Dr. Joel Sadavoy

This decision resolves a long motion in a family law dispute between Morgan MacDougall-Milne and Leigh Alexander Smith.

The respondent father sought medical disclosure and a parenting assessment of the applicant mother, alleging she suffered from dementia.

The court found no evidence supporting the claim of dementia and declined to order medical disclosure or a section 30 assessment.

The court granted the applicant’s requests to dispense with the respondent’s consent for their daughter’s passport, travel to Las Vegas, and enrollment in French Immersion, and ordered the release of certain records based on prior undertakings.

Full indemnity costs were awarded to the applicant.

This decision concerns the entitlement to the former home of Yvette Poirier and certain funds allegedly misappropriated from her bank account by her late son, Paul Poirier.

The applicant, Lyse Scharfe (Yvette’s daughter and attorney for property and personal care), sought to set aside a 2016 conveyance of the property to Paul, arguing Yvette lacked capacity and was subject to undue influence.

The court found that Yvette Poirier lacked capacity at the time of the transfer and that the presumption of undue influence was not rebutted.

The 2016 conveyance was set aside, and the property was to be re-vested in the joint names of Yvette Poirier and Paul’s estate.

The court also addressed the improper registration of a mortgage on the property by respondent’s counsel.

The court held a voir dire to determine the testimonial capacity of the applicant, Barbara Cohen, who suffers from mild dementia.

The respondents argued she had capacity, while her counsel argued she lacked it.

Based on expert reports from two geriatric specialists (Dr. Joel Sadavoy and Dr. Richard Shulman) and the court's own questioning of Barbara, the court found that the applicant lacked the capacity to testify due to inconsistent memory, difficulty communicating complex ideas, and potential for increased anxiety under cross-examination.

The court ruled that her previous questioning transcripts would be filed instead of compelling her live testimony.

The applicant, Dawn McKenzie, acting as Power of Attorney for Property for Raymond Morgan, sought court approval to sell the Springdale property.

This property was subject to a life leasehold interest in favour of the respondent, Wendy Morgan, as per Mr. Morgan's will.

The applicant argued the sale was necessary to cover Mr. Morgan's caregiving fees and debts.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's financial assessments were unreliable and that other options for liquidity had not been adequately explored.

The court also expressed concerns about the applicant's management of Mr. Morgan's care and his isolation from other family members.

This is a costs endorsement following the denial of the applicant's request to appoint Section 3 counsel for Lynda Miziolek, an incapable person.

The respondent, Elizabeth Miziolek, sought costs on a partial and substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant, Alexandra Miziolek, argued for no costs or an offset due to divided success on other application segments.

The court found Elizabeth entirely successful on the discrete Section 3 counsel issue, which was not part of the original application and was deemed ill-conceived after a medical report confirmed Lynda's inability to instruct counsel.

The court awarded Elizabeth costs of $11,500 plus HST, to be paid by Alexandra.

Disbursements for the medical report were directed to be paid from Lynda's estate, acknowledging the public policy of not discouraging reasonable applications for vulnerable persons.

The applicant sought the appointment of Section 3 counsel under the Substitute Decisions Act for her mother, whose capacity was in issue amid a family dispute over powers of attorney.

The respondent opposed the appointment, relying on a geriatric psychiatrist's report concluding the mother had severe dementia, lacked capacity to instruct counsel, and would likely suffer significant emotional distress if forced to deal with an unfamiliar lawyer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while Section 3 counsel can sometimes be appointed even when a person cannot provide instructions, in this specific case it would not be in the mother's best interests, would be ineffective, and would not assist in resolving the underlying litigation.

The defendants moved for leave to require the plaintiff to attend further medical examinations and a further examination for discovery in a long‑running civil action set down for trial.

The parties resolved the medical examination issue, leaving only the request for further discovery.

The court held that leave to conduct additional discovery after an action is set down for trial requires proof of a substantial or unexpected change in circumstances.

While the passage of time and new expert reports did not meet that threshold, amendments to the statement of claim created uncertainty regarding the alleged cause of an aircraft engine failure.

The court granted limited leave for a further examination for discovery of up to one hour strictly concerning the amendments, applying proportionality principles under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant doctor appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for the respondent's psychiatric injury, which developed after the doctor failed to promptly disclose a talar fracture in the respondent's ankle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that factual causation was established on the 'but for' test, as the respondent would not have suffered the psychiatric harm had the doctor disclosed the fracture.

The Court also found that legal causation was established, as it was reasonably foreseeable that a breach of the doctor-patient trust could cause a recognized psychiatric illness in a person of ordinary fortitude.

The appeal was dismissed, and the damages and costs awards were upheld.

The appellant nurse appealed a decision of the Fitness to Practise Committee of the College of Nurses of Ontario, which found her incapacitated due to a mental condition and suspended her Certificate of Registration.

The appellant argued the panel relied on a psychiatric assessment based on incorrect information and fabricated evidence.

The Divisional Court applied the standard of reasonableness simpliciter and found that the panel's credibility findings and reliance on the psychiatric assessment were reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.