Dr. Pollanen

The Crown applied for a lengthy adjournment of the accused's first-degree murder trial, citing the recent exclusion of a key expert witness, voluminous late disclosure from a third-party records application, and a newly received forensic pathology report.

The court rejected the request for a lengthy delay to replace the excluded expert evidence, noting the accused's right to a timely trial after 38 months of investigation.

However, the court granted a short adjournment of one month to allow the parties to review the late disclosure and the new pathology report.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the stabbing death of her former boyfriend.

At trial, the Crown cross-examined its own key witness on a prior inconsistent statement without bringing an application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, and subsequently used the inconsistency to impeach the witness's credibility during closing submissions.

The trial judge permitted this use and instructed the jury accordingly.

The Court of Appeal held that this improper cross-examination and the subsequent use of the evidence prejudiced the appellant's defence, rendering the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of unlawful act manslaughter for failing to provide the necessaries of life to their 27-month-old daughter, who died of what trial experts concluded was a combination of asthma and malnutrition.

On appeal, the appellants sought to introduce fresh expert evidence from a forensic pathologist and a pediatric bone disorder expert, challenging the trial evidence on the cause of death.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, noting it was highly cogent and undermined the Crown's theory of liability at trial.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiffs brought an action against GlaxoSmithKline following the sudden and unexplained death of their five-year-old daughter, who died five days after receiving the H1N1 vaccine (Arepanrix).

The plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer breached its standard of care by failing to adequately test the vaccine and failing to warn of its risks, and that the vaccine caused the child's death.

The court dismissed the action, finding no expert evidence to establish a breach of the standard of care regarding the vaccine's testing, approval, or disclosure of risks.

Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs' expert evidence on causation, relying instead on the forensic pathologist and epidemiological experts who concluded there was no evidence linking the vaccine to the child's death.

In a jury trial on a first degree murder indictment arising from a planned drug-related shooting, the court issued written reasons addressing objections to the jury charge and counsel's closings.

The court held that an out-of-court statement about a distinctive licence plate was inadmissible for its truth because it was hearsay and did not meet the excited utterance exception.

The court also gave a strong Hay warning on weak police identification evidence, ruled that haircut evidence lacked probative value as after-the-fact conduct, and corrected improper closing submissions by both Crown and defence where they exceeded the evidentiary record.

The jury ultimately convicted two accused of manslaughter and acquitted the third.

The accused were jointly charged with first-degree murder.

During pre-charge conferences, the Crown and defence counsel raised several issues regarding the jury instructions.

The court declined the Crown's request to leave section 21(2) of the Criminal Code and unlawful confinement under section 231(5)(e) as routes to liability, finding insufficient evidence to support those theories.

The court also dismissed defence requests to remove planning and deliberation or section 229(a)(ii) intent from the charge for one of the accused, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to consider.

Further defence requests for a specific identification instruction and modifications to the summary of eyewitness testimony were also dismissed.

The appellants, a father and stepmother, were convicted of second-degree murder in the death of their ten-year-old son following prolonged abuse.

On appeal, the father argued the trial judge erred in denying a mid-trial application for severance after late disclosure of photographs.

The stepmother argued the trial judge erred in finding her pre-arrest and post-arrest statements to police were voluntary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no injustice in the denial of severance and upholding the trial judge's application of the law on voluntariness.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder following his third trial for the offence.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to conduct an inquiry into juror bias after receiving a note expressing safety concerns, by giving inadequate instructions on eyewitness identification, and by refusing to grant a mistrial over the Crown's closing remarks.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury's withdrawal of the note negated the need for an inquiry, the identification instructions were adequate, and the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in addressing the Crown's remarks with an ameliorative instruction.

The Crown appealed a reviewing judge's decision to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for first degree murder and substitute a committal for second degree murder.

The accused was charged with first degree murder based on the allegation that he caused the victim's death while committing a sexual assault.

The reviewing judge found no evidence of lack of consent to the sexual act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the first degree murder committal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge did not exceed his jurisdiction.

The Court held that the nature of the injuries, the position of the body, and the short timeframe supported a reasonable inference that the sexual contact was not consensual.

The defendants, on trial for first-degree murder arising from a home invasion and robbery, raised numerous objections to the Crown's closing address to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown misstated evidence, improperly referenced out-of-court statements, and undermined the presumption of innocence, seeking a mistrial or the right to make reply submissions.

The court reviewed the objections and found that while some of the Crown's comments required corrective instructions in the final jury charge, the conduct did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.

The applications for a mistrial and for reply submissions were dismissed.

The Crown applied during a voir dire to admit crime scene and autopsy photographs of the deceased in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused argued the photographs were gratuitous, inflammatory, and highly prejudicial.

The court found the photographs were highly probative to illustrate the forensic pathologist's opinions, corroborate testimony, and rebut potential defences such as self-defence or a third-party suspect.

The court concluded the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and granted the application to admit the photographs.

Following a jury conviction for manslaughter by reason of failing to provide the necessaries of life, the court sentenced both parents for the death of their young child.

The sentencing judge found the respondents equally culpable because they ignored medical advice and obvious warning signs over an extended period, resulting in chronic malnutrition that materially contributed to death alongside an asthma attack.

Applying the sentencing fact-finding framework for jury verdict cases, the court distinguished more egregious child-death authorities involving deliberate abandonment or overt deprivation, but held that denunciation and deterrence had to predominate under the Criminal Code because the offence was committed against a vulnerable child.

A fit sentence was 30 months for each offender, subject to presentence and bail credit, with probation imposed on one respondent and ancillary DNA and weapons prohibition orders made.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on first degree murder, in her jury instructions regarding the timing of the victim's injuries, and in failing to give a limiting instruction on post-offence conduct.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant killed the victim while forcibly confining him.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the Arcuri test for a directed verdict, nor in the jury instructions when read as a whole.

The appeal was dismissed.