Anne E. Posno

The complainant, who has a severe brain injury, alleged that the respondent family physician discriminated against him on the basis of disability by refusing to accept him as a new patient.

The respondent maintained that she refused the complainant because his mother expected her to make house calls, a service she does not provide to any patients.

The Tribunal found that the respondent's refusal was based entirely on the expectation of house calls and not on the complainant's disability.

The Tribunal also rejected the argument that the respondent's new patient interview process was inherently discriminatory.

The complaint was dismissed.

The appellant's son was killed when his bicycle collided with the respondents' motor vehicle.

At trial, the jury dismissed the action, finding no negligence on the part of the respondents.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding the reverse onus under s. 193(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's instructions on the onus of proof were contradictory and confusing, which constituted a substantial wrong.

In an addendum to judgment regarding costs of an appeal, the respondents sought costs totaling $132,145.72.

The appellants opposed, seeking a stay of costs for one insolvent respondent, arguing for the application of the pre-2002 party and party costs regime, and challenging the hourly rates of junior counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the stay request, held that the new costs grid under O. Reg. 284/01 applies retrospectively to services rendered before January 1, 2002, and reduced the hourly rates for certain junior counsel.

Total costs of $122,998.02 were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants, holders of debentures issued by BCED, appealed a trial judgment finding that a series of corporate reorganizations and asset transfers did not breach a successor obligor clause in the trust indenture.

The clause prohibited BCED from transferring 'all or substantially all' of its assets unless the transferee assumed the debenture debt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the asset transfers did not meet either the quantitative or qualitative threshold to constitute 'all or substantially all' of BCED's assets.

The Court also found that a subsequent guarantee and foreclosure did not constitute a prohibited 'transaction' under the trust indenture, as the indenture expressly permitted BCED to incur and secure senior indebtedness.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his statement of claim against a physician who prepared a medical report for a statutory accident benefits arbitration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that statements made in quasi-judicial proceedings, including physicians' reports prepared for such hearings, are protected by absolute privilege.

The Court also reiterated that there is no independent civil cause of action for a breach of the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The complainant alleged discrimination and harassment in employment on the basis of marital status after she was transferred and subjected to a poisoned work environment due to her relationship with another employee.

The Board of Inquiry found that at the time of the transfer, the complainant was only dating the employee, which does not fall within the definition of marital status under the Human Rights Code.

Furthermore, the Board held that the Code's protection against discrimination based on marital status does not extend to the identity of a particular spouse, as it protects against group characteristics rather than individual identity.

The complaint was dismissed.