Ronald P. Bohm

The plaintiffs sought leave under Rules 53.03(4) and 53.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to deliver two further expert reports—an orthopaedic assessment and a future care cost report—after the pre-trial conference had been completed.

The court reviewed the applicable rules and relevant case law, ultimately finding that the plaintiffs failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the late delivery of both reports.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

This decision addresses an evidentiary dispute during a trial regarding the admissibility of post-assessment medical reports through a defendant fact witness, Dr. McPherson.

The defendants sought to introduce reports created after Dr. McPherson's last assessment of the plaintiff, Jeremy Veran, to demonstrate improvement in symptoms.

The plaintiffs objected, arguing Dr. McPherson had not seen these documents and was not an expert witness.

The court ruled that documents not seen or received by Dr. McPherson, and not directly relevant to his care of the plaintiff, could not be introduced through him as a fact witness, even if they were part of the joint book of documents.

The defendants brought a motion to address two issues: the admissibility of opinions in two plaintiff expert reports (Miyanji and Levin) and the admissibility of evidence from five lay witnesses.

The court ruled that portions of the Miyanji and Levin reports that did not respond to specific "Defence Expert Reports" or introduced new standard of care issues were inadmissible due to late service and lack of reasonable explanation.

The motion to exclude the lay witnesses was dismissed as premature, with the court stating that the admissibility of their evidence, particularly any opinion evidence, should be assessed at the time it is tendered at trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking several orders before trial, including dismissal of claims against certain defendants, leave to amend their statement of claim, preliminary determination of jury questions, and exclusion of expert evidence.

The court granted the dismissal of claims against the "Released Defendants" without costs, as it was previously agreed upon.

Leave was granted to file a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, as the proposed amendments were extensive and did not remove admissions.

The court also determined the format for jury questions, largely adopting the plaintiffs' approach for damages and requiring explanations for answers, emphasizing standard of care and "but for" causation.

The issue of expert evidence was adjourned to a later date.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to preclude the defendants from introducing evidence from fifteen expert reports served late in a medical malpractice action.

The court considered the admissibility under Rule 53.08, assessing whether there was a reasonable explanation for the late service and if granting leave would cause irreparable prejudice or undue delay.

The court allowed some reports as supplementary or responding reports, finding a general reasonable explanation for delay due to discovery issues and prior party understanding.

However, it excluded a vocational report that introduced new scenarios without prior notice and a neuropsychological report, reiterating a previous ruling that no neuropsychological impairment issue was pleaded or supported by evidence, and its introduction would cause significant prejudice and necessitate trial adjournment.

This is an appeal in a class action concerning an infectious disease outbreak at a pain care centre.

The appellant, Dr. Stephen James, challenged the trial judge's findings of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and the application of the limitation period, as well as the award of punitive damages and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusions that Dr. James breached the standard of care by failing to consistently use aseptic technique and to report/investigate infections.

The court affirmed the use of statistical evidence to establish a rebuttable presumption of causation for the class, and found no error in the breach of fiduciary duty or the appropriateness of punitive damages.

The appeal on costs, including the order for Dr. James to pay the successful co-defendant nurses' costs, was also dismissed.

This appeal concerned proposed class actions against auto insurers for improperly deducting HST from statutory accident benefits (SABs) and against the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) for alleged regulatory failures.

The motion judge had dismissed claims against insurers due to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) under s. 280 of the Insurance Act, but allowed claims against FSCO to proceed.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming the LAT's exclusive jurisdiction over SAB disputes and affirming the court's jurisdiction over tort claims against the regulator.

The court also refused leave to appeal the motion judge's costs order, finding it within his discretion.

This appeal concerned proposed class actions against auto insurers for improperly deducting HST from statutory accident benefits (SABs) and against the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) for alleged regulatory failures.

The motion judge had dismissed claims against insurers due to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) under s. 280 of the Insurance Act, but allowed claims against FSCO to proceed.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming the LAT's exclusive jurisdiction over SAB disputes and affirming the court's jurisdiction over tort claims against the regulator.

The court also refused leave to appeal the motion judge's costs order, finding it within his discretion.

In a class action alleging bacterial infections from epidural injections, the defendant physician, Dr. James, moved for documentary discovery and oral examinations of class members.

The court, considering the plaintiff's novel epidemiological causation theory, granted further documentary production for relevant, non-duplicative information.

However, it denied oral examinations for most class members, ordering written interrogatories for a selected sample instead, citing concerns about litigation delay, expense, and the passive role of class members.

The representative plaintiff could be re-examined orally.

This is a costs endorsement following a ten-day trial where judgment was granted in favour of the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's action and allowing the defendant Martha Stirpe's counterclaim.

The court fixed costs on a partial indemnity scale, rejecting the defendants' claim for substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49.10(2) and confirming that "costs in the cause" for a prior summary judgment motion and appeal meant costs were awarded to the successful party in the main action.

The court also found the hourly rates for lead counsel and the inclusion of a law clerk's attendance at trial to be reasonable.

The court conducted a case management conference in a medical malpractice action initiated in 2011.

The plaintiffs' renewed request to schedule a partial summary judgment motion against one physician defendant on liability was denied due to its partial nature, previous dismissal, and the plaintiffs' breach of an order to set the action down for trial.

The court provided specific directions for the action's progression, including allowing the plaintiffs to file a motion to extend time for setting down for trial, noting the discontinuance against Nurse Defendants, and scheduling further discussions on a de bene esse examination and expert report deadlines.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of expert medical evidence from Dr. Harmeet Gill, an ophthalmologist, in a medical malpractice trial.

The plaintiffs sought to have Dr. Gill testify on the standard of care for ophthalmologists, diagnosis and treatment of orbital cellulitis, the general standard of care for physicians dealing with orbital cellulitis (including emergency room and infectious disease specialists), and causation.

The defendants objected to Dr. Gill testifying outside his specialization and on causation.

The court admitted Dr. Gill's evidence regarding the standard of care for ophthalmologists, general physician knowledge (e.g., sepsis identification), and multidisciplinary team communication and record-keeping, finding it relevant and necessary to the plaintiffs' theory of the case.

However, the court excluded Dr. Gill's opinions on causation, as he admitted lacking expertise on the ultimate outcome of septic patients.

The plaintiff, Michel Drakoulakos, sued his daughter, Martha Stirpe, her husband, Mark Stirpe, and their company, 1166504 Ontario Limited, claiming beneficial ownership of a company share and its assets (taxis and investments) registered in his daughter's name, asserting a resulting trust.

He also sought alternative relief based on unjust enrichment and constructive trust.

The defendants counterclaimed for $49,000 withdrawn by the plaintiff from the daughter's credit cards.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action, finding that the transfer of the company share and its initial asset (a taxi) was a gratuitous gift from the parents to the daughter, rebutting the presumption of resulting trust.

The court accepted the defendants' evidence that promissory notes signed by the daughter were for protection in case of divorce, not to create a debt.

The plaintiff's alternative claims were dismissed as unpleaded and unsupported by evidence.

The court allowed the daughter's counterclaim for $49,000, which the plaintiff conceded.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order granting the respondents leave to amend their statement of claim to substitute the names of three doctors for "Dr. John Doe Anesthesiologist." The motion judge relied on the doctrine of misnomer and applied the "litigating finger" test, finding that the doctors would have known the claim was directed at them based on the notice of action, medical records, and their status as anesthesiologists.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error in the alternative finding based on the notice of action served within the limitation period.

The plaintiffs sought costs for undertakings and refusals motions brought against several defendants in a medical malpractice action.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $6,800 in costs against five defendant physicians who failed to answer undertakings until after the motion was served.

However, the court awarded costs of $3,257.64 to another defendant physician who was successful on the single refusal argued and had answered undertakings promptly.

No costs were awarded against two other defendants who resolved their issues prior to the hearing.

The defendant hospital brought two motions: one to enforce an alleged settlement (a Pierringer Agreement) and another for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim.

The court dismissed the motion to enforce the settlement, finding that while the parties had agreed on the settlement amount, essential terms regarding document production and witness cooperation remained unresolved.

The court also dismissed the summary judgment motion, concluding that competing expert evidence regarding the nursing standard of care and whether the nurses' actions contributed to the plaintiff's compartment syndrome created genuine issues requiring a trial.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for a declaration that his daughter holds assets in a numbered company in trust for him.

The motion judge had characterized the claim as involving a resulting trust and found it statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that no limitation period applies to claims against a trustee of a resulting trust for property still in the trustee's possession.

The court also found it appropriate to entertain the appellant's new argument on appeal, as it raised a pure question of law and the record provided a complete evidentiary basis for determination.

This costs endorsement followed successful summary judgment motions by the Bachly Defendants, the Township of Oro-Medonte, and the third party W.R. Hodgson, dismissing the plaintiffs' grading claims and the Bachly Defendants' third-party claim against Hodgson.

The court assessed the reasonableness and proportionality of the costs sought by the successful parties against the plaintiffs.

It determined that the plaintiffs were liable for the costs of the Bachly Defendants and the Township, and also for the third party Hodgson's costs, applying principles that allow for third-party costs against an unsuccessful plaintiff when the third-party proceedings were a natural and inevitable consequence of the plaintiff's action.

The court fixed specific amounts for partial indemnity costs for each successful party.

The plaintiffs brought claims for lot grade deficiencies against the defendants (Bachly Investments Inc., 411931 Ontario Ltd. o/a Heights of Moonstone, The Township of Oro-Medonte) and a third party claim was brought by the Bachly Defendants against W.R. Hodgson.

The defendants and third party brought summary judgment motions to dismiss these claims, primarily arguing they were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, and that there was no evidence of professional negligence against Hodgson.

The court granted the summary judgment motions, finding that the plaintiffs' grading claims were statute-barred as they knew or ought to have known of the issues by summer/fall 2010, and that the plaintiffs failed to provide expert evidence establishing a breach of standard of care or causation against Hodgson.

The court also found that a prior release only covered a specific driveway issue and not the broader grading claims.