Darrel A. Smith

The defendant municipality moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff contractor's claim for additional construction fees, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The plaintiff argued that the limitation period was tolled by promissory estoppel due to ongoing negotiations.

The court found that the cause of action was discovered by January 2010 at the latest, when formal default notices were exchanged, and that the defendant made no representation to forgo its limitation period rights.

The motion was granted and the claim for additional fees was dismissed as statute-barred.

The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her class action certification motion, conceding that the proposed class definition before the motion judge was defective.

On appeal, the plaintiff sought to certify the proceeding based on a newly drafted class definition and restated common issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an appeal is not the proper forum to raise fundamental new issues that alter the landscape of the litigation, and that any motion based on a reconstituted class definition should be brought at first instance.

Following a successful motion for leave to amend a statement of claim under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of $6,088.25, while the defendant argued the amount was excessive and proposed a lower figure.

The court applied the principle that costs should be fair and reasonable rather than calculated through a strict mathematical approach.

It found that certain claimed amounts, including costs for drafting the amended pleading and the appearance fee, were excessive.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs at $3,745 plus HST and disbursements, payable within 30 days.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking leave to amend their statement of claim in an action alleging breach of contract, misrepresentation, negligence, trespass, breach of good faith, and unjust enrichment arising from agreements permitting advertising on municipal waste bins.

The defendant opposed certain amendments on the basis that they introduced new causes of action after the expiry of the applicable limitation period.

The court held that the proposed amendments merely provided additional particulars and factual context for an already pleaded breach of good faith claim related to the alleged non-disclosure of municipal advertising directives.

Because the amendments did not advance a new cause of action, the limitation period concern did not bar them.

Leave to amend the statement of claim was granted.

The appellant subcontractor appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing portions of its multimillion-dollar construction counterclaim against the respondent City.

The motion judge found that the appellant failed to comply with a mandatory notice provision in the construction contract, which operated as a condition precedent to the claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that a notice provision need not contain a 'failing which' clause to bar a claim, nor does the owner need to prove prejudice to rely on it.

The court also rejected arguments based on waiver and variation of contract.

Following the dismissal of a motion to certify a proposed class proceeding, the successful defendant sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff argued that only nominal costs should be awarded because the litigation involved matters of public interest, addressed novel legal issues, and promoted access to justice.

The court held that public attention and bona fide motivations do not convert a case into public interest litigation warranting a departure from the ordinary rule that the successful party receives costs.

Finding the claimed amount reasonable and foreseeable under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the court awarded the defendant its full partial indemnity costs.

A journalist made a freedom of information request for anonymized data from police databases to investigate racial profiling.

The police refused, arguing that extracting the data required creating a new algorithm, which meant the requested information was not a 'record' under s. 2(1)(b) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The adjudicator ordered the police to respond to the request, but the Divisional Court quashed the order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal restored the adjudicator's order, holding that where requested information can be produced from an institution's existing computer software by means of technical expertise normally used by it, it constitutes a record under the Act.

The appellants appealed a decision interpreting the provisions of a commercial lease and applying those terms to two events held on the premises.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge's interpretation of the lease was correct and that the application of the terms to the facts was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Toronto Police Association brought an application seeking a declaration that a binding agreement existed to resolve disciplinary charges against officers who wore uniforms to a union rally.

The appellants moved to dismiss the application for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the matter fell under the Police Services Act.

The motion judge found the dispute was contractual and within the court's jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the essential character of the dispute involved police discipline and the consequences of that discipline on the officers' careers.

The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction, allowed the appeal, and dismissed the application.

The Toronto Police Services Board was successful in its application to quash an order issued by the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The Board sought costs against the respondent, James Rankin.

The Divisional Court rejected the respondent's arguments that he was successful on the majority of issues and that the matter was novel and of public interest.

Costs were awarded to the Board on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $15,000.

A journalist requested electronic data from the police board's databases, asking that names be replaced with randomly-generated unique numbers.

The board refused, arguing this would require the creation of a new record.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered the board to issue access decisions.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court quashed the Commissioner's order, finding that the Assistant Commissioner failed to consider whether the requested record could be produced by means 'normally used by the institution' as required by section 2(b) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner moved for an order sealing the private part of its record pending a judicial review application.

The underlying application was brought by a requester seeking access to police and securities commission records regarding allegations of his involvement in organized crime.

The sealing order was not opposed, but the requester's counsel sought access to the sealed record subject to a confidentiality undertaking to prepare for the judicial review.

The police and securities commission opposed access, citing the extreme sensitivity of the intelligence records.

The court granted access to the requester's counsel, finding that the benefit of full and informed submissions outweighed the risks of disclosure, provided counsel signed an expanded undertaking not to act for the client in any other proceeding arising out of the information.

The City of Toronto appealed a Divisional Court order that quashed an arbitrator's decision.

The arbitrator had found that a new bargaining unit position was not covered by seniority rights protections in the collective agreement and fell under management rights.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Divisional Court majority that the arbitrator's finding was patently unreasonable and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration decision that allowed the employer municipality to fill new positions using management rights clauses rather than seniority provisions from predecessor collective agreements following amalgamation.

The Divisional Court quashed the arbitrator's decision, finding it patently unreasonable to apply management rights while ignoring the seniority provisions to which those rights were subject under the statutorily mandated composite collective agreement.

The employer applied for a declaration terminating the union's bargaining rights for a unit of security guards under the transitional provisions of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

As a preliminary issue, the employer argued that the doctrine of issue estoppel applied based on a 1994 Board decision between the same parties that found a conflict of interest existed.

The majority of the Board dismissed the preliminary objection, finding that while the facts had not changed, the statutory context and the legal test for conflict of interest had materially changed under the new legislation.

The matter was referred to the Registrar to schedule a hearing on the merits.

One Board member dissented.