Anne E. Posno

The applicant, who has a hearing impairment, alleged that the respondent otolaryngologist discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his disability and by engaging in reprisal.

The applicant missed a rescheduled appointment and subsequently threatened a human rights complaint, after which the respondent declined to provide medical services, citing a breakdown in the doctor-patient relationship.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the respondent had communicated with the applicant through his requested contact method (his family doctor) and that the termination of services was not intended as retaliation but resulted from a genuine breakdown of trust.

The applicant, who is HIV positive, alleged discrimination with respect to services because of disability after the respondent out-patient clinic directed him to have a screening colonoscopy at a hospital rather than at the clinic.

The clinic's policy directed patients with certain medical histories, including HIV, to a hospital endoscopy unit due to the clinic's low-risk capacity.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's preference for a clinic setting over a hospital was not a need related to his disability, and that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to evaluate the medical appropriateness of a physician's clinical risk assessment absent arbitrariness.

The parties appeared at a case conference to settle a draft Order arising from previous Reasons for Decision.

The plaintiff advised the court of its intention to discontinue the proceeding and make a voluntary assignment into bankruptcy.

The draft Order, including costs, was settled and signed by the court.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found the testator had testamentary capacity and was not subjected to undue influence when executing his final will.

The Divisional Court found that while the trial judge properly analyzed the issue of testamentary capacity, there was no analysis or factual findings regarding the issue of undue influence, despite significant evidence suggesting it.

The appeal was allowed, the trial judgment was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new trial on all issues before a different judge.

The tenants under two long-term ground leases appealed a majority arbitration award determining the fair market value of the lands for rent re-set purposes.

The court upheld the arbitrators' finding that the freehold interest, not the leasehold interest, was to be valued.

However, the court found the arbitrators erred in law by including the potential value of a freehold residential condominium project in the valuation, as a prior Divisional Court decision between the parties established that development potential unavailable to the tenants due to legal restrictions must be excluded.

Finding that issue estoppel applied to this prior determination, the court set aside the arbitration award and ordered a new hearing.

Motions were brought to quash summonses issued by a litigant seeking to compel opposing counsel and a proposed estate trustee during litigation to testify in support of a motion alleging judicial duress in prior settlement proceedings.

The court considered the stringent requirements for summoning opposing counsel as witnesses, emphasizing that such a step requires a high degree of materiality and necessity and should be avoided unless demanded by the administration of justice.

The court found the evidence sought was neither material nor necessary, noting that the moving party had already filed affidavits, transcripts, and audio recordings addressing the relevant events.

The proposed examinations were characterized as a fishing expedition and potentially tactical, as they would force opposing counsel to withdraw and cause delay and expense.

The summonses were quashed and substantial indemnity costs were awarded.

The moving party sought an adjournment of his motion to set aside consent orders previously made in complex estate litigation.

The respondents opposed the adjournment, arguing prejudice and delay in the sale of an estate property.

The court refused to adjourn the portions of the motion relating to the dismissal of claims against former counsel and the removal of the Estate Trustee During Litigation, finding no merit to those claims and emphasizing the need to enforce court orders.

The court granted an adjournment for the remaining issues regarding the consent orders but ordered the moving party to personally pay the ongoing expenses of the estate property and awarded costs of $54,490 to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant alleged racial discrimination in the provision of medical services after the respondent's receptionist's boyfriend uttered racial slurs at him, and the respondent subsequently discontinued the doctor-patient relationship.

The Tribunal found that the respondent could not be held vicariously liable under s. 46.3 of the Human Rights Code for the boyfriend's actions, as the boyfriend was not an agent acting in the course of employment.

The Tribunal also found that the discontinuation of the doctor-patient relationship was not tainted by racial discrimination, but was a response to the applicant's unreasonable and inappropriate behaviour towards the receptionist.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal scheduled a summary hearing by teleconference to determine whether the application had no reasonable prospect of success.

Despite receiving notice, the applicant failed to attend the hearing.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The appellants, a solicitor and his law firm, appealed a summary judgment finding them liable for professional negligence in a commercial real estate transaction.

The respondent purchasers had relied on the solicitor's advice that a minor title issue regarding a city-owned laneway would be covered by title insurance.

When the respondents later attempted to sell the property, they discovered the city required $106,000 for the laneway and their title insurance claim was denied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the limitation period did not begin until the title insurance claim was denied, and that expert evidence was not required to establish the standard of care given the clear failure to warn.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's decision to grant summary judgment to the respondents despite the lack of a cross-motion, citing the principle of proportionality.

The successful plaintiffs sought recovery of expert witness disbursements following a summary judgment decision in their favour.

The parties agreed on partial indemnity costs of $25,000 plus HST, leaving only the amount recoverable for the plaintiffs’ expert report in dispute.

The court considered the reasonableness of the expert’s hourly rate and time spent, noting that the expert evidence had been largely unnecessary and that costs awards must be fair and reasonable under rule 57.01(1).

Applying principles governing recovery of expert fees similar to those for counsel fees, the court reduced the claimed expert disbursement from $13,000 to $9,000 plus HST.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the dismissal of their summary judgment motion in a solicitor negligence action.

The motion judge had found that the limitation period began to run from the date the plaintiffs' title insurance coverage was denied, rather than the date the plaintiffs learned the City was demanding payment for conveying lands.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the issue raised questions about the application of limitation period case law in the context of insurance claims that warranted appellate review, particularly as a related appeal was already proceeding to the Court of Appeal.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a solicitor’s negligence claim arising from a commercial real estate transaction involving a building encroaching on a municipal laneway.

The plaintiffs alleged their lawyers failed to warn that the municipality might require payment to convey the laneway and that the title insurance obtained did not cover such a cost.

The court rejected arguments that the claim was statute‑barred and held that expert evidence was unnecessary because the failure to warn of a significant legal risk was apparent on the record.

Applying the “but for” causation test, the court found that had proper advice been given the plaintiffs likely would have sought protection such as a holdback or price abatement.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and partial summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs, leaving only the assessment of damages and the claim against the title insurer for trial.

The plaintiffs, twin brothers born prematurely who developed cerebral palsy, sued their mother's obstetrician for negligence.

The trial judge found the obstetrician breached the standard of care by failing to assess the mother when she reported leaking fluid, resulting in a failure to administer a full course of antenatal corticosteroids (ACS).

The trial judge concluded this failure caused the twins' cerebral palsy and awarded damages.

The obstetrician appealed the causation finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, with the majority holding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in applying a robust and pragmatic approach to the expert evidence and concluding that the failure to administer ACS caused the injuries.

The self-represented plaintiff commenced nine separate actions against 30 defendants, including doctors, nurses, physiotherapists, and academic advisors, alleging medical malpractice and negligence.

The plaintiff, who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia but refused to accept the diagnosis or take medication, claimed the defendants failed to properly diagnose and treat his physical injuries and ignored his beliefs about synchronicities.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the actions.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motions, finding no genuine issue for trial as the plaintiff failed to provide any expert evidence to support his claims, while the defendants provided uncontradicted expert evidence that they met or exceeded the standard of care.

The court also found the actions to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs of $1,500 to each defendant.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce a California judgment of approximately (US)$17 million against the defendant Jay Chiang and sought a declaration that the debt survives his bankruptcy discharge under s. 178(1)(d) of the BIA.

The plaintiffs also brought a second action alleging that Jay Chiang and numerous family members engaged in fraudulent conveyances and a conspiracy to hide assets and frustrate collection efforts.

The court enforced the California judgment in the amount of (US)$9,678,832 but declined to declare that the debt survives bankruptcy, finding no fiduciary duty was owed to the plaintiffs.

The court found Jay Chiang liable for fraudulent conveyances and conspiracy, but dismissed the claims against most of the other family members, finding they were unwitting conduits used by Jay Chiang.

The appellants, a law firm and its partner, appealed a partial summary judgment finding that a cause of action for solicitor's negligence had been validly assigned to the respondent, Gentra Canada.

The Court of Appeal held that a claim for solicitor's negligence is assignable if the assignee has a legitimate commercial interest, departing from older jurisprudence.

The Court found the assignment language was broad enough to include the claim and that Gentra Canada could sue in its own name without joining the assignor.

However, the appeal was allowed with respect to a subsidiary company that was not a party to the assignment.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination in the provision of medical services.

The Tribunal previously dismissed the application for failing to set out a prima facie case on the grounds of race, ancestry, colour, ethnic origin, place of origin, or marital status.

On its own motion, the Tribunal reconsidered its decision after the Commission noted that the ground of disability had been added to the complaint.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's allegations regarding physical restraints and lack of proper assessment due to a perceived mental disability were sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

The applicant's request to reconsider the dismissal of the other grounds was denied.

The respondent's request for production of medical and employment records was denied as irrelevant or premature.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against the respondent general surgeon.

The action arose from the respondent's post-operative care of the deceased following a gallbladder surgery, specifically the decision to take a 'wait and see' approach when signs of jaundice appeared.

The trial judge found the respondent's approach met the standard of care and that causation was not established, as there was no known treatment for the necrotising pancreatitis that ultimately caused the death.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's findings of fact or application of the law and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering specific performance of an oral agreement to sell 100,000 shares of a private company to the respondent.

The appellant argued that no binding agreement was reached, that third-party approval was a condition precedent, and that specific performance was an inappropriate remedy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that an objective reasonable bystander would find the parties intended to contract based on securities industry custom.

The Court also upheld the specific performance order, noting the shares were unique and damages would be inadequate.