Erin Stoik

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Colin Patrick Murphy, finding that the motion judge erred by compelling Murphy to testify during his own civil contempt proceedings, in violation of section 11(c) of the Charter.

The compelled testimony was improperly used to support a finding of contempt and to justify a sentence of incarceration.

The Court held that section 11(c) applies to civil contempt proceedings, including sentencing, and prohibits testimonial compulsion once contempt is alleged.

The finding of contempt for failing to produce deleted data and the sentence were set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new sentencing hearing on the admitted acts of contempt.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Sutherland J. dated July 24, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs in the amount of $4,520.56 to the responding party.

This is an appeal concerning the application of limitation periods to tort claims, including sexual assault, against a police officer.

The motion judge had dismissed the appellant's motions to strike and for summary judgment, finding that the sexual assault allegations triggered s. 16(1)(h) of the Limitations Act, 2002, and that s. 16(1.3) extended this to related torts due to the officer's position of trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision regarding the application of s. 16(1.3) to claims against the perpetrator and related torts, but set aside the declaration that no limitation period applied to all claims, stating this ultimate determination should be left to the trial judge.

The appeal regarding costs was dismissed, affirming the motion judge's award.

The plaintiff parents sought an ex parte Mareva injunction to freeze funds they had previously gifted to their adult daughter, alleging she was dissipating the funds under the negative influence of her boyfriend.

The parents claimed the funds were held in trust or subject to a binding agreement restricting their use.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried or irreparable harm.

The court held that the daughter was the sole legal and beneficial owner of the funds upon turning 18, precluding the existence of a trust, and that any subsequent agreement regarding the funds' use was not legally binding or would only yield nominal damages.