Timothy S. B. Danson

The appellants were charged with unlawfully damaging and/or destroying protected rattlesnake habitat contrary to the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

They brought a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay, which was dismissed by the trial judge.

The appellants then sought certiorari and s. 24(1) Charter relief in Superior Court, arguing the trial judge failed to characterize certain disclosure as "obviously relevant" and failed to attribute all delay to the Crown.

The Superior Court dismissed both applications.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no jurisdictional error and rejecting the argument that the degree of relevance of outstanding disclosure alleviates the defence's obligation to act diligently.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal by Jagtar Dhaliwal and Voxx Sports Inc. from a Superior Court decision upholding an arbitrator’s refusal to recuse himself for bias.

The appellants alleged both a reasonable apprehension of bias and actual bias, based on the arbitrator’s prior involvement with respondents’ counsel and comments about the veracity of Mr. Dhaliwal’s affidavit.

The Court found no merit in either claim, holding that the arbitrator’s conduct did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and that adverse credibility findings do not, on their own, establish actual bias.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The Applicants sought to set aside an arbitrator's decision denying their challenge for bias and to remove the arbitrator, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias due to the arbitrator's undisclosed involvement in another arbitration with the Respondents' counsel, and actual bias from a costs decision.

The court dismissed the application, finding the bias challenge was not brought in a timely manner and that neither reasonable apprehension of bias nor actual bias was established.

The court found no meaningful overlap between the arbitrations and that the arbitrator's finding of 'false statements' did not indicate actual bias.

The applicants sought judicial review, including mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and s. 24(1) Charter relief, of a Justice of the Peace's decision.

The Justice of the Peace had dismissed their s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and deferred an abuse of process application in a provincial offences proceeding concerning alleged damage to Massasauga snake habitat.

The Superior Court dismissed the applicants' request for extraordinary relief, finding that the Justice of the Peace did not exceed or decline jurisdiction.

The court held that the issues raised were not appropriate for interlocutory intervention by a superior court, emphasizing that such matters are generally best addressed on appeal after the trial has concluded.

The appellant appealed a decision denying him leave to amend his statement of claim in a libel action against the respondents.

The Divisional Court upheld the Associate Justice's decision, finding no error in the application of issue estoppel to prevent the addition of the appellant's professional corporation as a plaintiff, as a previous judge had already ruled the corporation had no tenable cause of action.

The court also upheld the refusal to allow scandalous and irrelevant paragraphs about a non-party, and the refusal to permit a claim for document production within the pleadings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The defendants brought an application for disclosure of information related to four other land development projects, arguing it was relevant for full answer and defence, due diligence, and to demonstrate inconsistent application of environmental legislation by the Ministry.

The court determined that the materials sought were not first-party disclosure in the possession or control of the prosecution but rather third-party records held by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry.

The court outlined the proper two-step process for a third-party production application, emphasizing the need to notify the record holder and any parties with privacy interests, and provided guidance on the Crown's duty to inquire.

The application for disclosure was not granted as first-party, but the court provided a procedural path for the defendants to pursue it as third-party production.

The appellants, former litigation counsel, appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motion based on a limitations defence in a solicitor negligence claim.

The motion judge found the claim was not discoverable until the Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal, or alternatively, that commencing an action earlier was not an appropriate means to remedy it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the claim was not time-barred, emphasizing that the respondents reasonably relied on their counsel's advice regarding the underlying litigation's legal errors, thus delaying discoverability of the negligence claim.

The defendants, former legal counsel for the plaintiffs, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' solicitor negligence action on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants were negligent in failing to argue the unconscionability and public policy branches of the Tercon test regarding an exclusion clause in the underlying trial against Toyota.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that the limitation period did not begin to run until the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal in the underlying action, as the plaintiffs reasonably relied on the defendants' advice to pursue appeals and a legal proceeding was not an 'appropriate means' to seek a remedy until the appeal process was exhausted.

This urgent motion before the Court of Appeal addressed whether a non-party, John Kavanagh, had an automatic right to appeal or should be granted leave to appeal two approval and vesting orders related to the sale of properties in a mortgage enforcement and insolvency proceeding.

The Receiver brought the motion to prevent automatic stays of the property sales.

The court found no automatic right of appeal under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) because the orders were procedural and no loss exceeding $10,000 was demonstrated.

The court also denied leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of the BIA, concluding that the issues raised were not of general importance, lacked prima facie merit, and granting leave would unduly hinder the insolvency proceedings.

Consequently, Kavanagh's notices of appeal were quashed, and his motions for leave to appeal were dismissed, ensuring the property sales could proceed without automatic stays.

The plaintiff moved for an extension of the deadline to set the action down for trial, while the defendants brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The action, stemming from a 1998 arrest, had been stayed due to related criminal proceedings until 2017.

The court applied a contextual approach, considering the preference for merits-based decisions and timely resolution.

It found the plaintiff provided an adequate explanation for the delay, including the criminal proceedings and subsequent steps taken to gather evidence.

The court was not satisfied that the defendants demonstrated actual prejudice.

Consequently, the plaintiff's motion was granted, extending the deadline, and the defendants' cross-motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

Appeal from a Superior Court decision on a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant brought multiple motions, including a successful section 137.1 motion but also unsuccessful constitutional and procedural motions.

The Court of Appeal addressed costs for both the motion and the appeal.

On the motion, no costs were awarded due to the presumption in section 137.1(8) and the offsetting effect of the appellant's unsuccessful meritless motions.

On the appeal, the appellant was awarded partial indemnity costs reduced to account for time spent on unsuccessful constitutional and procedural arguments.

The appellant, a medical doctor who prepares impairment assessments for insurers in motor vehicle accident claims, sued the respondent, a lawyer and OTLA president-elect, for libel following an email posted to the OTLA Listserv.

The email alleged that the respondent had altered medical reports and misrepresented expert opinions in a catastrophic impairment arbitration.

The motion judge dismissed the action under section 137.1 of the Court of Justice Act (Anti-SLAPP legislation), finding that although the expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff failed to meet the merits threshold and the harm was outweighed by the public interest in protecting the expression.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in his application of sections 137.1(4)(a) and (b), and that the plaintiff had met his onus on both provisions.

The court also rejected constitutional challenges under sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicants sought urgent judicial review of decisions by the Toronto Soccer Association and Ontario Soccer Association that disqualified a youth girls' soccer team from a championship game, suspended their coach, and fined the league for allegedly playing ineligible 12-year-old players on a 13-year-old team.

The Superior Court of Justice assumed jurisdiction, finding the decisions were of a public nature.

The court set aside the associations' decisions, holding that they breached basic rules of procedural fairness by failing to provide adequate notice of the charges and sanctions, and by denying the applicants a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

Full indemnity costs were awarded against the respondents due to their reprehensible conduct, including ignoring the court's initial order.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order quashing their application for judicial review of the Minister's decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy to certain First Nations regarding hunting and fishing rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, upholding the motions judge's finding that the Minister's decision was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and therefore not justiciable absent an abuse of process.

The Court also agreed that the applicant's section 15 Charter claim was bound to fail as the policy did not alter his rights or impose a burden based on race.

Furthermore, the Court held it lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because the policy was not an exercise of a statutory power.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order of the motions judge, which added the Williams Treaties First Nations as necessary parties or interveners to an application for judicial review and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the applicants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motions judge's conclusion that the First Nations would be directly affected by the declarations sought.

The court also upheld the costs award, noting that the applicants persisted with an unnecessary motion despite being on notice that elevated costs would be sought.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing his motion for interim possession of an Irish sport horse.

The parties had a dispute over the ownership of the horse, with the applicant claiming sole ownership and the respondent claiming a one-third interest based on a partnership agreement.

The motions judge had dismissed the interim possession motion due to competing credibility issues that needed to be resolved at trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's order.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Natural Resources' decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy, which permits Aboriginal people to hunt and fish for food, social, and ceremonial purposes, within the 1923 Williams Treaties boundaries.

The Minister brought a motion to quash the application.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the application of the policy was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which is immune from judicial review absent an abuse of process.

The court also held that the policy did not violate the applicants' equality rights under section 15 of the Charter, as it constituted an ameliorative program under section 15(2).

Several First Nations moved to be added as party respondents in a judicial review application challenging Ontario’s Interim Enforcement Policy permitting First Nations to hunt and fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes on lands subject to the 1923 Williams Treaties pending resolution of related litigation.

The applicant organization opposed the motion, arguing the First Nations should not participate as parties or should be limited to intervenor status.

The court held that the proceeding directly targeted the asserted treaty and Charter rights of the First Nations and that effective adjudication required their participation.

The First Nations met the test for mandatory joinder under Rule 5.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and would also qualify as party intervenors under Rule 13.01.

As they were plainly proper parties and were forced to bring the motion after the applicant resisted their participation, the court awarded them substantial indemnity costs.

The defendants appealed a Master's decision that permitted the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim to include extra-contractual misrepresentation claims despite an entire agreement clause, and refused the defendants' amendments pleading similar fact evidence of the plaintiffs' aggressive litigation history.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master correctly struck the similar fact pleadings as they did not constitute an affirmative defence of abuse of process.

The court also upheld the Master's decision to allow the plaintiffs' extra-contractual claims to proceed through the pleadings stage, noting that under the Tercon principle, such claims are not necessarily doomed to failure.

The Master's deferral of discovery planning was upheld as a reasonable exercise of discretion.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to issue a commission and letter of request to judicial authorities in the State of Washington to compel the former owner of the defendant hockey club, an American resident, to give evidence at trial.

The court found the witness had material evidence regarding corporate negligence and vicarious liability for an on-ice assault.

Finding a gap in the rules regarding compelling foreign witnesses to testify via videoconference at trial, the court applied the rules by analogy and granted the order for a commission and letter of request for the witness to testify live by videoconference or be examined before trial.