Timothy S. B. Danson

The appellants were charged with unlawfully damaging and/or destroying protected rattlesnake habitat contrary to the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

They brought a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay, which was dismissed by the trial judge.

The appellants then sought certiorari and s. 24(1) Charter relief in Superior Court, arguing the trial judge failed to characterize certain disclosure as "obviously relevant" and failed to attribute all delay to the Crown.

The Superior Court dismissed both applications.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no jurisdictional error and rejecting the argument that the degree of relevance of outstanding disclosure alleviates the defence's obligation to act diligently.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal by Jagtar Dhaliwal and Voxx Sports Inc. from a Superior Court decision upholding an arbitrator’s refusal to recuse himself for bias.

The appellants alleged both a reasonable apprehension of bias and actual bias, based on the arbitrator’s prior involvement with respondents’ counsel and comments about the veracity of Mr. Dhaliwal’s affidavit.

The Court found no merit in either claim, holding that the arbitrator’s conduct did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and that adverse credibility findings do not, on their own, establish actual bias.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The Applicants sought to set aside an arbitrator's decision denying their challenge for bias and to remove the arbitrator, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias due to the arbitrator's undisclosed involvement in another arbitration with the Respondents' counsel, and actual bias from a costs decision.

The court dismissed the application, finding the bias challenge was not brought in a timely manner and that neither reasonable apprehension of bias nor actual bias was established.

The court found no meaningful overlap between the arbitrations and that the arbitrator's finding of 'false statements' did not indicate actual bias.

The applicants sought judicial review, including mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and s. 24(1) Charter relief, of a Justice of the Peace's decision.

The Justice of the Peace had dismissed their s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and deferred an abuse of process application in a provincial offences proceeding concerning alleged damage to Massasauga snake habitat.

The Superior Court dismissed the applicants' request for extraordinary relief, finding that the Justice of the Peace did not exceed or decline jurisdiction.

The court held that the issues raised were not appropriate for interlocutory intervention by a superior court, emphasizing that such matters are generally best addressed on appeal after the trial has concluded.

The defendants brought an application for disclosure of information related to four other land development projects, arguing it was relevant for full answer and defence, due diligence, and to demonstrate inconsistent application of environmental legislation by the Ministry.

The court determined that the materials sought were not first-party disclosure in the possession or control of the prosecution but rather third-party records held by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry.

The court outlined the proper two-step process for a third-party production application, emphasizing the need to notify the record holder and any parties with privacy interests, and provided guidance on the Crown's duty to inquire.

The application for disclosure was not granted as first-party, but the court provided a procedural path for the defendants to pursue it as third-party production.

The appellants, former litigation counsel, appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motion based on a limitations defence in a solicitor negligence claim.

The motion judge found the claim was not discoverable until the Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal, or alternatively, that commencing an action earlier was not an appropriate means to remedy it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the claim was not time-barred, emphasizing that the respondents reasonably relied on their counsel's advice regarding the underlying litigation's legal errors, thus delaying discoverability of the negligence claim.

This urgent motion before the Court of Appeal addressed whether a non-party, John Kavanagh, had an automatic right to appeal or should be granted leave to appeal two approval and vesting orders related to the sale of properties in a mortgage enforcement and insolvency proceeding.

The Receiver brought the motion to prevent automatic stays of the property sales.

The court found no automatic right of appeal under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) because the orders were procedural and no loss exceeding $10,000 was demonstrated.

The court also denied leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of the BIA, concluding that the issues raised were not of general importance, lacked prima facie merit, and granting leave would unduly hinder the insolvency proceedings.

Consequently, Kavanagh's notices of appeal were quashed, and his motions for leave to appeal were dismissed, ensuring the property sales could proceed without automatic stays.

The plaintiff moved for an extension of the deadline to set the action down for trial, while the defendants brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The action, stemming from a 1998 arrest, had been stayed due to related criminal proceedings until 2017.

The court applied a contextual approach, considering the preference for merits-based decisions and timely resolution.

It found the plaintiff provided an adequate explanation for the delay, including the criminal proceedings and subsequent steps taken to gather evidence.

The court was not satisfied that the defendants demonstrated actual prejudice.

Consequently, the plaintiff's motion was granted, extending the deadline, and the defendants' cross-motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

Appeal from a Superior Court decision on a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant brought multiple motions, including a successful section 137.1 motion but also unsuccessful constitutional and procedural motions.

The Court of Appeal addressed costs for both the motion and the appeal.

On the motion, no costs were awarded due to the presumption in section 137.1(8) and the offsetting effect of the appellant's unsuccessful meritless motions.

On the appeal, the appellant was awarded partial indemnity costs reduced to account for time spent on unsuccessful constitutional and procedural arguments.

The appellant, a medical doctor who prepares impairment assessments for insurers in motor vehicle accident claims, sued the respondent, a lawyer and OTLA president-elect, for libel following an email posted to the OTLA Listserv.

The email alleged that the respondent had altered medical reports and misrepresented expert opinions in a catastrophic impairment arbitration.

The motion judge dismissed the action under section 137.1 of the Court of Justice Act (Anti-SLAPP legislation), finding that although the expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff failed to meet the merits threshold and the harm was outweighed by the public interest in protecting the expression.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in his application of sections 137.1(4)(a) and (b), and that the plaintiff had met his onus on both provisions.

The court also rejected constitutional challenges under sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

In a high‑value personal injury action arising from an on‑ice hockey incident, the defendant moved under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 33 for orders compelling the plaintiff to attend a vocational assessment and to authorize access to detailed GMAT testing data.

The plaintiff alleged permanent cognitive impairment and loss of future earning capacity exceeding $60 million.

The court held that a further psychovocational examination was justified because newly delivered expert reports placed the plaintiff’s post‑injury vocational capacity squarely in issue and fairness required the defendant to obtain responsive expert evidence.

However, the court declined to compel authorization for access to the GMAT database, finding the detailed testing data irrelevant to the material issues in dispute.

The motion was therefore granted in part and dismissed in part.

Following a motion to vary a prior order permitting two defence neuropsychological examinations, the court had previously concluded that the defendants failed to disclose a settlement agreement eliminating their adversity on liability.

The order was varied to allow only one examination, and the court considered the appropriate costs consequences of the defendants’ breach of their duty to immediately disclose the agreement.

The plaintiffs sought elevated costs given the defendants’ non‑disclosure and the procedural consequences that followed.

The court held that full indemnity costs were justified as a “consequence of the most serious nature” arising from the breach, even though the conduct was not found to be reprehensible.

Costs of $27,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST were fixed as fair, reasonable, and proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues.

Costs determination following several pre‑trial motions in a civil action arising from a professional hockey incident.

The court considered competing motions concerning disclosure of a settlement agreement, neuropsychological examinations, production of expert materials, and procedural timelines.

The plaintiffs were largely successful, particularly in compelling disclosure of the settlement agreement and obtaining related procedural relief.

While elevated costs were awarded for part of the motion due to the defendants’ failure to disclose the agreement and the resulting prejudice, most costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis after considering Rule 57.01 factors and the overall mixed results on some minor issues.

The plaintiffs sought disclosure of a settlement agreement entered into between multiple defendants and a third party in a civil action arising from a professional hockey assault.

The settlement resolved cross-claims and contained a proportional sharing arrangement for any judgment or settlement with the plaintiffs.

The moving parties asserted settlement privilege and appealed a master's order compelling disclosure.

The court held that settlement privilege, whether class-based or case-by-case, admits exceptions where disclosure is necessary to preserve the integrity of the adversarial process.

Because the agreement changed the adversarial orientation of the litigation, immediate disclosure to the non-settling parties and the court was required.

Following earlier reasons addressing disclosure of a settlement agreement between co-defendants, the defendants requested supplementary reasons to clarify whether the court had implied professional misconduct by counsel.

The court issued an addendum confirming that no lawyer intentionally misled the court and expressing confidence in counsel’s professionalism.

However, the court maintained its conclusion that the settlement agreement ending adversity between the defendants should have been disclosed because it was relevant to a prior motion concerning two neuropsychological examinations.

The court held the failure to disclose was an honest but mistaken decision made in good faith, rejecting claims that correspondence from the plaintiffs influenced the earlier ruling.