Christopher M. Hubbard

The plaintiffs sued the defendant cardiac surgeon for failing to obtain informed consent after the plaintiff suffered permanent vision loss following life-saving heart valve surgery.

The defendant moved for summary judgment.

The court held that the presence of a jury notice does not alter the test for summary judgment.

Applying the modified objective test for causation, the court found that even if the remote risk of blindness was a material risk that should have been disclosed, no reasonable person in the plaintiff's position—facing an 80% chance of death within three years without the surgery—would have declined the procedure.

The plaintiff also admitted in cross-examination that he would have consented if presented with the relative risks.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

Family members brought a medical negligence action after a hospital patient died from viral myocarditis shortly after presenting to the emergency department.

A civil jury found two treating physicians liable and awarded $600,000 in damages.

On appeal, the physicians argued the trial judge made multiple procedural and instructional errors, including permitting further discovery at trial, limiting expert evidence, improperly charging the jury on standard of care and causation, misphrasing the causation question, misdirecting the jury on agreement requirements, and refusing to poll the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that most alleged errors were unfounded and that the causation wording error in the verdict questions caused no substantial wrong because the jury was repeatedly instructed on the correct “but for” test.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a motion where the plaintiff was successful, the court considered costs submissions.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs based on a settlement offer, which the court rejected.

Applying the factors in the Rules of Civil Procedure and Boucher, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $22,500, in accordance with the parties' prior agreement on the quantum for partial indemnity costs.

The defendants brought a motion seeking dismissal or a stay of an Ontario action arising from a landslide at a Costa Rican gold mine, arguing that Costa Rica or Colorado was the more appropriate forum under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The court applied the principles articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda and Breeden v. Black.

While the moving defendants established certain connections between the dispute and the proposed foreign forums, they provided little evidence regarding the characteristics of those forums or how litigation there would be fairer or more efficient.

The court held that merely identifying geographical connections and residence locations was insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating that an alternative forum was clearly more appropriate.

As the evidentiary record did not establish that either Colorado or Costa Rica was better positioned to resolve the dispute, the motion was dismissed.

Physicians applied under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act for an order declaring the respondents vexatious litigants following years of repetitive and abusive litigation arising from reports made to the Children’s Aid Society concerning a newborn’s health.

The respondents had commenced multiple lawsuits against doctors, a hospital, and others, repeatedly raising the same allegations despite several summary judgment dismissals and appellate rulings confirming the claims had no legal basis due to statutory reporting obligations and qualified privilege.

The court reviewed the history of motions, appeals, unpaid costs awards, and scandalous allegations against judges, counsel, and institutions.

Applying established criteria for vexatious litigation, the court found the respondents persistently instituted proceedings without reasonable grounds and abused court processes.

Orders were granted prohibiting them from commencing or continuing proceedings in any court without leave of the Superior Court, together with substantial indemnity costs.