Brian McCall

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his civil action for damages arising from his arrest on February 13, 2013.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as time-barred, finding that the limitation period for battery and false arrest claims crystallized on the date of arrest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that where a battery action is a mirror image of criminal charges, the discovery date is when the criminal proceedings conclude, not when the arrest occurs.

The appellant's action, commenced May 13, 2016, was within two years of the October 22, 2015 conclusion of the criminal charges via peace bond and therefore not time-barred.

The plaintiff sued police for battery, illegal search, wrongful arrest and detention, Charter breaches, and malicious prosecution.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that all claims except malicious prosecution were statute-barred by the two-year limitation period, and the malicious prosecution claim failed because the criminal proceedings did not terminate in the plaintiff's favour due to his entry into a peace bond.

The court dismissed the claims for battery, illegal search, wrongful arrest, detention, and Charter breaches as time-barred, finding the plaintiff knew of the injury and the appropriateness of a civil action at the time of arrest.

The court also dismissed the malicious prosecution claim, holding that entering into a peace bond does not constitute a termination of proceedings in the plaintiff's favour, and there was no evidence of improper motive by the Crown or police in offering the peace bond.

The appellant, a 16-year-old, was rendered paraplegic after falling from a tree in a municipal park.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the municipality's monitoring of the park was reasonable and the danger of falling from a tree was obvious.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming there is no duty to warn of such an obvious and self-evident danger.

The Court also dismissed the appeal regarding costs awarded against the Family Law Act claimants, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's discretion.

The defendants brought a Rule 21 motion to determine questions of law regarding applicable limitation periods and proper parties in an action for damages arising from a municipal drain.

The court held that the limitation period in s. 111 of the Drainage Act applies only to proceedings before a referee, not the Superior Court, meaning s. 45 of the former Limitations Act applied to the plaintiffs' claims.

The court also found that the one-year limitation period under s. 46 of the Professional Engineers Act applied to the claims against the engineering defendants.

Finally, the court determined that under s. 79 of the Drainage Act, the municipality is strictly liable for damages caused by the condition of drainage works, precluding claims against the other defendants.

The plaintiffs contracted HIV from the defendant after he had unprotected sex with them without disclosing his status.

The plaintiffs sued the Windsor Health Unit and the Windsor Police for negligence, alleging they knew of the risk the defendant posed but failed to take steps to prevent it.

The health unit and police moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing they owed no private law duty of care to the plaintiffs.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that the issue of whether a duty of care existed was complex and required a full trial to determine proximity and policy considerations.

On a summary judgment motion in long-running drainage litigation, the moving defendants sought dismissal on limitation grounds and substantial indemnity costs.

The responding plaintiffs opposed and sought related procedural relief, including amendment of pleadings to particularize nuisance and to plead discoverability and fraudulent concealment.

The court held that the record disclosed multiple genuine issues requiring a trial, including disputed facts regarding design, construction, disclosure obligations, and the interaction of potentially applicable statutory limitation regimes.

Summary judgment was dismissed, leave to further amend the amended statement of claim was granted, and the matter was directed to proceed expeditiously toward trial.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sued the defendant driver.

The defendant later brought third party proceedings against two municipalities, alleging snow banks obstructed her view.

The plaintiff sought to amend her statement of claim to add the municipalities as defendants after the three-month limitation period under the Municipal Act had expired.

The motions judge dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application of the discoverability principle to postpone the limitation period is a question of fact to be determined at trial.

The municipalities were added as defendants with leave to plead the limitation period.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits for mileage and meal expenses incurred by his fiancée.

The parties attended mediation, and the mediator issued a report indicating all issues were resolved.

The applicant subsequently applied for arbitration, claiming a dispute over the time frame of the expenses.

The arbitrator dismissed the application, finding that the issues in dispute had been settled at mediation and therefore mediation had not failed, which is a statutory prerequisite for commencing arbitration under the Insurance Act.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits from Wawanesa, who denied coverage alleging the policy was void due to misrepresentation and had been terminated prior to the accident.

The applicant then applied to Guarantee, the insurer of the other vehicle, who argued Wawanesa was responsible.

The arbitrator held that Ontario Regulation 283/95 did not apply retroactively to this dispute.

The arbitrator further found that Wawanesa failed to properly terminate the policy because the premium refund did not accompany the notice of termination as required by statutory condition 12 of the Insurance Act.

Additionally, the applicant's misrepresentations did not render the policy void ab initio for the purpose of statutory accident benefits.

Wawanesa was ordered to pay the benefits.

The appellant was involved in a minor motor vehicle collision.

Following the collision, the other driver assaulted the appellant with a cellular telephone.

The appellant claimed statutory accident benefits, arguing the assault was an 'accident' caused directly or indirectly by the use or operation of an automobile.

The arbitrator dismissed the claim.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate confirmed the arbitrator's decision, finding that the use or operation of the automobile merely created an atmosphere of hostility and did not have a sufficient causal relationship to the injuries sustained in the subsequent assault.

The applicant was involved in a minor motor vehicle collision with another driver.

After both vehicles stopped, an altercation ensued, and the other driver struck the applicant in the head with a cellular telephone.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits.

The arbitrator applied the purpose and chain of causation tests, finding that the assault did not result from the ordinary and well-known activities to which automobiles are put, and the chain of causation was broken by new and independent acts.

The injuries were not caused by an 'accident' under the Schedule.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought accident benefits.

The arbitrator held that the applicant's pre-accident income included cash payments and food (beef and milk) received from his father in exchange for his work on the family farm, as these constituted 'income' under subsection 12(7) of the No-Fault Benefits Schedule.

However, the arbitrator dismissed the applicant's claim for reimbursement of the cost of hiring farm workers to replace his labour, finding that these were business expenses rather than rehabilitation expenses under clause 6(1)(f).

The applicant was awarded interest on overdue benefits and his expenses for the arbitration.