Maureen Addie

The accused was charged with manslaughter after he ran at full speed up a sidewalk and forcefully pushed an 89-year-old pedestrian from behind, causing her to fall and suffer fatal neck injuries.

The accused claimed the contact was accidental and a reflex to the victim suddenly veering into his path.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding it inconsistent with video surveillance and his subsequent actions of fleeing the scene without hesitation.

The court concluded the push was a deliberate act of assault, satisfying the elements of unlawful act manslaughter.

The parents of a one-year-old infant who suffered a catastrophic brain injury appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board.

The Board had found that the parents failed to comply with the principles of substitute decision-making under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 by refusing to consent to the withdrawal of life support proposed by the treating physician.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board made no error in its objective assessment that the withdrawal of life support was in the infant's best interests, given her irreversible condition and lack of any prospect of recovery.

The appellants, parents of an infant with a catastrophic brain injury, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision directing them to consent to a palliative care treatment plan proposed by the treating physician.

As the parents' legal aid certificates did not cover the appeals and the matter was highly urgent, the court issued a procedural direction appointing their previous counsel and the infant's counsel as amicus curiae to ensure the appeals could proceed fairly and quickly without waiting for Legal Aid Ontario decisions.

The accused attacked military personnel at a Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre with a knife.

He was charged with nine counts of committing indictable offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist group under s. 83.2 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the accused, acting as a 'lone wolf', constituted a terrorist group himself.

The court rejected this interpretation, holding that s. 83.2 requires the terrorist group to have an identity separate from the person committing the offence.

The accused was therefore acquitted of the terrorism charges.

On the included offences of attempted murder, assault causing bodily harm, and weapons offences, the court accepted joint psychiatric evidence that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia and was incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The accused was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder, the trial judge ruled on several motions.

The judge excused a prospective juror for obvious partiality under s. 632(c) of the Criminal Code.

A motion to sever one of the co-accused due to his counsel's illness was dismissed, as the jury was willing to wait and the public interest favoured a joint trial.

The judge also dismissed a Charter application alleging that the consumption of a DNA negative control by the Centre of Forensic Sciences breached the accused's rights, finding the control was an analytical tool rather than first-party disclosure.

Finally, a request for a mid-trial instruction regarding an in-dock identification was denied, with the judge opting to provide a general warning about eyewitness identification instead.

The Crown and defence brought multiple pre-trial motions in a first-degree murder case.

The court ruled on various procedural and evidentiary issues, including denying the Crown's request to shackle the accused and the defence's request to sit at counsel table.

The court permitted the defence to introduce alternate suspect evidence, finding an air of reality to the claim.

The court allowed the Crown to introduce post-offence conduct evidence regarding changes in hairstyle and phone numbers, but excluded bad character evidence regarding prior firearm possession due to its prejudicial effect.

The court also found a section 7 Charter breach due to the police's unacceptable negligence in losing a witness interview DVD, but ordered alternative remedies rather than excluding the witness's evidence.

During jury deliberations in a first-degree murder trial, the jury requested to take a view of the apartment complex where the shooting occurred.

The Crown opposed the request due to logistical and security concerns, while one of the accused argued a view constitutes real evidence.

The trial judge refused the request, finding that a view would not provide a real and demonstrable advantage given the extensive photographic and video evidence already adduced.

Furthermore, the judge held that a view at the deliberation stage was not in the interests of justice due to the passage of time, the risk of the jury drawing untested inferences, and significant logistical challenges.

The accused were jointly charged with first-degree murder.

During pre-charge conferences, the Crown and defence counsel raised several issues regarding the jury instructions.

The court declined the Crown's request to leave section 21(2) of the Criminal Code and unlawful confinement under section 231(5)(e) as routes to liability, finding insufficient evidence to support those theories.

The court also dismissed defence requests to remove planning and deliberation or section 229(a)(ii) intent from the charge for one of the accused, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to consider.

Further defence requests for a specific identification instruction and modifications to the summary of eyewitness testimony were also dismissed.

During a first degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce evidence that the accused had been in custody for two years prior to the murder.

The Crown argued this evidence was necessary to prove the accused did not have access to a cell phone during that time, thereby refuting a potential defence claim that the accused was a contact in the deceased's phone.

The defence offered to admit the accused was 'out of the area' without cell phone access for two months.

The court held that the extended two-year period of non-access was irrelevant.

Furthermore, the court ruled that even if relevant, the prejudicial effect of revealing the accused's prior incarceration to the jury outweighed its probative value, and prohibited the Crown from leading the evidence.

In a murder trial, the Crown applied to exclude references to the name 'CJ' from the deceased's phone records, arguing the evidence was irrelevant and hearsay.

A co-accused also sought to redact text messages involving 'Scarface' on similar grounds.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the evidence relevant to the live issue of DNA transfer and identification.

The court held that the admission of the contact list and text messages engaged issues of authentication rather than hearsay, as they were not being adduced for the truth of their contents but to determine whether the communications were actually made by the accused.

During a jury trial, the Crown sought to file a DNA expert's written report as an exhibit after the expert had already provided viva voce evidence.

The defence objected, arguing the report was prejudicial.

The court dismissed the Crown's request, ruling that the report was inadmissible because it added nothing to the oral testimony, contained matters not explored in evidence, and risked misleading or confusing the jury.

The court emphasized that the expert's evidence is their testimony, not their report.

During a criminal trial for a shooting death, the court issued written reasons for several oral evidentiary rulings.

The court ruled that the defence could not elicit self-serving admissions from a Crown witness during cross-examination.

The court allowed two photographs to be entered as numbered exhibits, finding them relevant and authenticated.

The court permitted the Crown to re-examine a witness regarding phone numbers to clarify answers given in cross-examination, but denied re-examination on the circumstances of an identification, finding it more prejudicial than probative.

Finally, the court prohibited the defence from introducing investigative hearsay about a third-party suspect without a proper voir dire.

The accused were on trial for first degree murder.

During the trial, the defence filed a section 24(1) Charter application alleging a breach due to the Centre of Forensic Sciences consuming a 'negative control' sample during DNA testing.

The Crown sought directions, arguing the court should determine the relevancy of the consumed sample before the Crown's DNA expert testified, and restrict cross-examination if relevance was not established.

The court dismissed the Crown's request, holding that the defence was entitled to cross-examine the expert on the DNA extraction process, including the use and consumption of the negative control.

The court deferred ruling on the Charter application until the end of the trial, when the full evidentiary record would allow for a proper assessment of prejudice.

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought to adduce opinion evidence from a police officer that clothing worn by a male in a surveillance video resembled clothing she had previously observed the accused wearing.

The defence objected, arguing the officer was in no better position than the jury to make this comparison.

The trial judge reconsidered and reversed an earlier ruling, holding that the officer's opinion was not helpful to the trier of fact and was more prejudicial than probative.

The jury, equipped with the video as real evidence, could make the comparison themselves without the officer's narration or opinion.

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought leave to communicate with its witness, a cell phone security analyst, while she was still under cross-examination.

The defence had pointed out a geographical and temporal discrepancy in the cell phone records, and the Crown wished to direct the witness to investigate the discrepancy.

The court granted leave, noting that the witness was providing factual evidence about the operation of the network and that investigating the discrepancy would prevent further delay.

The applicants brought an application for certiorari seeking to quash their committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

They argued that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction by failing to consider the totality of the evidence, particularly frailties in the identification evidence.

The reviewing judge found that the preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the law, noting that there was sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict of guilty.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.