Timothy S. B. Danson

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim in a solicitor's negligence action to significantly increase their claim for damages based on a new expert report.

The defendants opposed the amendments, arguing the increase was frivolous and the apportionment of damages among multiple plaintiffs was improper.

The court granted leave for the quantum amendments, finding them legally tenable and within the existing factual matrix without causing non-compensable prejudice.

The proposed amendments regarding the apportionment of damages were adjourned to allow the parties further opportunity to resolve the issue.

The appellants were charged with unlawfully damaging and/or destroying protected rattlesnake habitat contrary to the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

They brought a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay, which was dismissed by the trial judge.

The appellants then sought certiorari and s. 24(1) Charter relief in Superior Court, arguing the trial judge failed to characterize certain disclosure as "obviously relevant" and failed to attribute all delay to the Crown.

The Superior Court dismissed both applications.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no jurisdictional error and rejecting the argument that the degree of relevance of outstanding disclosure alleviates the defence's obligation to act diligently.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal by Jagtar Dhaliwal and Voxx Sports Inc. from a Superior Court decision upholding an arbitrator’s refusal to recuse himself for bias.

The appellants alleged both a reasonable apprehension of bias and actual bias, based on the arbitrator’s prior involvement with respondents’ counsel and comments about the veracity of Mr. Dhaliwal’s affidavit.

The Court found no merit in either claim, holding that the arbitrator’s conduct did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and that adverse credibility findings do not, on their own, establish actual bias.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The Applicants sought to set aside an arbitrator's decision denying their challenge for bias and to remove the arbitrator, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias due to the arbitrator's undisclosed involvement in another arbitration with the Respondents' counsel, and actual bias from a costs decision.

The court dismissed the application, finding the bias challenge was not brought in a timely manner and that neither reasonable apprehension of bias nor actual bias was established.

The court found no meaningful overlap between the arbitrations and that the arbitrator's finding of 'false statements' did not indicate actual bias.

The applicants sought judicial review, including mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and s. 24(1) Charter relief, of a Justice of the Peace's decision.

The Justice of the Peace had dismissed their s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and deferred an abuse of process application in a provincial offences proceeding concerning alleged damage to Massasauga snake habitat.

The Superior Court dismissed the applicants' request for extraordinary relief, finding that the Justice of the Peace did not exceed or decline jurisdiction.

The court held that the issues raised were not appropriate for interlocutory intervention by a superior court, emphasizing that such matters are generally best addressed on appeal after the trial has concluded.

The appellant appealed a decision denying him leave to amend his statement of claim in a libel action against the respondents.

The Divisional Court upheld the Associate Justice's decision, finding no error in the application of issue estoppel to prevent the addition of the appellant's professional corporation as a plaintiff, as a previous judge had already ruled the corporation had no tenable cause of action.

The court also upheld the refusal to allow scandalous and irrelevant paragraphs about a non-party, and the refusal to permit a claim for document production within the pleadings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The defendant in a defamation action brought a motion for the production and preservation of documents from non-parties, as well as a sealing order and publication ban regarding the identities and medical information of two non-party insured individuals.

The court granted the unopposed production orders.

Applying the Sherman Estate test, the court granted the sealing order and publication ban for one insured whose identity remained anonymous, but dismissed the request for the other insured whose identity was already public and where the scope of the requested health information ban was too vague.

The plaintiff in a defamation action brought a motion for leave to amend his statement of claim, including adding his professional corporation as a plaintiff, and alternatively sought to extend the time to issue a statement of claim in a placeholder action.

A non-party sought and was granted leave to intervene to oppose certain amendments.

The court denied the amendment to add the professional corporation on the basis of issue estoppel, as a previous judge had already denied the same request.

The court also denied amendments that improperly sought document production or contained scandalous information about the non-party.

The motion to extend time in the placeholder action was dismissed as an abuse of process and a collateral attack on the previous judge's order.

Success being divided, no costs were awarded.

The defendants brought an application for disclosure of information related to four other land development projects, arguing it was relevant for full answer and defence, due diligence, and to demonstrate inconsistent application of environmental legislation by the Ministry.

The court determined that the materials sought were not first-party disclosure in the possession or control of the prosecution but rather third-party records held by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry.

The court outlined the proper two-step process for a third-party production application, emphasizing the need to notify the record holder and any parties with privacy interests, and provided guidance on the Crown's duty to inquire.

The application for disclosure was not granted as first-party, but the court provided a procedural path for the defendants to pursue it as third-party production.

The appellants, former litigation counsel, appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motion based on a limitations defence in a solicitor negligence claim.

The motion judge found the claim was not discoverable until the Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal, or alternatively, that commencing an action earlier was not an appropriate means to remedy it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the claim was not time-barred, emphasizing that the respondents reasonably relied on their counsel's advice regarding the underlying litigation's legal errors, thus delaying discoverability of the negligence claim.

The defendants, former legal counsel for the plaintiffs, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' solicitor negligence action on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants were negligent in failing to argue the unconscionability and public policy branches of the Tercon test regarding an exclusion clause in the underlying trial against Toyota.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that the limitation period did not begin to run until the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal in the underlying action, as the plaintiffs reasonably relied on the defendants' advice to pursue appeals and a legal proceeding was not an 'appropriate means' to seek a remedy until the appeal process was exhausted.

This urgent motion before the Court of Appeal addressed whether a non-party, John Kavanagh, had an automatic right to appeal or should be granted leave to appeal two approval and vesting orders related to the sale of properties in a mortgage enforcement and insolvency proceeding.

The Receiver brought the motion to prevent automatic stays of the property sales.

The court found no automatic right of appeal under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) because the orders were procedural and no loss exceeding $10,000 was demonstrated.

The court also denied leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of the BIA, concluding that the issues raised were not of general importance, lacked prima facie merit, and granting leave would unduly hinder the insolvency proceedings.

Consequently, Kavanagh's notices of appeal were quashed, and his motions for leave to appeal were dismissed, ensuring the property sales could proceed without automatic stays.

The appellants sought dismissal of a defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, arising from an email sent by the appellant lawyer to a professional listserv alleging that the respondent physician had improperly altered medical assessors' reports and changed a doctor's impairment classification in the context of statutory accident benefits disputes.

The motion judge allowed the anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed the defamation proceeding; the Court of Appeal reversed that decision and remitted the defamation claim to the Superior Court.

A five-justice majority of this Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the respondent had discharged his burden under s. 137.1(4) by demonstrating grounds to believe his defamation claim had substantial merit, that the appellants had no valid defence of justification or qualified privilege, and that the public interest in permitting the defamation action to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expression.

The majority also partially admitted fresh evidence tendered by the respondent, including a letter from the assessed specialist and letters from counsel for the magazine that republished the email.

Four justices dissented, concluding that the appellant lawyer had a valid defence of qualified privilege that gave her expression a real prospect of success at trial, and that the public interest in protecting her communication to fellow plaintiff-side personal injury lawyers outweighed the harm to the respondent's reputation.

The plaintiff moved for an extension of the deadline to set the action down for trial, while the defendants brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The action, stemming from a 1998 arrest, had been stayed due to related criminal proceedings until 2017.

The court applied a contextual approach, considering the preference for merits-based decisions and timely resolution.

It found the plaintiff provided an adequate explanation for the delay, including the criminal proceedings and subsequent steps taken to gather evidence.

The court was not satisfied that the defendants demonstrated actual prejudice.

Consequently, the plaintiff's motion was granted, extending the deadline, and the defendants' cross-motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

Appeal from a Superior Court decision on a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant brought multiple motions, including a successful section 137.1 motion but also unsuccessful constitutional and procedural motions.

The Court of Appeal addressed costs for both the motion and the appeal.

On the motion, no costs were awarded due to the presumption in section 137.1(8) and the offsetting effect of the appellant's unsuccessful meritless motions.

On the appeal, the appellant was awarded partial indemnity costs reduced to account for time spent on unsuccessful constitutional and procedural arguments.

The appellant, a medical doctor who prepares impairment assessments for insurers in motor vehicle accident claims, sued the respondent, a lawyer and OTLA president-elect, for libel following an email posted to the OTLA Listserv.

The email alleged that the respondent had altered medical reports and misrepresented expert opinions in a catastrophic impairment arbitration.

The motion judge dismissed the action under section 137.1 of the Court of Justice Act (Anti-SLAPP legislation), finding that although the expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff failed to meet the merits threshold and the harm was outweighed by the public interest in protecting the expression.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in his application of sections 137.1(4)(a) and (b), and that the plaintiff had met his onus on both provisions.

The court also rejected constitutional challenges under sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicants sought urgent judicial review of decisions by the Toronto Soccer Association and Ontario Soccer Association that disqualified a youth girls' soccer team from a championship game, suspended their coach, and fined the league for allegedly playing ineligible 12-year-old players on a 13-year-old team.

The Superior Court of Justice assumed jurisdiction, finding the decisions were of a public nature.

The court set aside the associations' decisions, holding that they breached basic rules of procedural fairness by failing to provide adequate notice of the charges and sanctions, and by denying the applicants a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

Full indemnity costs were awarded against the respondents due to their reprehensible conduct, including ignoring the court's initial order.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order quashing their application for judicial review of the Minister's decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy to certain First Nations regarding hunting and fishing rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, upholding the motions judge's finding that the Minister's decision was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and therefore not justiciable absent an abuse of process.

The Court also agreed that the applicant's section 15 Charter claim was bound to fail as the policy did not alter his rights or impose a burden based on race.

Furthermore, the Court held it lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because the policy was not an exercise of a statutory power.

The defendants successfully brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

In this costs endorsement, the court considered whether to depart from the presumption of full indemnity costs under s. 137.1(7).

The court denied the plaintiff's request to file a further affidavit and found no reason to depart from the statutory presumption.

The court awarded full indemnity costs of $282,943.42 to the defendant Bent and partial indemnity costs of $30,000 to the defendant Lerners LLP.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order of the motions judge, which added the Williams Treaties First Nations as necessary parties or interveners to an application for judicial review and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the applicants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motions judge's conclusion that the First Nations would be directly affected by the declarations sought.

The court also upheld the costs award, noting that the applicants persisted with an unnecessary motion despite being on notice that elevated costs would be sought.