Tudor Bogdan Carsten

The applicant sought recognition and enforcement in Ontario of a CIETAC arbitral award issued in China.

The respondent resisted enforcement on the grounds of incapacity and public policy, alleging that he signed the underlying repayment agreement under threat, coercion, and mental distress.

The court held that those allegations had already been raised before and rejected by the arbitral tribunal, and that the respondent's position amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on the award.

Applying the limited refusal grounds under the New York Convention and Model Law, the court found no viable basis to deny enforcement and granted judgment in accordance with the award.

The plaintiff's motion for an interlocutory injunction was previously dismissed.

The successful defendants sought partial indemnity costs of $47,884.76.

The plaintiff argued that no costs should be awarded, or alternatively, that costs should be reserved to the trial judge or fixed at $20,000.

The court found no extraordinary circumstances to reserve costs to the trial judge and held that the defendants were entitled to their costs payable forthwith.

After reducing the amount claimed for cross-examinations due to potential duplication of work among three lawyers, the court fixed the defendants' partial indemnity costs at $40,000 inclusive.

This costs endorsement followed the Court of Appeal's reasons dated November 1, 2024, where parties were invited to make submissions regarding costs if they could not agree.

After reviewing the submissions, the Court ordered the respondent, Matthew Preston, to pay the appellant, Cervus Equipment Corporation, all-inclusive costs of $30,000 for the motion.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a release and minutes of settlement executed by an employee after termination.

The core issue was whether the settlement documents released the employee's claim for damages related to vested stock units.

The motion judge found the vested stock units were not released, concluding the settlement made little economic sense otherwise.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in law by allowing the factual matrix to overwhelm the clear and broad language of the settlement documents, misapplying the guidance on narrow construction of releases, and improperly evaluating the economic benefits of the settlement.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the judgment for the employee and granting judgment in favour of the employer, finding the vested stock units claim was released.

The appellant, Knights of Columbus, appealed an order dismissing their motion for a stay of proceedings in favour of arbitration.

The motion judge had concluded that the respondent was an employee and that the arbitration clauses in subsequent contracts were invalid for want of fresh consideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming its jurisdiction to hear the appeal despite s. 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, because the motion judge found no valid arbitration agreement existed.

The Court upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no fresh consideration for the contracts containing the arbitration clauses, making them invalid.

It also clarified that the motion judge's preliminary finding on the respondent's employment status was not a final determination for the underlying action.

The appellant, Knights of Columbus, brought a motion to file a five-page reply factum in an appeal concerning the dismissal of their motion to stay an action in favour of arbitration.

The respondent, Neil Goberdhan, did not oppose the motion but sought conditions, including permission to file a sur-reply factum.

The motion judge dismissed the request for a reply factum, emphasizing that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not generally provide for such filings in civil appeals, except for leave to appeal motions, and that oral argument is the appropriate stage to clarify issues.

The court found the case was not exceptional enough to justify a reply factum and dismissed the motion without costs.

The plaintiff, Aware Ads Inc., sought an interlocutory injunction against its former employee, Greg Walker, to prevent him from working for a competitor, despite his non-competition and non-solicitation clauses having expired.

The plaintiff alleged breach of confidence, breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy.

The court ruled that the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case on any of its causes of action, failed to prove irreparable harm, and found the balance of convenience favoured the defendant.

The court also ruled that a transcript and audio recording of a conversation were inadmissible due to lack of proper authentication.

The motion for an injunction was dismissed.

FSD Pharma Inc. applied to validate the cancellation of Class B shares issued to its former CEO, Raza Bokhari, arguing they were issued for future consideration contrary to s. 23 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

Bokhari contended the shares were valid or that the issue should be pursued under s. 130 OBCA, and that FSD was estopped from raising the issue.

The court found that shares issued for future consideration are not a nullity but their status depends on circumstances.

Applying a flexible approach, the court allowed Bokhari to retain shares proportionate to his actual employment days in 2021 (208/365ths) and permitted FSD to cancel the remainder.

The court also rejected the cause of action estoppel argument, noting the prior hearing was limited in scope.

Costs were not awarded to either party due to divided success and tactical efforts by the respondent.

The plaintiff, an internet marketing company, brought an urgent motion for an interim injunction, a Mareva injunction, and a Certificate of Pending Litigation against two former employees and a related corporation.

The plaintiff alleged the former employees breached non-competition and non-solicitation clauses by operating a competing business and misappropriating confidential information.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case or irreparable harm, as the evidence connecting the defendants to the competing business was largely circumstantial and speculative.

The requests for asset-freezing relief and a Certificate of Pending Litigation were also dismissed due to insufficient evidence of asset dissipation or illicit funding.

The defendants brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The plaintiff, Sikhs for Justice, sued the defendants over an article alleging the plaintiff's referendum campaign for an independent Sikh state was driven and controlled by Pakistan.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim had substantial merit and that there were grounds to believe the defendants' defences of responsible communication and fair comment might not succeed.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order that awarded her five weeks' pay in lieu of notice for wrongful dismissal and dismissed her other claims of improper conduct by the employer.

On appeal, she argued the notice period was insufficient, the motion judge ignored her amended employment agreement, and there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error of fact or error of law in the motion judge's application of the Bardal factors or dismissal of the other claims.

A motion to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed as the evidence could have been obtained prior to the summary judgment motion.

The defendant brought a motion to stay the Ontario action on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The plaintiff had sued the defendant in Ontario on a personal guarantee related to a promissory note, despite the guarantee containing a New York choice of law and non-exclusive forum selection clause.

The court applied the Van Breda factors and concluded that New York was clearly the more appropriate forum, noting the risk of inconsistent results and the efficiency of applying New York law in a New York court.

The motion was granted and the action was stayed.

The appellant, a former inbound technical call centre agent employed for approximately six months, appealed a summary judgment decision that awarded her $4,846.92 in pay in lieu of notice and dismissed her remaining claims for damages totalling millions of dollars.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the order was a final order for a single payment not exceeding $50,000 exclusive of costs, which falls within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court rather than the Court of Appeal.

The defendant, Corus Entertainment Inc., brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff, a former employee, claimed Corus breached a retirement agreement by reducing monthly Supplementary Executive Retirement Plan (SERP) payments.

The court found that the jurisprudence regarding limitation periods for periodic payments was unsettled and fact-dependent, making it not "plain and obvious" that the plaintiff's claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

The motion to strike was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment in her wrongful dismissal claim, seeking 18 months' pay in lieu of notice and punitive damages.

The court found the plaintiff was terminated without cause after six months of employment and was entitled to reasonable pay in lieu of notice.

The court dismissed all other claims, including fraudulent misrepresentation, harassment, and punitive damages, finding no cogent evidence.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court awarded the plaintiff 5 weeks' pay in lieu of notice, totaling $4,846.92 after accounting for amounts already paid.

No costs were awarded due to mixed results.

The defendant moved to set aside two ex parte orders that had extended the time for the plaintiff to serve its statement of claim, alleging the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure.

The plaintiff cross-moved to further extend and validate service.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to disclose material facts, including the defendant's representation by counsel and the acrimonious relationship between the parties, which might have impacted the original ex parte orders.

Consequently, the ex parte orders were set aside.

However, the court exercised its discretion to grant the plaintiff an extension of time *nunc pro tunc* and validated service, finding that the just resolution of the dispute required adjudication on the merits and that the defendant did not suffer material prejudice from the delay.

The plaintiffs successfully defeated the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act and sought partial indemnity costs of $43,641.16.

The court considered the presumption in s. 137.1(8) that a successful responding party is not entitled to costs unless appropriate in the circumstances.

The court found that the plaintiffs' defamation claim was weak and appeared to be used strategically to extract a gag order from the defendant.

Given the strategic behaviour of both parties, the court declined to award costs to the plaintiffs.

The University of Toronto Graduate Students’ Union (UTGSU) challenged a referendum on its continued membership in the Canadian Federation of Students (CFS) and CFS-Ontario (CFS-O), arguing that the Chief Returning Officer (CRO) made unreasonable decisions regarding polling stations and mail-out ballots, which led to a failure to meet quorum.

The CFS sought a declaration that UTGSU remained a member.

The court found that the relationship between the organizations and their members was contractual, governed by bylaws.

The court declined to imply a term into the bylaws to alter quorum calculation for disenfranchised voters.

It also found that the CRO's decisions were within his discretion and not made in bad faith, applying a subjective standard to his judgment.

Consequently, the court granted the CFS's application, declaring UTGSU's continued membership, and dismissed UTGSU's counter-application.

The moving party and respondent entered into a joint venture to develop condominiums.

After the moving party's family assets were frozen, he transferred his shares in the project companies to the respondent to allow the respondent to secure financing, executing a document styled as a 'trust agreement'.

The moving party later brought a motion seeking the return of the shares, arguing the agreement created a bare trust that could be collapsed under the rule in Saunders v. Vautier.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the document was a contractual agreement rather than a trust, and that the rule in Saunders v. Vautier would not apply regardless because the moving party did not have absolute beneficial ownership of the shares.

In a group of related civil proceedings involving multiple plaintiffs and the same defendants, the court considered a request concerning the deadline for filing third party claims.

Following a prior order, the parties jointly sought an extension of time to file all third party claims.

The court granted the request on consent and extended the deadline to September 25, 2015.

The endorsement reflects a procedural timetable adjustment rather than a substantive determination of the underlying claims.