Neil R. Jones

The plaintiffs, Christopher McCullough and Nicholas Nossey, along with their Family Law Act claimants, sued the Hamilton Police Services Board and individual officers for damages arising from malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, negligent investigation, and breach of Charter rights.

McCullough and Nossey were jointly charged with murder in 1990; Nossey was acquitted, and McCullough's conviction was set aside on appeal, with the Crown declining a new trial.

The court found that the police had objectively reasonable grounds for the arrests of both McCullough and Nossey, dismissing all claims for malicious prosecution, negligence, and false imprisonment.

The plaintiff sued the police and the Crown for injuries sustained when he was bitten by a police dog during his arrest.

The plaintiff had fled from a vehicle and hidden in tall grass, prompting the police to deploy a canine unit.

The dog located the plaintiff and bit him, following its 'bite and hold' training.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the police had reasonable grounds to use the dog and that the 'bite and hold' policy was not unreasonable.

The court assessed the plaintiff's general damages at $40,000 in the alternative.

The appellant, a 16-year-old, was rendered paraplegic after falling from a tree in a municipal park.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the municipality's monitoring of the park was reasonable and the danger of falling from a tree was obvious.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming there is no duty to warn of such an obvious and self-evident danger.

The Court also dismissed the appeal regarding costs awarded against the Family Law Act claimants, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's discretion.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for sexual assaults against three young girls.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred by drawing an adverse inference against the credibility of one appellant's testimony because the defence failed to cross-examine a complainant on alleged written consent documents, invoking the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal found no error, holding that the adverse inference was a proper part of the trial judge's fact-finding and weighing of evidence, not a penalty for a tactical error.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge misapprehended evidence or failed to give separate consideration to the co-appellant's case.

The appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence for assault, raising issues regarding pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code and the trial judge's consideration of the victim's severe injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the pre-sentence custody issue was not clearly raised below and the appellant was being released on parole that day.

The court also held that the sentence was entirely fit given the seriousness of the assault and the severity of the injuries.

The City of Hamilton appealed a trial judgment finding it liable in negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct standard of care and that her findings were supported by the evidence.

The Court also found that the trial judge correctly applied the 'but for' test for causation, noting that causation is a practical question of fact best answered by ordinary common sense.

The appellant, a sex trade worker, was convicted of second-degree murder after a client was found stabbed to death in his car.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding bad character evidence, improperly allowing cross-examination on her prior assault convictions under a Corbett application, and delivering an unbalanced jury charge that failed to adequately summarize the defence's evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with all three grounds, finding that the cumulative effect of the errors prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The insurer brought a motion for the production of Children's Aid Society (CAS) files relating to the minor applicant and her two sisters.

The applicant sought attendant care benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The arbitrator found the CAS files were arguably relevant to determining whether the applicant's attendant care needs arose from the accident or pre-existed it, and to understanding the overlapping care requirements of the siblings who lived together.

The motion was granted, subject to an order restricting the use and dissemination of the files to protect the minors' privacy.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first-time offender, appealed his 11-year sentence for two robberies involving a loaded firearm and extreme gratuitous violence.

The Court of Appeal noted his youth, lack of prior record, and positive rehabilitation efforts while in custody.

Finding the original sentence excessive compared to similar cases, the court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence to eight years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and production of a controlled substance.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of drugs found during a warrantless search of his residence by police assisting a Children's Aid Society worker.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Collins framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter and concluding the police acted in good faith.

The appellant was convicted of participating in a sophisticated marijuana growing operation and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment.

She appealed both the conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, the verdict was unreasonable, and the trial judge erred in principle by presuming a conditional sentence was unavailable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably inferred her involvement from circumstantial evidence, including her access to the house and items found in her car.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered a conditional sentence but concluded denunciation and deterrence mandated a custodial sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the appellant's prior cocaine use and the second step of the Carter analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the instruction that prior drug use could be considered for credibility, as the appellant introduced the evidence in chief and the judge cautioned against propensity reasoning.

The court also found the Carter analysis instruction, while not a model charge, was sufficient when viewed as a whole.

The youthful offender appealed her sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by focusing almost exclusively on general deterrence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding an error in principle as the judge failed to consider individual deterrence and rehabilitation, and the principle that a first sentence of imprisonment should be as short as possible.

Given the offender's youth, guilty plea, and fresh evidence of rehabilitation, the court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence to time served plus probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a drug offence, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to rely on surveillance evidence of probable drug transactions and the appellant's presence near a barbecue to infer he was aware of and in control of the cocaine hidden inside it.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to address the totality principle given the remnant of a prior sentence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle, that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, and that the fresh evidence did not warrant interference.

The appellant was sentenced on a joint submission to two years in a penitentiary followed by three years' probation.

He appealed to vary the custodial part of his sentence to two years less a day to preserve his right to appeal a deportation order under the Immigration and Refugee Act, a consequence he was unaware of at sentencing.

The Crown did not oppose the variation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that immigration consequences are a relevant consideration and the variation would not disserve the fitness of the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of arson and mischief causing danger to life.

The trial judge delivered brief reasons for judgment, stating that he found the Crown witnesses truthful and rejected the appellant's evidence, but provided no insight into why he reached these conclusions beyond a blanket adverse credibility finding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge's reasons were conclusory and generic, failing to facilitate meaningful appellate review and constituting an error of law.

The Crown sought leave to appeal sentence following convictions for incest and indecent assault arising from historical sexual offences against the respondent's daughter and her friend.

The sentencing judge imposed a suspended sentence and probation after considering the respondent's advanced age, frailty, and medical condition.

The majority held that, although the normal sentencing range for incest involving sexual intercourse with a young child was three to five years' imprisonment, the case was unique and any additional custodial sentence might lead to the respondent's death.

A dissenting judge would have found the sentence manifestly unfit and imposed custody.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that the appeal did not raise a question of law alone.

As a result, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and it was quashed.