his wife perpetrated or encouraged these alleged falsehoods.

The deceased's testamentary changes were determined to be her own decisions, made gradually over time, based on her long-standing concerns about protecting the family's wealth from her son-in-law, and after receiving independent professional advice.

The court dismissed the objections, declared the wills valid, and granted the application for the Certificate of Appointment.

The defendant Mireille Jehn brought a motion seeking directions to restrain the plaintiffs from registering a caution or certificate of pending litigation (CPL) and for leave to provide 22 days' notice for refinancing instead of 30 days.

The plaintiffs cross-moved to restrain further encumbrance/refinancing and to place a CPL on the properties.

The court permitted the refinancing to proceed but restrained Mireille Jehn from drawing down funds beyond refinancing costs and $80,000 for carrying costs.

Leave was granted for the immediate 22-day notice, but future notice was extended to 60 days.

The court denied the request for a caution or CPL, finding the plaintiffs' resulting trust claim enured to the Estate, not them personally, thus they lacked a direct "interest in land."

Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd. (GRE) appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice requiring it, as a non-party, to produce financial documents for the valuation of shares held by a deceased in estates litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motions judge's discretionary decision.

The court found the documents relevant to the estate's valuation and the validity of the deceased's will, and that it would be unfair to proceed to trial without them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's application of the Rule 30.10 test, emphasizing deference to the lower court's discretion and the effectiveness of the established Confidentiality Protocol in addressing GRE's concerns about privacy and business interests.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for financial disclosure.

The applicant, Barbara Cohen, sought extensive financial disclosure from the Estate of Sidney Cohen and other parties, which the court found to be an attempt to circumvent a prior bifurcation order by Justice Audet.

The court dismissed the disclosure motion and subsequently awarded costs to the successful respondents and non-parties, including the Estate, Susan Charendoff, Brian Cohen, and several corporate non-parties.

The decision addresses the principles of costs, including partial indemnification, encouraging settlement, discouraging inappropriate behavior, and ensuring justice, while considering the reasonableness and proportionality of the requested amounts.

The court held a voir dire to determine the testimonial capacity of the applicant, Barbara Cohen, who suffers from mild dementia.

The respondents argued she had capacity, while her counsel argued she lacked it.

Based on expert reports from two geriatric specialists (Dr. Joel Sadavoy and Dr. Richard Shulman) and the court's own questioning of Barbara, the court found that the applicant lacked the capacity to testify due to inconsistent memory, difficulty communicating complex ideas, and potential for increased anxiety under cross-examination.

The court ruled that her previous questioning transcripts would be filed instead of compelling her live testimony.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action for defamation and misfeasance in public office, the successful defendants sought their costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court applied the principles from Apotex and Rule 57.01, noting the serious allegations made, the complexity of the 10-year litigation, and the plaintiff's reasonable expectations.

The court found the defendants' reduced costs requests to be fair and reasonable, ordering the plaintiff to pay $280,000 to one defendant and $250,000 to the remaining defendants.

The applicant brought a motion for extensive financial disclosure from the respondents and non-parties in the context of a bifurcated trial.

Phase 1 of the trial was ordered to solely determine the validity of the marriage contracts.

The applicant argued the disclosure was necessary to assess the value of the estate for the fairness consideration under the Levan test and to respond to the defence of laches.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the exact value of the estate was not necessary for Phase 1 and that ordering the disclosure would undermine the purpose of the bifurcation order.

The plaintiff, a general surgeon, sued the hospital, its chief executive officer, and its chief of staff for defamation and misfeasance in public office after losing his hospital privileges.

The plaintiff alleged that the chief of staff defamed him in a letter and in oral statements, and that the defendants acted in bad faith to oust him from the hospital.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the oral defamatory statements were not proven and that the letter was protected by qualified privilege.

The court held it had jurisdiction to hear the misfeasance claim but dismissed it, finding no evidence of unlawful acts, malice, or improper purpose by the defendants.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

In a family law proceeding, the parties disputed whether the applicant, who suffers from mild dementia and requires a litigation guardian, had the testimonial competence to testify at trial.

The court reviewed the conflicting expert evidence from geriatric specialists regarding her capacity to observe, recollect, and communicate.

Applying section 18(2) of the Ontario Evidence Act, the court determined it was necessary to conduct an in-person examination of the applicant to assess her testimonial capacity before ruling on the issue.

The moving parties sought a review of a motion judge's order that dismissed their request for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal.

The underlying appeal was from an order striking out their statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of the test for an extension of time, agreeing that there was no apparent merit to the appeal and that granting an extension would prejudice the responding parties.

The Court noted that the Brampton action, which was struck, appeared to be an improper attempt to circumvent rulings made in prior Ottawa actions.

The motion for review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed her action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and struck her pleadings as frivolous, scandalous, and vexatious.

The core of her claim concerned how her insurer handled her statutory accident benefits claims, alleging a conspiracy with healthcare practitioners to stage examinations and produce false reports, and breach of privacy.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the Licence Appeal Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes related to statutory accident benefits under s. 280 of the Insurance Act, regardless of how the claims are framed.

The Court also upheld the denial of leave to amend pleadings and dismissed the appeal regarding costs due to procedural non-compliance and lack of error in principle.

In the context of complex estate litigation, the applicant sought to withdraw two affidavits previously filed in support of a motion for the appointment of an Estate Trustee During Litigation and for documentary production.

The applicant argued the affidavits were no longer necessary due to a subsequent consent order that streamlined the proceedings and provided for documentary discovery.

The respondent opposed the withdrawal, arguing it was a tactic to shield the affiants from cross-examination.

The court held that leave is required to withdraw an affidavit filed in support of a motion.

Applying the Gill factors, the court granted leave, finding that the affidavits had not yet been used by the court, the respondents would not be prejudiced, and the withdrawal was a legitimate response to the evolving litigation landscape rather than an improper tactic to avoid cross-examination.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiff's action on a motion to strike, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis and requested that the costs be paid personally by the plaintiff's lawyers.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff lacked the mental capacity to instruct her counsel to commence the action.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity and personal costs, noting that if the defendants genuinely believed the plaintiff was under a disability, they should have sought the appointment of a litigation guardian or challenged the lawyers' authority under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff, Celia Yang, claimed $150 million in damages against her insurer and various service providers, alleging misconduct in the administration of her statutory accident benefits (SABs) claims.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the statement of claim, arguing it contravened pleading rules, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction (as SABs disputes fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Licence Appeal Tribunal), and the claims failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action (including breach of Charter, PIPEDA, tort of bribery, spoliation, breach of contract, inducing breach of contract, fiduciary duty, and conspiracy).

The court dismissed the action, finding the statement of claim scandalous, the court lacked jurisdiction over SABs-related complaints, and the pleaded causes of action were untenable.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed costs for both the appeal and the underlying summary judgment motion.

The parties agreed to no costs for the appeal due to divided success.

For the summary judgment motion, the court declined to award costs to the primary appellants (Bistricer) or respondents (Rubner), citing reasons such as new arguments on appeal and divided success.

However, the litigation guardian for Eda Rubner, who was aligned with the original applicants, was awarded partial recovery of costs for the summary judgment motion.

Giuseppe Paolo Magnotta died intestate, survived by his wife, Melissa Magnotta (Applicant), and his mother, Rossana Magnotta (Respondent).

Melissa applied for a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee without a Will.

Rossana objected, initially citing Melissa's alleged threat to exhume the deceased's remains and misrepresentation of estate liabilities, and sought a neutral third-party trustee.

The court found Rossana's objections unreasonable, as Melissa was the sole beneficiary and her "threat" to exhume was not acted upon.

Rossana's claim of a financial interest as a creditor for funeral expenses was also deemed insufficient to grant standing under Rule 75.03, as creditors have other remedies.

The court granted Melissa's application, dispensed with the administration bond, and awarded Melissa partial indemnity costs against Rossana.

This appeal concerns a financial dispute among adult siblings over entitlement to distributions from a valuable investment in a residential development in Oakville, Ontario.

The investment, originally a 10% interest in the Lower Fourth Joint Venture purchased by the father in 1969, was held by the mother in trust for three children in equal shares.

The daughter disclaimed her interest for tax reasons.

When distributions began in 2014, they were deposited into bank accounts opened in the mother's name.

The central issue was whether the mother held the distributions as bare trustee for the daughter or whether the daughter had received only individual gifts.

The Court of Appeal found that a bare trust existed over the bank account contents for the benefit of both the daughter and one son in equal shares, reversing the trial judge's finding that the mother held the funds beneficially.