Daniel Zacks

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion for leave to continue his action against his former defence counsel, a Crown attorney, and the Attorney General, alleging conspiracy and malicious prosecution arising from his 2014 arrest and subsequent criminal proceedings.

The defendants brought cross-motions to set aside being noted in default.

The court lifted the defaults on consent.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for leave under section 17 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, finding the action was likely statute-barred and there was no reasonable possibility the claims could succeed, as the evidence demonstrated good faith by the Crown and effective representation by defence counsel.

The respondents purchased a property in 2021 and discovered significant foundation defects in a dwelling constructed between 1986 and 1987.

They sued the appellant municipality in 2022 for negligent supervision of the construction.

The motion judge dismissed the municipality's summary judgment motion, finding that the municipality had an ongoing duty to monitor the open building permit, which constituted a continuous omission tolling the 15-year ultimate limitation period under s. 15(6)(a) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a continuous act or omission requires successive or repetitive actionable conduct, which was absent here.

The claim was therefore statute-barred by the ultimate limitation period.

The Court also noted the motion judge erred in recognizing a novel duty to monitor without conducting an Anns/Cooper analysis.

The court dismissed two actions by will beneficiaries against the drafting lawyer for negligence, holding that the claims were statute-barred by the 15-year ultimate limitation period in section 15(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the limitation period began to run from the date of the negligent drafting, not the testator’s death, and that no statutory or common law exception applied.

The court also addressed the application of the Trustee Act and concluded that the two-year limitation period for estate claims did not revive or extend the beneficiaries’ claims.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal two previous orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the amount of $2,237.40.

The Township of McMurrich Monteith brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss a negligence claim by the plaintiffs, William and Emily Huether, on the grounds that the limitation period had expired.

The plaintiffs alleged the Township was negligent for failing to continuously monitor an open building permit file and conduct necessary inspections for a house built in 1986, whose foundation was failing.

The Township argued its duty ended with construction or permit closure in 1988, making the claim statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the Township had a continuous duty to monitor its open permit file until the building was substantially complete and met occupancy conditions, which never occurred.

Therefore, the ultimate limitation period under s. 15(2) of the Limitations Act did not apply, and s. 15(6) for continuous omissions applied.

The Township's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The proposed defendant, Trisan, brought a motion to compel the plaintiff's lawyer to answer questions refused during cross-examination on an affidavit filed in support of a motion to amend the statement of claim.

The refused questions related to instructions the lawyer received from the plaintiff regarding the timing of adding Trisan as a defendant.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the questions were properly refused on the basis of solicitor-client privilege and that the plaintiff's post-discovery litigation strategy was irrelevant to the application of the limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

This solicitor negligence action involved a motion brought by the self-represented plaintiff seeking orders for production of a former lawyer's file and retainer agreements, further particulars of the statement of defence, and a stay of proceedings pending review of a prior order removing the defendants as counsel.

The court dismissed all requested relief, finding the production requests premature and the particulars unnecessary as they sought evidence rather than material facts.

The request for a stay was also denied as premature.

The court imposed a modified discovery plan proposed by the defendants.

The defendants, an appraisal service, brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss a negligence action by the plaintiff mortgage financing company, MCAP, on the basis that the action was commenced beyond the applicable limitation period.

MCAP alleged that the defendants negligently overvalued a property in a 2012 appraisal, leading to a loss on a 2013 mortgage loan.

The court found that MCAP had sufficient knowledge to discover its claim by June 15, 2016, or at the latest, September 6, 2016, when it received various post-default valuations and opinions questioning the original appraisal's accuracy.

The court rejected MCAP's argument that its internal protocol justified delaying discovery until the property sale was complete or a retrospective valuation was obtained.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed as statute-barred.

This is an appeal concerning the application of limitation periods to tort claims, including sexual assault, against a police officer.

The motion judge had dismissed the appellant's motions to strike and for summary judgment, finding that the sexual assault allegations triggered s. 16(1)(h) of the Limitations Act, 2002, and that s. 16(1.3) extended this to related torts due to the officer's position of trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision regarding the application of s. 16(1.3) to claims against the perpetrator and related torts, but set aside the declaration that no limitation period applied to all claims, stating this ultimate determination should be left to the trial judge.

The appeal regarding costs was dismissed, affirming the motion judge's award.

The court dismissed a motion for leave to appeal the order of Justice Lemon dated June 22, 2021.

As no costs submissions were received from the parties, no costs were awarded.

The appellant, Gordon Dunk Farms Ltd., appealed a summary judgment decision that found its action for negligence and breach of contract against the respondents (designers, contractors, and concrete workers) was statute-barred due to the expiration of the limitation period.

The action stemmed from the collapse of a hog barn.

The motion judge found that the appellant's principals knew or ought to have known the material facts constituting their claim by May 12, 2014, more than two years before the action was commenced on May 24, 2016.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that a "claim" under the Limitations Act, 2002, does not require knowledge of every specific act or omission, but rather sufficient facts to draw a plausible inference of liability.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the action was statute-barred against all respondents.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend the statement of claim to correct an alleged misnomer, seeking to substitute his mother as the plaintiff after the limitation period had expired.

A previous motion to add the mother as a plaintiff had been dismissed.

The court dismissed the misnomer motion, finding that the original naming of the plaintiff was intentional and tactical, not an error.

Furthermore, the court held that the motion constituted an abuse of process because it relied on evidence that contradicted the plaintiff's position on the prior motion.

The defendant insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing it was brought outside the one-year limitation period set out in the Insurance Act and the standard automobile insurance policy.

The plaintiff argued the claim was not for breach of contract, but for breach of the insurer's independent duty of good faith, which is subject to the basic two-year limitation period.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that based on the pleadings, the bad faith claim is separate and distinct from a claim under the insurance contract, and therefore falls outside the one-year limitation period.

Two groups of defendants brought summary judgment motions arising from a dispute over festival food and alcohol catering and alleged municipal interference.

The court applied the summary judgment framework and found the evidentiary record sufficient to resolve the matter without a trial.

It held the plaintiffs failed to establish an enforceable long-term oral contract or any viable negligence or negligent misrepresentation claim against the festival defendants, and further held there was no basis for personal liability against the individual directors.

The claims against the mayor and municipality were also dismissed as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and, in any event, unsupported by evidence of bad faith or negligence under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The appellant purchased an electric vehicle and later discovered its range was significantly lower than advertised.

He communicated with the respondents for months before discovering they had secretly lowered the advertised range on their website.

The Small Claims Court dismissed his misrepresentation claim on summary judgment, finding it was statute-barred.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the dismissal, holding that the Deputy Judge failed to apply the proper test for summary judgment and that the date of discoverability and potential tolling of the limitation period due to the respondents' conduct were triable issues.

On a motion for partial summary judgment, a defendant sought dismissal of the action against it as statute-barred under ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the limitation issue was a discrete issue suitable for partial summary judgment under the governing appellate framework.

The court found that the material facts supporting a negligence claim against the moving party were known, or ought reasonably to have been known, when counsel received and reviewed the police materials, not when a later witness interview was obtained.

As the claim against the moving party was deemed commenced more than two years after that discovery date, the action against that defendant was dismissed.

The defendant, Recipe Unlimited Corporation, moved to strike the plaintiff's (Angus Inc.) Statement of Claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b), alleging failure to plead material facts for claims of inducing breach of contract, intentional interference with economic relations, and "misrepresentation in the marketplace." The court dismissed the motion regarding inducing breach of contract and intentional interference, finding the pleadings sufficient.

However, the claim for "misrepresentation in the marketplace" interpreted as injurious falsehood, was struck with leave to amend due to insufficient particulars of malice and intent to induce non-dealing.

The plaintiffs and the defendant police officer provided written submissions on costs following the plaintiffs' successful motion for leave to amend their statement of claim.

The defendant argued the plaintiffs' submissions were late, but the court found them timely under the Rules of Civil Procedure as the deadline fell on a weekend.

Although the plaintiffs were successful on the motion, the court expressed concern over the timing of the new, more serious allegations of battery and sexual assault, which the defendant argued were an attempt to circumvent the Limitations Act.

Consequently, the court declined to award costs immediately to the successful plaintiffs, instead fixing costs at $6,500 payable in the cause.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to add causes of action for battery and sexual assault, and sought a publication ban to protect their identities.

The defendant police officer opposed the timing of the amendment, arguing his outstanding summary judgment motion should be heard first, and sought costs thrown away.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend immediately, finding no non-compensable prejudice, and ordered a publication ban due to the sexual nature of the allegations.

The court also awarded the defendant $2,000 in costs thrown away for the need to redraft his pleadings.

An appeal from a trial judgment in which the trial judge found that an employee, who held the position of Assistant Vice President of Campus Services and Building Operations, had misappropriated nearly one million dollars from York University through various fraudulent schemes between 2007 and 2009.

The employee was terminated without cause and paid a severance package of $696,166 with mutual releases after vehemently denying any wrongdoing.

York subsequently discovered the full extent of the misconduct and sued to rescind the severance agreement and recover the stolen funds.

The trial judge found that the employee had fraudulently misrepresented his innocence and that the claim was not barred by the limitations period.

The appeal was dismissed.