Ashley Dawn Boyes

The appellant, diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a Superior Court decision affirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued by the respondent psychiatrist.

The appeal challenged the Consent and Capacity Board's finding of the appellant's incapacity to consent to treatment and the validity of the CTO.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's application of the two-part capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, as interpreted by Starson v. Swayze, and its assessment of the CTO's compliance with the Mental Health Act.

The court affirmed that the appellant failed to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of not receiving treatment, despite his history of non-compliance and subsequent deterioration.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that confirmed his incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication and a community treatment plan, and the validity of a community treatment order.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the legal standard for capacity and had ample evidence to determine the appellant's incapacity to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of treatment or lack thereof.

The court also found that the Board had a sufficient basis to confirm that all statutory criteria for issuing the community treatment order were met.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment in her wrongful dismissal claim, seeking 18 months' pay in lieu of notice and punitive damages.

The court found the plaintiff was terminated without cause after six months of employment and was entitled to reasonable pay in lieu of notice.

The court dismissed all other claims, including fraudulent misrepresentation, harassment, and punitive damages, finding no cogent evidence.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court awarded the plaintiff 5 weeks' pay in lieu of notice, totaling $4,846.92 after accounting for amounts already paid.

No costs were awarded due to mixed results.

The applicant, a condominium corporation, sought to compel the Director of Titles to register an agreement with a commercial owner involving common elements, land transfers, and altered easements.

The Director of Titles opposed, arguing the condominium board failed to follow the required 80% unit holder vote under section 124 of the Condominium Act, 1998, instead relying on section 107.

The court, exercising its broad discretion under section 134 of the Act, found section 124 was the preferable procedure but regularized the process by deeming prior consents as votes in favour, with conditions for notice to unit holders.

No costs were awarded.