David Brown

Following a successful appeal that set aside the dismissal of their action under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, the appellants sought costs of the motion below.

The respondents argued that the presumption against costs in s. 137.1(8) should apply.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellants that the presumption should not apply because the underlying dispute was a private matter and not a SLAPP.

The court awarded the appellants costs of the motion below fixed at $30,000.

The appellant father appealed a final parenting order regarding his adult child with Down Syndrome.

The trial judge had ordered that the father have no unsupervised parenting time, and that supervised parenting time occur only at the respondent mother's discretion.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence confirming the child's views could not be easily ascertained, satisfying the presumption of capacity framework.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred by failing to include a review mechanism in the order, given that the adult child would never 'age out' of it.

The appeal was allowed in part and remitted to the trial judge to structure a built-in review mechanism to allow the father to seek unsupervised parenting time in the future.

The appellant appealed her conviction for dangerous driving.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge relied on inadmissible hearsay to find that the appellant was the driver of the tractor trailer involved in the collision.

As there was no other admissible evidence tying the appellant to the accident, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding the election of the respondents' board of directors and officers at an annual general meeting.

The appellant argued that as the incumbent Vice-Chair, he was automatically entitled to become Chair, and that the election of the respondent Chair was irregular due to nomination and membership admission procedures.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge's holistic interpretation of the poorly drafted bylaws and historical governance practices was reasonable and free from palpable and overriding error.

Family members brought a medical negligence action after a hospital patient died from viral myocarditis shortly after presenting to the emergency department.

A civil jury found two treating physicians liable and awarded $600,000 in damages.

On appeal, the physicians argued the trial judge made multiple procedural and instructional errors, including permitting further discovery at trial, limiting expert evidence, improperly charging the jury on standard of care and causation, misphrasing the causation question, misdirecting the jury on agreement requirements, and refusing to poll the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that most alleged errors were unfounded and that the causation wording error in the verdict questions caused no substantial wrong because the jury was repeatedly instructed on the correct “but for” test.

The appeal was dismissed.