Timothy S. B. Danson

The plaintiff in a defamation action brought a preliminary motion prior to the hearing of the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff sought to record oral arguments, compel answers to cross-examination refusals, amend the statement of claim to add a corporate plaintiff, and file late affidavit evidence.

The court dismissed the motion in its entirety, finding that the proposed amendments would frustrate the purpose of the anti-SLAPP legislation and that there was no reasonable explanation for the late filing of evidence.

The moving party (defendant) brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the responding party's (plaintiff's) defamation action.

The action arose from an email sent by the moving party to a restricted listserv of plaintiff-side personal injury lawyers, which criticized the responding party's conduct as a medical expert in preparing executive summary reports for insurance companies.

The responding party also challenged the constitutionality of s. 137.1 under ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The court found that the email related to a matter of public interest.

The court held that the responding party failed to show there were grounds to believe the moving party had no valid defence, as the defences of substantial justification and qualified privilege were reasonably likely to succeed.

Furthermore, the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue.

The court also dismissed the Charter challenges, finding that reputation is not a free-standing right under s. 7 and that potential defamation plaintiffs do not constitute an analogous group under s. 15(1).

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing his motion for interim possession of an Irish sport horse.

The parties had a dispute over the ownership of the horse, with the applicant claiming sole ownership and the respondent claiming a one-third interest based on a partnership agreement.

The motions judge had dismissed the interim possession motion due to competing credibility issues that needed to be resolved at trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's order.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Natural Resources' decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy, which permits Aboriginal people to hunt and fish for food, social, and ceremonial purposes, within the 1923 Williams Treaties boundaries.

The Minister brought a motion to quash the application.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the application of the policy was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which is immune from judicial review absent an abuse of process.

The court also held that the policy did not violate the applicants' equality rights under section 15 of the Charter, as it constituted an ameliorative program under section 15(2).

Several First Nations moved to be added as party respondents in a judicial review application challenging Ontario’s Interim Enforcement Policy permitting First Nations to hunt and fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes on lands subject to the 1923 Williams Treaties pending resolution of related litigation.

The applicant organization opposed the motion, arguing the First Nations should not participate as parties or should be limited to intervenor status.

The court held that the proceeding directly targeted the asserted treaty and Charter rights of the First Nations and that effective adjudication required their participation.

The First Nations met the test for mandatory joinder under Rule 5.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and would also qualify as party intervenors under Rule 13.01.

As they were plainly proper parties and were forced to bring the motion after the applicant resisted their participation, the court awarded them substantial indemnity costs.

In a medical negligence action arising from allegations that hepatitis B vaccinations caused multiple sclerosis, the court addressed a request by the plaintiffs' counsel for an extension of time to deliver responding motion materials on a pending summary judgment motion.

The request was made by letter after a case conference, notwithstanding that an adjournment motion and related procedural issues had already been scheduled for hearing.

The court held that the letter request was improper and that the existing consent scheduling order remained in full force and effect unless and until amended.

The extension request was therefore denied, with the plaintiffs' broader adjournment motion left to be determined in the ordinary course.

The defendants appealed a Master's decision that permitted the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim to include extra-contractual misrepresentation claims despite an entire agreement clause, and refused the defendants' amendments pleading similar fact evidence of the plaintiffs' aggressive litigation history.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master correctly struck the similar fact pleadings as they did not constitute an affirmative defence of abuse of process.

The court also upheld the Master's decision to allow the plaintiffs' extra-contractual claims to proceed through the pleadings stage, noting that under the Tercon principle, such claims are not necessarily doomed to failure.

The Master's deferral of discovery planning was upheld as a reasonable exercise of discretion.

The applicant soccer club brought an urgent application for judicial review of a decision by the respondent sports governing body's Protest Committee, which had reversed the applicant's semi-final victory due to an alleged ineligible player.

The Divisional Court found it had jurisdiction to review the decision because the governing body exercises compulsory power over a broad segment of the public, giving its decisions a significant public dimension.

The court set aside the Protest Committee's decision, finding it unreasonable and procedurally unfair, as the player's ineligibility was caused by an administrative error by the association itself and the applicant was not given a fair opportunity to respond.

The applicant's victory was restored.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to issue a commission and letter of request to judicial authorities in the State of Washington to compel the former owner of the defendant hockey club, an American resident, to give evidence at trial.

The court found the witness had material evidence regarding corporate negligence and vicarious liability for an on-ice assault.

Finding a gap in the rules regarding compelling foreign witnesses to testify via videoconference at trial, the court applied the rules by analogy and granted the order for a commission and letter of request for the witness to testify live by videoconference or be examined before trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to extend the date by which their defamation action must be set down for trial, after failing to meet a consent timetable order due to an overlooked mandatory mediation requirement.

The court treated the motion similarly to one setting aside a registrar's dismissal order and applied the Reid factors.

Finding that the delay was adequately explained, the failure to set down was inadvertent, the motion was brought promptly, and the defendants suffered no actual prejudice, the Master granted the extension.

No costs were awarded as the plaintiffs required an indulgence from the court.

In a high‑value personal injury action arising from an on‑ice hockey incident, the defendant moved under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 33 for orders compelling the plaintiff to attend a vocational assessment and to authorize access to detailed GMAT testing data.

The plaintiff alleged permanent cognitive impairment and loss of future earning capacity exceeding $60 million.

The court held that a further psychovocational examination was justified because newly delivered expert reports placed the plaintiff’s post‑injury vocational capacity squarely in issue and fairness required the defendant to obtain responsive expert evidence.

However, the court declined to compel authorization for access to the GMAT database, finding the detailed testing data irrelevant to the material issues in dispute.

The motion was therefore granted in part and dismissed in part.

Following a motion to vary a prior order permitting two defence neuropsychological examinations, the court had previously concluded that the defendants failed to disclose a settlement agreement eliminating their adversity on liability.

The order was varied to allow only one examination, and the court considered the appropriate costs consequences of the defendants’ breach of their duty to immediately disclose the agreement.

The plaintiffs sought elevated costs given the defendants’ non‑disclosure and the procedural consequences that followed.

The court held that full indemnity costs were justified as a “consequence of the most serious nature” arising from the breach, even though the conduct was not found to be reprehensible.

Costs of $27,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST were fixed as fair, reasonable, and proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues.

Costs determination following several pre‑trial motions in a civil action arising from a professional hockey incident.

The court considered competing motions concerning disclosure of a settlement agreement, neuropsychological examinations, production of expert materials, and procedural timelines.

The plaintiffs were largely successful, particularly in compelling disclosure of the settlement agreement and obtaining related procedural relief.

While elevated costs were awarded for part of the motion due to the defendants’ failure to disclose the agreement and the resulting prejudice, most costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis after considering Rule 57.01 factors and the overall mixed results on some minor issues.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside an order that required the plaintiff to undergo two defence neuropsychological examinations.

The original order was made on the assumption that the defendants were adverse in interest.

It was subsequently discovered that the defendants had entered into a secret settlement agreement ending all adversity between them six months prior to the order.

The court found that the failure to disclose the agreement altered the landscape of the litigation.

The court varied the original order to permit only a single neuropsychological examination, finding that allowing two examinations by experts in the same field for non-adverse defendants was improper.

The court declined to exclude both reports entirely, finding that such a consequence would be disproportionate, but awarded the plaintiffs full indemnity costs.

The plaintiffs sought disclosure of a settlement agreement entered into between multiple defendants and a third party in a civil action arising from a professional hockey assault.

The settlement resolved cross-claims and contained a proportional sharing arrangement for any judgment or settlement with the plaintiffs.

The moving parties asserted settlement privilege and appealed a master's order compelling disclosure.

The court held that settlement privilege, whether class-based or case-by-case, admits exceptions where disclosure is necessary to preserve the integrity of the adversarial process.

Because the agreement changed the adversarial orientation of the litigation, immediate disclosure to the non-settling parties and the court was required.

The applicant's motion to set aside a judgment quashing his application for judicial review was previously dismissed.

The court determined costs for that motion.

The Attorney General of Canada sought full indemnity costs, while the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport sought partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $14,000 to the Attorney General and $7,000 to the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport.

Following earlier reasons addressing disclosure of a settlement agreement between co-defendants, the defendants requested supplementary reasons to clarify whether the court had implied professional misconduct by counsel.

The court issued an addendum confirming that no lawyer intentionally misled the court and expressing confidence in counsel’s professionalism.

However, the court maintained its conclusion that the settlement agreement ending adversity between the defendants should have been disclosed because it was relevant to a prior motion concerning two neuropsychological examinations.

The court held the failure to disclose was an honest but mistaken decision made in good faith, rejecting claims that correspondence from the plaintiffs influenced the earlier ruling.

The plaintiff, a professional hockey player, was seriously injured by the defendant during a game.

The plaintiff sued the defendant and the team owners, alleging vicarious and direct liability.

The defendant issued a third party claim against the head coach.

The defendants and third party subsequently entered into a secret settlement agreement that dismissed the cross-claims and third party claim, and apportioned liability among them.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel production of the settlement agreement.

The court granted the motion, holding that the agreement changed the landscape of the litigation and must be disclosed to ensure trial fairness, regardless of whether settlement privilege is a class privilege or determined on a case-by-case basis.

The applicant sought to set aside a motion judge's decision quashing his application for judicial review of a sports arbitration award.

The applicant argued that the arbitration panel exercised public powers and a statutory power of decision, making it subject to judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the arbitration was a private contractual matter and did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision, meaning declaratory relief under the Judicial Review Procedure Act was unavailable.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a $40,000 substantial indemnity costs award made against them after a motion to strike was resolved on consent.

The motions judge had awarded costs to the defendants for responding to a claim by a voluntarily dissolved corporation.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding strong grounds to question whether the defendants reasonably incurred such high costs given their position that the claim was certain to fail, and whether costs for an adjourned motion should have been awarded before its final disposition.