Neil R. Jones

The appellant, a 16-year-old, was rendered paraplegic after falling from a tree in a municipal park.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the municipality's monitoring of the park was reasonable and the danger of falling from a tree was obvious.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming there is no duty to warn of such an obvious and self-evident danger.

The Court also dismissed the appeal regarding costs awarded against the Family Law Act claimants, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's discretion.

The appellant appealed his sentence for assault, raising issues regarding pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code and the trial judge's consideration of the victim's severe injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the pre-sentence custody issue was not clearly raised below and the appellant was being released on parole that day.

The court also held that the sentence was entirely fit given the seriousness of the assault and the severity of the injuries.

The appellant, a sex trade worker, was convicted of second-degree murder after a client was found stabbed to death in his car.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding bad character evidence, improperly allowing cross-examination on her prior assault convictions under a Corbett application, and delivering an unbalanced jury charge that failed to adequately summarize the defence's evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with all three grounds, finding that the cumulative effect of the errors prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first-time offender, appealed his 11-year sentence for two robberies involving a loaded firearm and extreme gratuitous violence.

The Court of Appeal noted his youth, lack of prior record, and positive rehabilitation efforts while in custody.

Finding the original sentence excessive compared to similar cases, the court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence to eight years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and production of a controlled substance.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of drugs found during a warrantless search of his residence by police assisting a Children's Aid Society worker.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Collins framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter and concluding the police acted in good faith.

The appellant was convicted of participating in a sophisticated marijuana growing operation and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment.

She appealed both the conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, the verdict was unreasonable, and the trial judge erred in principle by presuming a conditional sentence was unavailable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably inferred her involvement from circumstantial evidence, including her access to the house and items found in her car.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered a conditional sentence but concluded denunciation and deterrence mandated a custodial sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the appellant's prior cocaine use and the second step of the Carter analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the instruction that prior drug use could be considered for credibility, as the appellant introduced the evidence in chief and the judge cautioned against propensity reasoning.

The court also found the Carter analysis instruction, while not a model charge, was sufficient when viewed as a whole.

The youthful offender appealed her sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by focusing almost exclusively on general deterrence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding an error in principle as the judge failed to consider individual deterrence and rehabilitation, and the principle that a first sentence of imprisonment should be as short as possible.

Given the offender's youth, guilty plea, and fresh evidence of rehabilitation, the court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence to time served plus probation.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to address the totality principle given the remnant of a prior sentence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle, that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, and that the fresh evidence did not warrant interference.

The appellant was sentenced on a joint submission to two years in a penitentiary followed by three years' probation.

He appealed to vary the custodial part of his sentence to two years less a day to preserve his right to appeal a deportation order under the Immigration and Refugee Act, a consequence he was unaware of at sentencing.

The Crown did not oppose the variation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that immigration consequences are a relevant consideration and the variation would not disserve the fitness of the sentence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that the appeal did not raise a question of law alone.

As a result, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and it was quashed.