Jennifer L. Hunter

This is an appeal from a medical malpractice judgment where the trial judge found the appellant physician negligent in treating a stroke victim, leading to permanent injuries.

The core issue on appeal was causation: whether the trial judge erred in finding that the physician's negligence caused the injuries, specifically by not requiring the plaintiff to establish precisely which treatment option would have prevented the unfavourable outcome.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's robust and pragmatic application of the "but for" causation test, particularly in the context of an evidentiary gap created by the defendant's negligence.

The appellant, G.H., appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that upheld a physician's finding of her incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication and a Community Treatment Plan (CTP), and confirmed the renewal of a Community Treatment Order (CTO).

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's determination that G.H. was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions due to her mental disorder, and that the CTO criteria were met.

The court also upheld the Board's dismissal of preliminary objections.

The appellant, diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a Superior Court decision affirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued by the respondent psychiatrist.

The appeal challenged the Consent and Capacity Board's finding of the appellant's incapacity to consent to treatment and the validity of the CTO.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's application of the two-part capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, as interpreted by Starson v. Swayze, and its assessment of the CTO's compliance with the Mental Health Act.

The court affirmed that the appellant failed to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of not receiving treatment, despite his history of non-compliance and subsequent deterioration.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that confirmed his incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication and a community treatment plan, and the validity of a community treatment order.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the legal standard for capacity and had ample evidence to determine the appellant's incapacity to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of treatment or lack thereof.

The court also found that the Board had a sufficient basis to confirm that all statutory criteria for issuing the community treatment order were met.

The plaintiffs brought an action for negligent investigation and defamation against various police defendants following a search warrant execution and a press conference.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court upheld the search warrant, finding ample evidence for its issuance, thereby dismissing the negligent investigation claim.

The court also dismissed the defamation claim, concluding that the statements made at the press conference were not defamatory in context, were substantially true (justification), and were protected by qualified privilege.

A claim for negligent misstatement was also dismissed as a "dressed up" defamation claim.

The plaintiffs brought an action under s. 258(1) of the Insurance Act to recover insurance monies to satisfy a judgment arising from a settlement in a personal injury action.

The issue was which insurer—Gore Mutual (insurer of the vehicle owner) or Allstate (insurer of the injured passenger)—should satisfy the judgment.

The motion judge found Gore liable, concluding that the vehicle owner had not breached the insurance policy's cooperation clause and, alternatively, that relief from forfeiture was available.

Gore appealed, arguing the vehicle owner breached the policy by failing to cooperate and failing to provide updated contact information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the vehicle owner's conduct did not constitute substantial non-cooperation as required to breach the cooperation condition.

This costs endorsement followed two motions heard on August 29, 2016.

The defendant solicitors were successful in their motion for disclosure of a litigation file and in opposing the plaintiffs' cross-motion to strike a limitation period defence.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendant solicitors for both motions, totaling $12,607 for their motion and $2,700.12 plus HST for the plaintiffs' cross-motion.

The decision included deductions and offsets for costs related to the cross-examination of an affiant, as per Rule 39.02(4).

The plaintiffs brought an action for solicitor negligence against their former lawyers.

Two motions were heard: the defendants' motion for a further and better affidavit of documents, and the plaintiffs' cross-motion to strike paragraphs from the statement of defence pleading a limitation period defence.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion to strike, finding the limitation defence was not plain and obvious to fail.

The court granted the defendants' motion for disclosure, ordering the plaintiffs to produce the complete litigation file from their subsequent lawyers, subject to privilege claims for non-parties.

The defendant radiologist moved for summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice claim against him, arguing the plaintiffs failed to tender expert opinion evidence on causation.

The plaintiffs cross-moved for leave to admit late-served expert reports from a gastroenterologist and a radiologist.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to admit the late reports, finding that their exclusion could cause a miscarriage of justice and the defendants would not suffer undue prejudice given the trial's adjournment.

Relying on the newly admitted expert evidence regarding standard of care and breach, the court dismissed the defendant's summary judgment motion, concluding that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed and that an inference of causation might be drawn at trial.

The issue of costs thrown away due to the trial's adjournment was reserved to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The Board had rescinded a certificate of involuntary admission but upheld the physician’s finding that the appellant lacked capacity to consent to treatment due to inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing antipsychotic medication.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review and the test for capacity under s. 4 of the Act, the court found the Board reasonably concluded the appellant’s delusional beliefs and disorganized thinking prevented her from performing a risk–benefit analysis regarding treatment.

The court rejected arguments that the Board equated mental illness with incapacity or failed to ensure the appellant had been informed about treatment options.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant physician appealed an order of a master compelling him to attend an examination under Rule 39.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure in advance of a motion to strike the statement of claim in a medical negligence action.

The defendant argued that the motion to strike raised only legal issues concerning pleading sufficiency and therefore evidence was irrelevant.

The court held that once the defendant asserted in his factum that he was unable to respond to the allegations, his ability to respond became a relevant issue on the Rule 25.11 motion.

The plaintiffs therefore had a prima facie right to examine him on that issue under Rule 39.03(1).

The court found no error in the master’s reasoning and upheld both the examination order and the costs award.