Timothy S. B. Danson

The plaintiffs brought a motion to extend the date by which their defamation action must be set down for trial, after failing to meet a consent timetable order due to an overlooked mandatory mediation requirement.

The court treated the motion similarly to one setting aside a registrar's dismissal order and applied the Reid factors.

Finding that the delay was adequately explained, the failure to set down was inadvertent, the motion was brought promptly, and the defendants suffered no actual prejudice, the Master granted the extension.

No costs were awarded as the plaintiffs required an indulgence from the court.

In a high‑value personal injury action arising from an on‑ice hockey incident, the defendant moved under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 33 for orders compelling the plaintiff to attend a vocational assessment and to authorize access to detailed GMAT testing data.

The plaintiff alleged permanent cognitive impairment and loss of future earning capacity exceeding $60 million.

The court held that a further psychovocational examination was justified because newly delivered expert reports placed the plaintiff’s post‑injury vocational capacity squarely in issue and fairness required the defendant to obtain responsive expert evidence.

However, the court declined to compel authorization for access to the GMAT database, finding the detailed testing data irrelevant to the material issues in dispute.

The motion was therefore granted in part and dismissed in part.

Following a motion to vary a prior order permitting two defence neuropsychological examinations, the court had previously concluded that the defendants failed to disclose a settlement agreement eliminating their adversity on liability.

The order was varied to allow only one examination, and the court considered the appropriate costs consequences of the defendants’ breach of their duty to immediately disclose the agreement.

The plaintiffs sought elevated costs given the defendants’ non‑disclosure and the procedural consequences that followed.

The court held that full indemnity costs were justified as a “consequence of the most serious nature” arising from the breach, even though the conduct was not found to be reprehensible.

Costs of $27,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST were fixed as fair, reasonable, and proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues.

Costs determination following several pre‑trial motions in a civil action arising from a professional hockey incident.

The court considered competing motions concerning disclosure of a settlement agreement, neuropsychological examinations, production of expert materials, and procedural timelines.

The plaintiffs were largely successful, particularly in compelling disclosure of the settlement agreement and obtaining related procedural relief.

While elevated costs were awarded for part of the motion due to the defendants’ failure to disclose the agreement and the resulting prejudice, most costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis after considering Rule 57.01 factors and the overall mixed results on some minor issues.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside an order that required the plaintiff to undergo two defence neuropsychological examinations.

The original order was made on the assumption that the defendants were adverse in interest.

It was subsequently discovered that the defendants had entered into a secret settlement agreement ending all adversity between them six months prior to the order.

The court found that the failure to disclose the agreement altered the landscape of the litigation.

The court varied the original order to permit only a single neuropsychological examination, finding that allowing two examinations by experts in the same field for non-adverse defendants was improper.

The court declined to exclude both reports entirely, finding that such a consequence would be disproportionate, but awarded the plaintiffs full indemnity costs.

The plaintiffs sought disclosure of a settlement agreement entered into between multiple defendants and a third party in a civil action arising from a professional hockey assault.

The settlement resolved cross-claims and contained a proportional sharing arrangement for any judgment or settlement with the plaintiffs.

The moving parties asserted settlement privilege and appealed a master's order compelling disclosure.

The court held that settlement privilege, whether class-based or case-by-case, admits exceptions where disclosure is necessary to preserve the integrity of the adversarial process.

Because the agreement changed the adversarial orientation of the litigation, immediate disclosure to the non-settling parties and the court was required.

The applicant's motion to set aside a judgment quashing his application for judicial review was previously dismissed.

The court determined costs for that motion.

The Attorney General of Canada sought full indemnity costs, while the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport sought partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $14,000 to the Attorney General and $7,000 to the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport.

Following earlier reasons addressing disclosure of a settlement agreement between co-defendants, the defendants requested supplementary reasons to clarify whether the court had implied professional misconduct by counsel.

The court issued an addendum confirming that no lawyer intentionally misled the court and expressing confidence in counsel’s professionalism.

However, the court maintained its conclusion that the settlement agreement ending adversity between the defendants should have been disclosed because it was relevant to a prior motion concerning two neuropsychological examinations.

The court held the failure to disclose was an honest but mistaken decision made in good faith, rejecting claims that correspondence from the plaintiffs influenced the earlier ruling.

The plaintiff, a professional hockey player, was seriously injured by the defendant during a game.

The plaintiff sued the defendant and the team owners, alleging vicarious and direct liability.

The defendant issued a third party claim against the head coach.

The defendants and third party subsequently entered into a secret settlement agreement that dismissed the cross-claims and third party claim, and apportioned liability among them.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel production of the settlement agreement.

The court granted the motion, holding that the agreement changed the landscape of the litigation and must be disclosed to ensure trial fairness, regardless of whether settlement privilege is a class privilege or determined on a case-by-case basis.

The applicant sought to set aside a motion judge's decision quashing his application for judicial review of a sports arbitration award.

The applicant argued that the arbitration panel exercised public powers and a statutory power of decision, making it subject to judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the arbitration was a private contractual matter and did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision, meaning declaratory relief under the Judicial Review Procedure Act was unavailable.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a $40,000 substantial indemnity costs award made against them after a motion to strike was resolved on consent.

The motions judge had awarded costs to the defendants for responding to a claim by a voluntarily dissolved corporation.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding strong grounds to question whether the defendants reasonably incurred such high costs given their position that the claim was certain to fail, and whether costs for an adjourned motion should have been awarded before its final disposition.

The responding parties sought judicial review of a coroner's jury verdict and recommendations regarding a death following a chiropractic neck manipulation.

The application was commenced 10 months after the verdict and remained unperfected nearly seven years later.

The moving party coroner moved to dismiss the application for delay.

The court held that a single judge of the Divisional Court has jurisdiction to dismiss for delay in clear cases.

The court found the delay inordinate, rejected the explanation that the responding parties were waiting for complete transcripts of submissions made in the absence of the jury, and found significant prejudice to the deceased's family and the public interest.

The motion to dismiss for delay was granted.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict dismissing their action against the respondent.

They argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding the Occupiers' Liability Act, improperly excluded them from the courtroom, and that the respondent's jury address was inflammatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge, noting the exclusion was on agreement of counsel, and holding that the jury address was not inappropriate.

The applicant, an elite wheelchair athlete, sought judicial review of an arbitral decision by the Court of Arbitration for Sport regarding an anti-doping violation.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, holding that the arbitrator derived authority from a private contract rather than a statutory power, meaning the court lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The court also found the application to be an abuse of process due to a parallel civil action seeking the same relief.

The Toronto Police Association (TPA) brought an application for judicial review seeking an order of mandamus to compel the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services to conduct a public inquiry under s. 25 of the Police Services Act into various matters, including a dispute between officers at a gas pump.

The Commission had previously conducted a screening review and declined to hold a formal inquiry, but made several recommendations under s. 22(1)(e.2) of the Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's decision not to investigate the TPA's complaints while recommending an investigation into a related human rights complaint was entirely reasonable and within its broad statutory discretion.

The Court also noted that mandamus was not available as a remedy on the facts of the case.

The Toronto Police Association brought an application seeking a declaration that a binding agreement existed to resolve disciplinary charges against officers who wore uniforms to a union rally.

The appellants moved to dismiss the application for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the matter fell under the Police Services Act.

The motion judge found the dispute was contractual and within the court's jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the essential character of the dispute involved police discipline and the consequences of that discipline on the officers' careers.

The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction, allowed the appeal, and dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed a finding of liability after the respondent tripped and fell over pipes left on the sidewalk in front of the appellant's house.

The pipes had been left for five days, contrary to the City of Toronto's by-laws for special collection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant breached the standard of care and materially contributed to the injuries was supported by the evidence.

The appellant challenged the jurisdictional and constitutional validity of a City of Toronto by-law requiring restaurant operators to post the results of food premises inspections.

The appellant argued the by-law conflicted with provincial health legislation and infringed freedom of expression under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the city had jurisdiction to enact the by-law under its business licensing powers and that the by-law did not unjustifiably infringe Charter rights.

The appellants, retail employees and corporate retailers, were charged with working in or carrying on a retail business on a holiday contrary to the Retail Business Holidays Act.

They challenged the constitutionality of the 1993 amendments to the Act, arguing it infringed their freedom of religion under s. 2(a) and equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Act's purpose remains the secular one of providing common pause days for retail employees, and that it does not significantly burden religious freedom.

The court also held that any differential treatment was based on occupational status, not an enumerated or analogous ground under s. 15, and therefore did not constitute discrimination.

Following the dismissal of an application for judicial review seeking to quash or adjourn the commencement date of a coroner's inquest, the court determined the issue of costs.

The respondent coroner and the family of the deceased sought costs against the applicant and his employer, a ski club.

The court found the claimed costs excessive but ordered the applicant and the ski club to jointly and severally pay fixed costs of $7,500 to the coroner and $2,500 to the family.