Joel P. McCoy

The appellant, Knights of Columbus, appealed an order dismissing their motion for a stay of proceedings in favour of arbitration.

The motion judge had concluded that the respondent was an employee and that the arbitration clauses in subsequent contracts were invalid for want of fresh consideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming its jurisdiction to hear the appeal despite s. 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, because the motion judge found no valid arbitration agreement existed.

The Court upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no fresh consideration for the contracts containing the arbitration clauses, making them invalid.

It also clarified that the motion judge's preliminary finding on the respondent's employment status was not a final determination for the underlying action.

The appellant, Knights of Columbus, brought a motion to file a five-page reply factum in an appeal concerning the dismissal of their motion to stay an action in favour of arbitration.

The respondent, Neil Goberdhan, did not oppose the motion but sought conditions, including permission to file a sur-reply factum.

The motion judge dismissed the request for a reply factum, emphasizing that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not generally provide for such filings in civil appeals, except for leave to appeal motions, and that oral argument is the appropriate stage to clarify issues.

The court found the case was not exceptional enough to justify a reply factum and dismissed the motion without costs.

During a civil jury trial for a slip and fall claim, the plaintiff moved to discharge the jury following the defendants' closing address.

The plaintiff argued that defence counsel's closing submissions contained numerous transgressions, including misstating evidence, expressing personal opinions, referring to unproven hearsay, and breaching the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The trial judge agreed, finding that the cumulative effect of the improper statements and trial conduct created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice that could not be cured by correcting instructions.

The motion was granted, the jury was discharged, and the trial was concluded by judge alone.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for damages after slipping and falling on a clear, greasy cleaning substance outside an elevator on the defendants' premises.

The court found the defendants 100% liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act, as their cleaner had improperly sprayed the substance onto the elevator doors, causing it to pool on the shiny granite floor without warning signs.

The court rejected arguments of contributory negligence.

The plaintiff suffered a mild traumatic brain injury (concussion) and chronic soft tissue injuries, leading to chronic migraines and neck pain that significantly impacted her career trajectory in the financial sector.

The court awarded $115,000 in general damages, $173,400 for past income loss, $501,500 for future loss of earning capacity (after a 15% contingency deduction), $10,000 for special damages, and $15,000 for past loss of housekeeping capacity.

In a slip and fall case, the plaintiff tenant brought a motion to strike a landlord's defence relying on an exculpatory waiver provision in the residential tenancy agreement.

The landlord defendants brought a cross-motion to strike the plaintiff's reply pleading.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, affirming that landlords cannot contract out of their statutory duties to maintain safe premises under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 and the Occupiers' Liability Act.

As a result, the plaintiff's reply became moot, and the defendants' cross-motion to strike the reply was also granted.

The City of Toronto appealed a motion judge's decision that dismissed the City's summary judgment motion and granted reverse summary judgment to the plaintiffs, Robyn Graham and David Mitchell.

The original action stemmed from Ms. Graham tripping on a pothole, and the City argued the claim was barred due to late notice under the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The motion judge found a reasonable excuse for the late notice and no prejudice to the City.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the City's appeal, affirming that the motion judge's grant of reverse summary judgment was procedurally fair and that her findings on reasonable excuse and lack of prejudice were supported by the evidence and applicable law.

The appellant, injured while moving out of the respondent's home, sued for damages under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding no duty of care between co-occupiers and no breach of duty.

The Court of Appeal held that one occupier can indeed owe a duty of care to another under the Act, correcting the motion judge's legal error.

However, the appeal was dismissed on the alternative ground that the appellant failed to prove a breach of duty, as the alleged hazard was not sufficiently proven and the appellant was aware of the unevenness.

Costs of the original motion were reduced.

The plaintiff was injured after slipping on ice on a municipal sidewalk after exiting a bus.

She sued the City of Toronto and the TTC, and later added the City's winter maintenance contractor, Pave-Tar.

Pave-Tar and the TTC brought motions for partial summary judgment to dismiss the claims against them.

Pave-Tar argued the claim against it was statute-barred, while the TTC argued it owed no duty of care.

The court dismissed both motions, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the limitation period and concluding that partial summary judgment was inappropriate due to the intertwined facts and risk of inconsistent findings at trial.

The plaintiffs sought to vary the terms of a formal order resulting from a previous endorsement, specifically regarding the restriction of an amended statement of claim to 'the Estate’s claim of negligent legal advice from the Defendant.' The court clarified that such a request constituted a motion to vary the endorsement, not merely an appointment to settle the order under Rule 59.04(12).

The court held the Registrar-signed order in abeyance and granted the plaintiffs 30 days to serve a formal Notice of Motion to vary the endorsement.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action for abuse of process, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims for negligent legal advice were estopped by a prior judgment enforcing a settlement.

The court found that the claims brought by the family members of the deceased were indeed estopped, as the prior judgment had conclusively determined the reasonableness and providence of the settlement for them, including infant plaintiffs under Rule 7.08.

However, the Estate's claim for negligent legal advice regarding its own compensation (or lack thereof) was not estopped, as this specific issue was not integral to the prior judgment and had been explicitly left open by the previous judge.

The Statement of Claim was struck with leave to amend to proceed solely with the Estate's claim.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim arising from a trip and fall on her premises.

The central issue was whether the plaintiff, who had cohabited with the defendant and contributed to household expenses and maintenance, was an 'occupier' or a 'visitor' under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court found that the plaintiff was a co-occupier, exercising sufficient control over the premises, and therefore could not maintain a claim against the defendant under the Act.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the plaintiff's claim, and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's order dismissing his action for delay, nearly four years after the dismissal.

The court applied the established principles for setting aside such orders, requiring a reasonable explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness in bringing the motion, and rebuttal of prejudice.

The court found no reasonable explanation for the delay, no evidence of inadvertence by the former lawyer, and significant prejudice to the defendants due to the passage of nearly a decade since the incident, impacting witness recollection and the ability to defend.

While the motion was brought promptly after the plaintiff's new counsel discovered the dismissal, the overall delay and resulting prejudice outweighed the plaintiff's plea for indulgence, upholding the principle of finality.

The motion was dismissed.

The estate of a deceased tenant brought an action in Superior Court for $500,000 in damages for injuries suffered when the deceased allegedly slipped and fell over a damaged carpet in a residential rental unit.

The motion judge dismissed the action, concluding the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Landlord and Tenant Board and was outside the one-year limitation period prescribed under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act does not grant the board exclusive jurisdiction over all claims of non-repair.

Where damages exceed the board's monetary jurisdiction, a party may commence proceedings in Superior Court.

Additionally, the one-year limitation period for board applications does not apply to Superior Court actions for non-repair; instead, the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applies.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $42,500 after successfully having the plaintiff's action dismissed on a jurisdictional issue.

The court noted that neither party raised the jurisdictional issue until the pretrial stage, resulting in approximately five years of unnecessary litigation.

Consequently, the court declined to award costs for the entire litigation period and fixed the defendant's costs at $7,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff estate sued the defendant landlord for personal injuries sustained when the deceased tripped over torn carpet in his rental unit.

The defendant moved to strike the claim, arguing the Landlord and Tenant Board had exclusive jurisdiction over claims of disrepair and the one-year limitation period under the Residential Tenancies Act had expired.

The court agreed, finding that the essential character of the dispute was a repair claim within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction, rendering the Occupiers' Liability Act inapplicable.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff alleged she suffered injuries while using a shoulder press machine at a gym and sued the operator for negligence, claiming the machine was defective and not properly maintained.

A jury found that the plaintiff had signed a membership agreement containing waiver provisions and that the defendant took reasonable steps to bring those provisions to her attention.

The trial judge determined the enforceability and scope of the waiver.

The court held that the membership agreement remained in effect through automatic renewal and that the waiver clearly and unambiguously released the defendant from liability for negligence, including claims arising from use of gym equipment.

The waiver was also sufficient to exclude liability under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

The claim was barred by the waiver.

Following the dismissal of a slip and fall negligence action on summary judgment, the defendant sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $21,331.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be ordered due to the seriousness of the injuries and the plaintiff’s limited financial means, asserting that bringing a reasonable claim should not attract a costs penalty.

The court held that partial indemnity costs are not punitive and serve broader objectives in civil justice, including indemnifying successful litigants and encouraging settlement.

While acknowledging potential hardship, the court found the defendant was entitled to costs as the successful party.

After modest reductions and consideration of fairness, the court fixed costs at $17,500 inclusive.

The defendant transit authority brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a slip‑and‑fall action arising from a fall on stairs at a subway station.

The plaintiff alleged she slipped on debris on the steps and that the occupier failed to keep the premises reasonably safe under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

The court held that the plaintiff produced no direct evidence that debris or another hazard existed at the time of the fall, relying instead on speculation and past observations of debris elsewhere in the station.

Evidence showed the stairs were non‑slip tiles in good repair and that the defendant maintained a reasonable inspection and cleaning system.

Applying the summary judgment principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and concluded the plaintiff could not establish a breach of the statutory duty of care.