Joan L. Lax

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their motion to strike a portion of the respondent's amended claim seeking disgorgement of profits based on unjust enrichment.

The respondent, a generic drug manufacturer, argued it had an independent cause of action outside the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations due to the invalidity of the appellants' patent and alleged false representations.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Patent Regulations constitute a complete code and leave no room for stand-alone equitable remedies like unjust enrichment in these circumstances.

The claim was struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The appellant appealed a judgment terminating her membership and occupancy rights in a non-profit housing co-operative.

The co-operative's board had voted to evict her following complaints about her behaviour, but suspended the eviction subject to receiving no further complaints.

After receiving more complaints, the co-operative lifted the suspension and obtained an eviction order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the board's decision was reasonable, procedurally fair, and free from a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating his tenancy after the Board found he had assaulted the building superintendent.

The tenant argued the Board erred in law by failing to consider his personal circumstances, including his lack of a criminal record, financial situation, and ties to the community, as required by section 83 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the tenant had adduced little to no evidence on these factors before the Board, and the Board had properly considered section 83 based on the evidentiary record before it.

The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her class action certification motion, conceding that the proposed class definition before the motion judge was defective.

On appeal, the plaintiff sought to certify the proceeding based on a newly drafted class definition and restated common issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an appeal is not the proper forum to raise fundamental new issues that alter the landscape of the litigation, and that any motion based on a reconstituted class definition should be brought at first instance.

The plaintiff brought a motion for approval of a proposed class action settlement and class counsel fees.

The class action involved franchisees alleging the franchisor breached its duties of good faith and fair dealing regarding changes to the franchise system.

The court approved the $8,500,000 settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class members.

The court also approved class counsel fees of $2,125,000 plus HST and disbursements, noting the significant risk assumed by class counsel.

A former equity partner withdrew from an accounting partnership and joined a competing firm, triggering a liquidated damages clause requiring payment equal to two times the partner’s “permanent capital.” The dispute concerned whether shareholder loans made through a related corporation formed part of “permanent capital” under the partnership agreement.

The court interpreted the agreement according to its plain language and held that permanent capital was equivalent to the partner’s capital account in the partnership, which had been equalized to $10,000 and did not include shareholder loans.

The plaintiff was therefore liable for $20,000 in liquidated damages but was entitled to repayment of capital, profit share, shareholder loan amounts, and related payments.

Allegations of fiduciary misconduct and various counterclaims by the partnership, including claims for suppressed work‑in‑progress and loss of opportunity damages, were rejected.

The applicant, a private career college, sought judicial review of a Restraining Order issued by the Superintendent of Private Career Colleges.

The Superintendent had issued the order alongside a Notice of Contravention without providing the applicant prior notice or an opportunity to respond.

The Divisional Court held that the application was not premature and found that the Superintendent breached the duty of procedural fairness by failing to allow submissions before issuing the Restraining Order.

However, because the applicant was subsequently given an opportunity to be heard, which cured the procedural defect, the application was dismissed.

No costs were awarded due to the initial breach of fairness.

The representative plaintiff in a proposed class proceeding sought leave to discontinue the action under s. 29(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The claim concerned retiree health benefits allegedly promised to spouses of employees who accepted an early retirement program.

The representative plaintiff ceased to have a personal cause of action after his spouse predeceased him and he was unable to find another class member willing to assume the representative role.

The court held that, given the small class size, lack of interest among potential class members, and the marginal economics of the litigation, discontinuance was appropriate.

Leave to discontinue was granted subject to notice being provided to potential class members.

In a defamation trial concerning an allegedly defamatory newspaper article also posted online, the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of republication on third‑party websites based on Internet search results.

The court considered the rule that each republication of a libel is a separate publication and that the original publisher is not liable for subsequent republications unless an exception is pleaded, such as where repetition is the natural and probable consequence of the original publication.

The court reviewed authorities confirming that pleadings in defamation actions must specifically allege such exceptions.

Because the statement of claim did not plead the republication exception and no amendment had been sought despite notice from the defendants, the court held the plaintiff could not introduce evidence of republication by other Internet sites.

The evidentiary request was therefore refused.

The appellant psychiatrist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario finding that he sexually abused a patient.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Committee's structure of analysis effectively reversed the burden of proof by eliminating alternative scenarios based on an absence of evidence.

The Court also found the Committee compounded this error by relying on the absence of mental health evidence after denying the appellant's application for third-party records, and by improperly using prior consistent statements to bolster the complainant's credibility.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Judicial Council's disposition of his complaint against a Small Claims Court judge.

The complaint took 584 days to resolve, which the applicant argued was an unreasonable delay.

The Divisional Court found that while the applicant had standing to bring the application, the OJC's procedure and disposition were reasonable and mandated by statute.

The application was dismissed, but costs were awarded to the unsuccessful applicant due to the OJC's delay and misleading correspondence regarding the availability of judicial review.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that premises occupied by the Hospital for Sick Children Foundation were not exempt from municipal taxation.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's findings that the Foundation was a tenant under the Assessment Act and that there was no shared patrimony between the Hospital and the Foundation that would extend the hospital's tax exemption to the Foundation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants sought judicial review of a private school's decision to expel a student after he admitted to smoking marijuana in a dormitory room.

The Divisional Court held that it had jurisdiction to review the decision because the school was created by a Special Act, making its disciplinary decisions an exercise of a statutory power.

The majority quashed the expulsion decision, finding a breach of procedural fairness because the student and his parents were denied an adequate opportunity to be heard regarding the appropriate sanction.

The court declined to order the school to confer a diploma, remitting the matter to the Head of School.

The applicant sought judicial review of an adjudicator's decision ordering the disclosure of the base salaries of the Chief of Police and two deputies under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The adjudicator found that the compelling public interest in transparency outweighed the limited privacy interests of the affected parties, even though their total income was already disclosed under the Public Sector Salary Disclosure Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the adjudicator reasonably balanced the competing interests and his decision was owed deference.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal, which upheld the Director's finding that he was not a 'person with a disability' under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act.

The Tribunal found the appellant had a substantial impairment but not a substantial restriction in activities of daily living.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Tribunal's weighing of the medical evidence and concluding that the Tribunal's reasons were adequate and reasonable.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside the orders of a motions judge who had dismissed her motion to amend an application for judicial review and dismissed the application as moot.

The Divisional Court panel dismissed the motion, noting it was brought outside the four-day time limit and the applicant failed to identify any error of law.

The panel confirmed the motions judge had jurisdiction to hear the motion to amend pursuant to section 21(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicant chiropractor sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a written caution issued by the College of Chiropractors of Ontario regarding the tone and language of a letter sent to a patient.

The applicant argued the Board failed to address a claim of reasonable apprehension of bias concerning a committee member who had co-authored an academic article critical of the applicant's treatment philosophy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no merit to the bias claim and concluding that the Board's decision to uphold the written caution was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying him compensation for injuries sustained in an assault.

The Board found the assault was directly related to his activities as a drug trafficker and his injury was a foreseeable consequence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Board's application of proportionality principles or its admission of hearsay evidence under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

Correctional Service of Canada brought an urgent motion to stay a ruling by the Coroner presiding over the Ashley Smith inquest.

The Coroner had dismissed CSC's motion for a sealing order regarding confidential documents and videos.

Applying the RJR Macdonald test, the Divisional Court found that CSC failed to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried or irreparable harm, noting that much of the information was already public and the assertions of harm were speculative.

The motion for a stay was dismissed with costs.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision denying him leave to appeal an interlocutory order.

The Court of Appeal had ordered the appeal to be heard by a three-judge panel of the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court panel held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter as a panel appeal, noting that the appropriate route is to seek leave to appeal from a single judge of the Superior Court of Justice.

With the consent of the parties, the matter was converted to a motion for leave to appeal to be determined by one member of the panel sitting as a Superior Court judge.