Mira Novek

The defendant successfully moved to strike the plaintiff's jury notice and sought costs of $80,461.65 on a substantial indemnity basis or $61,175.38 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff argued for partial indemnity costs of $15,000.

The court rejected the defendant's request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiff did not act unreasonably in refusing to withdraw its jury notice despite the COVID-19 pandemic.

Applying the principles of reasonableness and the expectations of the parties, the court fixed the defendant's costs at $42,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendant, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's jury notice in an action arising from a tender process for the refurbishment of a nuclear reactor.

AECL argued the case was too complex for a jury, that a jury trial against a federal Crown agent is prohibited by the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act (CLPA), and that the plaintiff sought equitable relief.

The court granted the motion, finding that the factual and legal issues were too complex for a jury and that section 26 of the CLPA applies to AECL, prohibiting a jury trial.

The court rejected the argument that the plaintiff was seeking equitable relief.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against several physicians and a hospital following the plaintiff's development of compartment syndrome after hand surgery.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to substitute the name of one anesthesiologist for another, claiming misnomer.

The proposed defendant anesthesiologist brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the separate action against him as statute-barred.

The court dismissed the misnomer motion, finding the plaintiffs made a strategic decision rather than a true naming error.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the material facts to discover her claim against the anesthesiologist more than two years before commencing the action.

In a securities misrepresentation class action, the defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' reply expert report, delivered by Andrew M. Mintzer, in its entirety.

The report, initially intended to address causation, expanded to cover liability, contravening the agreed timetable and the rule against case-splitting.

The court granted the defendants' motion, striking the report but allowing the plaintiffs leave to file a new affidavit from Mr. Mintzer strictly confined to the issue of causation, as originally agreed.

The court emphasized the importance of adhering to timetables and the rule against case-splitting, particularly in leave motions under the Ontario Securities Act, which serve a gatekeeper function.

Family members brought a medical negligence action after a hospital patient died from viral myocarditis shortly after presenting to the emergency department.

A civil jury found two treating physicians liable and awarded $600,000 in damages.

On appeal, the physicians argued the trial judge made multiple procedural and instructional errors, including permitting further discovery at trial, limiting expert evidence, improperly charging the jury on standard of care and causation, misphrasing the causation question, misdirecting the jury on agreement requirements, and refusing to poll the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that most alleged errors were unfounded and that the causation wording error in the verdict questions caused no substantial wrong because the jury was repeatedly instructed on the correct “but for” test.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a jury verdict in a medical negligence action, the plaintiffs moved for judgment in accordance with the verdict, while the defendant physicians sought dismissal of the action or a retrial on the basis that there was no evidence supporting causation.

The court reviewed the narrow circumstances under which a trial judge may refuse to enter judgment consistent with a jury’s verdict under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 52.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants argued the plaintiffs failed to establish a key link in the causal chain regarding whether mechanical cardiac support could have been obtained within a limited treatment window.

The court found there was some evidence from expert testimony and surrounding facts permitting the jury to infer that appropriate mechanical assistance could have been obtained through inter‑hospital transfer.

Because the verdict was supported by some evidence and the jury’s answers could sustain judgment, the court entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.