Kieran C. Dickson

The plaintiff moved for leave to strike the jury notice, to amend her claim to bring it within the simplified procedure, and to have the action tried pursuant to the simplified procedure.

The defendant opposed the relief.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that the grounds for the request pre-existed the filing of the trial record, meaning there was no substantial or unexpected change in circumstances to warrant granting leave.

Furthermore, the court held that striking the jury notice would deprive the defendant of a substantive statutory right without providing a significant benefit to the plaintiff, as trial delays would likely occur regardless of the trial format.

This mid-trial ruling addressed whether the plaintiffs could pursue claims for housekeeping and attendant care losses.

The defendant argued these claims were eliminated during discovery and would cause prejudice.

The court found that the discovery answer regarding "economic component" lacked precision, and the defendant had sufficient notice through pre-trial memoranda and the occupational therapist's report.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to lead evidence on these past care claims, finding no prejudice to the defendant.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motorcycle accident while travelling through a road construction zone.

A flagger employed by the defendant paving contractor directed the plaintiff to cross an elevated lip of freshly laid asphalt.

The asphalt was unstable and had not sufficiently cooled, causing the motorcycle's rear tire to lose traction and the plaintiff to be thrown from the vehicle.

The court found the County liable under the Municipal Act, 2001 for failing to keep the road in a reasonable state of repair, and the contractor liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act for failing to ensure the premises were reasonably safe.

No contributory negligence was found against the plaintiff.

The defendants were held jointly and severally liable for the agreed damages of $325,000.

The estate of a deceased tenant brought an action in Superior Court for $500,000 in damages for injuries suffered when the deceased allegedly slipped and fell over a damaged carpet in a residential rental unit.

The motion judge dismissed the action, concluding the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Landlord and Tenant Board and was outside the one-year limitation period prescribed under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act does not grant the board exclusive jurisdiction over all claims of non-repair.

Where damages exceed the board's monetary jurisdiction, a party may commence proceedings in Superior Court.

Additionally, the one-year limitation period for board applications does not apply to Superior Court actions for non-repair; instead, the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applies.

The plaintiff, Sandra Tondat, brought a claim for damages against Hudson's Bay Company and Quinterra Property Management Inc. following a slip and fall accident in the Bay store's vestibule.

The incident occurred on December 2, 2012, during light rain, when Ms. Tondat slipped on a wet tiled floor after stepping off a mat, resulting in a broken kneecap.

The parties agreed on the quantum of damages if liability was established.

The court found both Hudson's Bay and Quinterra to be occupiers under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

Despite expert evidence suggesting the floor was not unreasonably dangerous when wet, the court found that Quinterra failed to implement or adjust its cleaning system to adverse weather conditions, thereby breaching its duty of care.

Judgment was rendered in favour of the plaintiff against Quinterra for $100,000 in damages.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $42,500 after successfully having the plaintiff's action dismissed on a jurisdictional issue.

The court noted that neither party raised the jurisdictional issue until the pretrial stage, resulting in approximately five years of unnecessary litigation.

Consequently, the court declined to award costs for the entire litigation period and fixed the defendant's costs at $7,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff estate sued the defendant landlord for personal injuries sustained when the deceased tripped over torn carpet in his rental unit.

The defendant moved to strike the claim, arguing the Landlord and Tenant Board had exclusive jurisdiction over claims of disrepair and the one-year limitation period under the Residential Tenancies Act had expired.

The court agreed, finding that the essential character of the dispute was a repair claim within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction, rendering the Occupiers' Liability Act inapplicable.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, Christopher McCullough and Nicholas Nossey, along with their Family Law Act claimants, sued the Hamilton Police Services Board and individual officers for damages arising from malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, negligent investigation, and breach of Charter rights.

McCullough and Nossey were jointly charged with murder in 1990; Nossey was acquitted, and McCullough's conviction was set aside on appeal, with the Crown declining a new trial.

The court found that the police had objectively reasonable grounds for the arrests of both McCullough and Nossey, dismissing all claims for malicious prosecution, negligence, and false imprisonment.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar’s dismissal of a personal injury action for abandonment under former Rule 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The claim arose from a bicycle collision with a vehicle door, but the issued statement of claim was never served and the action was administratively dismissed.

Applying the Reid factors and a contextual approach, the court held the delay largely resulted from counsel’s inadvertence and internal file management failures, and that the defendant’s insurer had early notice and preserved evidence.

The court found the plaintiff moved promptly after discovering the dismissal and that the defendant had not demonstrated sufficient prejudice to preclude restoration.

The action was reinstated on terms, including permission to use the defendant’s written statement as evidence if he could not be located and conditions regarding service and costs.

Following a jury trial in a motor vehicle personal injury action where liability was admitted and damages were awarded, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiffs sought over $365,000 in fees and disbursements, including substantial indemnity costs after an offer to settle.

The defendant conceded entitlement to costs but argued the claimed fees and some disbursements were excessive.

Applying the principles under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the absence of a detailed Bill of Costs and the involvement of multiple law firms made it difficult to assess duplication and reasonableness of services.

The court reduced the requested amounts and fixed total costs, including fees, threshold motion costs, and allowable disbursements, at $157,292.57 inclusive of HST.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's Dismissal Order that was issued over four years prior, due to his former counsel's chronic delay and failure to comply with court orders.

The court applied the Reid factors and found that while there was no prejudice to the defendant, the delay was inexcusable, not prompt, and counsel's conduct amounted to deliberate dereliction rather than mere inadvertence.

The motion was dismissed and the dismissal order was upheld, with costs awarded to the defendant.

Following the dismissal of a summary judgment motion, the successful party sought partial indemnity costs.

The court considered the amended Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the developing jurisprudence governing costs consequences of unsuccessful summary judgment motions.

The court found that both bringing and resisting the motion had been reasonable and that the matter was a close contest.

Applying the approach in prior authority, the court ordered that costs be payable in the cause rather than immediately.

The amount of costs was fixed at $6,895.94.

An automobile insurer brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a negligence action against the vehicle owner, arguing the vehicle was in the possession of another person without the owner’s consent under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Minister of Finance, defending in the name of the driver under the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, argued that the owner’s evidence regarding consent was inconsistent and raised factual issues.

The court held that the evidence created a genuine issue requiring a trial, particularly regarding whether consent or implied consent existed.

The court also found that the procedural circumstances disadvantaged the Minister in defending the action.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.