J. Gary McMahon

The defendants brought an application for disclosure of information related to four other land development projects, arguing it was relevant for full answer and defence, due diligence, and to demonstrate inconsistent application of environmental legislation by the Ministry.

The court determined that the materials sought were not first-party disclosure in the possession or control of the prosecution but rather third-party records held by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry.

The court outlined the proper two-step process for a third-party production application, emphasizing the need to notify the record holder and any parties with privacy interests, and provided guidance on the Crown's duty to inquire.

The application for disclosure was not granted as first-party, but the court provided a procedural path for the defendants to pursue it as third-party production.

Three separate speeding prosecutions were consolidated to address a recurring legal issue regarding sentencing discretion in the early resolution process.

The defendants were charged with speeding offences under section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Following early resolution meetings, the prosecution and defence jointly proposed fines significantly exceeding the applicable set fines and fixed fines.

The court held that it lacked authority to impose fines beyond those prescribed by statute, and that the early resolution process under the Provincial Offences Act limits judicial discretion to either the applicable set fine or the fixed fine specified in section 128(14) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The court rejected the joint submissions as unlawful.

The defendant was charged with depositing snow or ice on a highway contrary to City of Greater Sudbury By-law 2011-219, Road Fouling By-law, section 8(1), with an offence date of November 21, 2018.

The prosecution failed to prove the municipal by-law creating the offence charged, as it tendered only an uncertified photocopy of a by-law dated seven years prior without establishing that it had not been amended or repealed.

Additionally, on the merits, the defendant established a due diligence defence.

The defendant was found not guilty.

The defendant corporation brought a disclosure application seeking either a stay of proceedings or a disclosure order, alleging the prosecution failed to disclose relevant information regarding a guarding project conducted at the defendant's facility between 2007 and 2009.

The defendant was charged with failing to ensure prescribed measures and procedures were carried out in the workplace, contrary to the Occupational Health and Safety Act, specifically regarding failure to guard a machine.

The application was heard on the first day of trial.

The court denied the application, finding that the requested information was not in the possession of the prosecution, was not part of the fruits of the investigation, and was not obviously relevant to the defendant's case given the significant time lapse and modifications made to the equipment between 2007-2009 and the alleged 2016 offence date.

The defendant was charged with disobeying a traffic sign contrary to section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant admitted to proceeding through an intersection marked "right turns only" to access a Tim Hortons but raised a defence of necessity due to an urgent need to use the washroom.

The court found the defendant not guilty because the prosecution failed to prove an essential element of the actus reus of the offence—that the traffic sign complied with the regulatory requirements.

The constable's testimony regarding the sign's appearance was inconsistent with the prescribed regulatory specifications for such intersections, and the evidence was insufficient to establish either the sign's compliance or the existence of a supporting municipal by-law.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act following a head-on collision on Highway 11 south of Temagami on January 18, 2012.

The defendant's southbound vehicle crossed into the northbound lane and collided with the victim's vehicle.

The court conducted a new trial following an appeal.

The defendant was acquitted after the court found that while the vehicle crossed into the opposing lane, the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's driving fell below the standard of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances.

The court found that slippery road conditions and the rapid unfolding of events, combined with gaps in the evidence regarding speed, braking, and the pre-collision event, created reasonable doubt as to careless driving.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle left of centre while upon a curve in the roadway, contrary to section 149(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant admitted to crossing into the opposing lane but claimed the conduct was involuntary due to a sudden episode of sneezing and watery eyes caused by allergies.

The court found that the defendant's testimony regarding the involuntary nature of his conduct was not sufficiently compelling and did not raise a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness.

The court determined that the actus reus of the strict liability offence was established beyond a reasonable doubt and found the defendant guilty.

The defendant did not establish a defence of due diligence.

The Crown applied for an adjournment of a bail hearing pursuant to section 516(1) of the Criminal Code to permit further investigation, including interviews with the accused's child and a Children's Aid worker, and to conduct other police investigations.

The accused opposed the adjournment and was ready to proceed with the bail hearing.

The Justice of the Peace denied the Crown's application, finding that the reasons advanced—further investigation and investigation of a potential new charge—were insufficient to pre-empt the accused's constitutional right to a prompt determination of bail.

The bail hearing proceeded on the scheduled date.

The defendant was charged with driving without wearing a seat belt contrary to section 106(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant produced a medical note from a doctor stating he was unable to wear a seat belt because of his size.

The note did not stipulate an expiry date.

The prosecution argued the exemption under section 106(6)(b)(ii) only applies where the certificate stipulates a time period.

The court found that while certificates under section 106(6)(b)(i) for medical reasons must include a time period, certificates under section 106(6)(b)(ii) for physical characteristics need not include an expiry date.

The defendant was acquitted.

The applicant brought a motion to strike previously entered guilty pleas for trafficking in cocaine and common assault.

He asserted the pleas were not voluntary because he maintained his innocence and felt pressured by defence counsel to accept a negotiated resolution.

Evidence showed counsel did not conduct a proper plea comprehension review and advised the applicant to answer the court’s plea inquiry questions affirmatively to ensure acceptance of the plea.

The court held that a valid guilty plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed under s. 606 of the Criminal Code.

Finding that the applicant never admitted guilt and entered the plea under improper circumstances, the court concluded the plea was involuntary and constituted a fraud on the court.

The pleas were struck and the matter ordered to proceed to trial on all counts.